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ABSTRACT
Cambodia went through diverse social, political and economic events -  
colonialism, civil war and market neoliberalism -  in recent histories. All these events 
have caused tremendous social disruptions and changes. As part of the social changes, 
we see subtle changes in the way Cambodian men configure masculinities -  gender 
practices in relation to women as well as other men -  both in family and public 
spheres.
Domestic Violence (DV), particularly men's violence against their wives, in 
Cambodia coincides with the country's abrupt social changes. In particular, DV has 
become a visible phenomenon in contemporary time. The trend of DV is increasing 
despite an increasing number of anti-DV programmes.
Using Archival Documents and Life Histories, this thesis (i) explores Khmer 
masculinities that emerged in the course of Cambodia's colonial rule (1863-1954) and 
during the increased militarisation and civil war (from early 1970s to early 1990s); (ii) 
identifies masculinities that Cambodian men have constructed in contemporary 
society; (iii) studies the configuration and reconfiguration of masculinities by the 
former perpetrators of DV, and (iv) provides suggestions for policy and practice on 
DV.
The archival documents suggest that the gender regimes of French colonial 
administration (1863-1954) promoted patriarchy in matrilineal Cambodian families by 
promoting men as the head of the family and assigning men as the sole breadwinner.
ii
Nine full-length case studies of men’s lives are presented in this thesis. The 
life histories of men suggest that Cambodian men in contemporary society are diverse 
and dynamic in the construction of masculinities. Despite divergence and change, 
generally speaking ‘a man is the head of the family who holds power over the family’ 
-the patriarchal gender order established during colonial rule remains central in the 
construction of their masculinities. But men's gender role of providing the main 
support to the family matters to an extent that can mitigate the patriarchal gender 
order. Personal capabilities in relation to the changing labour market, income earned 
from work, and gender regimes in workplaces all mediate what kinds of masculinities 
they construct in relation to intra-family gender relations.
Based on the configuration of masculinities by the former perpetrators of DV 
in different periods of their lives, it can be argued that though men perpetrate violence 
against their wives within patriarchal and hierarchal family power relations, the 
violence takes place within assumptions that men should provide the main support to 
the family -a  specific pattern of the gender division of labour installed in Cambodian 
society historically. Men's tasks of providing the main support to the family, and their 
authority over the family are reciprocal. If they exert power as the head of family 
without providing support, their authority is challenged. At this point violence is 
likely to begin. DV prevention programmes need to take account of this historically- 
produced gender dynamic.
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P A RT I
PRELIMINARIES
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
Ranking 139th in the human development index in 20111, Cambodia is one of 
the poorest countries in the world with 30.1% population living under the national 
poverty line. Gender inequality in the country is indexed at 99 in the world rankings. 
The GDP per capita is US$1,915 (UNDP, 2011). Almost 90% of the country’s 
population live in rural areas and there is a very high level of inequality of income and 
livelihood between rural and urban areas.
The Cambodian economy is mainly agrarian although industrial and service 
sectors are emerging since Cambodia became a member of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) in October 2004. Through becoming a member state of WTO, 
Cambodia moved from a command economy towards becoming a neo-liberal 
economy when it opened its market for the free-flow of capital, hoping to attract 
foreign direct investment. Most of the economic growth is urban-centric and this 
growth seldom trickles down to rural areas (UNDP, 2004).
1 Human Development Report 2011, UNDP.
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Cambodia enjoys a high degree of ethnic homogeneity, with 90% Khmer, 5% 
Vietnamese, 1% Chinese and 4% other populations . The Khmer marriage and family 
system is still largely matrilocal -  the common practice in pre-colonial Cambodia.
Cambodian history records a great civilisation followed by colonialism, 
decades of civil war and finally political stability. The great Angkorian Empire 
underpinned Cambodia’s great civilisation between the ninth and fourteenth centuries 
but the Empire collapsed in the fifteenth century under pressure from the Ayutthaya 
and Champa Kingdoms. The status of women was equal to that of men, both in family 
and social life, until fourteenth century. They had full freedom in all aspects of life 
and held important positions in social and political institutions in Khmer society 
(Thierry, 1955). Cambodia came under French power in 1863 and was ruled by 
France until 1954.
Cambodian politics started to face internal conflicts after independence was 
gained from French colonialism in the 1950s. After being a war zone in the Second 
Indochina War (popularly known as the Vietnam War), the entire nation experienced 
extreme civil strife from 1975 to 1979 with the advent of the Democratic Kampuchea 
(DK) regime. With the brief invasion by the Vietnamese Army, the Khmer Rouge 
regime was dismantled and a new regime, the People’s Republic of Kampuchea 
(PRK) was installed in 1979. Until the Paris Peace Accord in 1991, conflicts 
continued between political factions of the DK and the armed forces of PRK. The 
Cambodian nation first elected a democratic government in 1993 under the
2 CIA World Fact book.
Indochina was the part of the French colonial empire located in today’s Southeast Asia. The 
Indochina region under the French was divided between Tonkin (capital Hanoi), Annam (Da Lat) and 
Cochinchina (Saigon) in present-day Vietnam plus Cambodia and Laos.
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supervision of the United Nations (UNTAC). Since then, Cambodia has observed 
three democratic national elections and the country is experiencing relative peace, 
with Cambodia connected to the world both culturally and economically.
A lot of social, cultural, economic and political changes in Cambodian society 
took place through these historical events. Gender order and the codes of the 
Cambodian people in family and social life were tremendously transformed by legal, 
administrative and political reform by the French colonial power. Colonial taxation 
and the introduction of Corvée labour and agricultural policies gave rise to peasant 
revolts (Vickery, 1986), changed the living standard of the peasant class (Chandler, 
1983), and promoted patriarchy in Cambodian families (Frieson, 2000) through the 
adoption of the Code Civil Cambodgien (1920).
Civil war created many social changes and upheavals. Many survivors from 
the Khmer Rouge regime were left with psychological traumas. Many children grew 
up without proper parenting and the social system and its institutions experienced 
total collapse (Kent, 2007). The Khmer Rouge destroyed the old system of family 
social relationships which had bound people together and operated through well- 
understood obligations. New patterns of social relations emerged in the post-Khmer 
Rouge era. The disproportionate killing of adult men altered demographic patterns, 
with populations up to 70 per cent female in some areas. This shift brought changes in 
marriage, residence patterns and gender roles (Ledgerwood et al. 1995).
The country’s new neoliberal market economy, since its membership of World 
Trade Organisation (WTO), has brought new social, cultural and economic changes 
with the traditional social fabric once again being disrupted (Boike, 2007). New 
businesses and occupations are emerging following an influx of foreign direct 
investment.
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The gender division of labor (GDL) and gender relations that are typical in 
Cambodian society are changing in course of the country’s economic shift. Typically, 
GDL is complementary and flexible, with both men and women performing a range of 
productive tasks. Among the rural majority, women's economic contribution was 
mainly concentrated in subsistence family farming. The typical gender relations in 
Cambodian society are that men accord greater status as the head of the family and 
women exercise considerable autonomy (Ebihara, 1968).
With the growth of manufacturing industries, particularly the garment 
factories, more and more women are entering formal paid work, meaning women are 
increasingly taking on a breadwinning role. The changing economic base of women's 
live is also impacting intra-household gender relations. Women with regular income 
from waged labor enjoy greater freedom in occupational choice, mobility, 
contraception, household decision-making, and personal wellbeing. But it seems that 
the pattern of GDL in unpaid household chores is not changing much as we see 
women aged 18-60 do three more hours of household work than men (Ministry of 
Women’s Affairs, 2008).
Households in rural areas are increasingly losing their jobs because of the 
acquisition of hundreds of thousands hectares of government land for export 
processing zones and foreign private investors4. This is affecting the rural and peasant 
livelihood. Transnational businesses are opening new avenues for corporate careers to 
many Cambodians (mainly men) and the neo-liberal economy has created new
4 Private ownership of land in Cambodia was abandoned during the civil war in 1975-79. It was 
declared to be government property during the post-conflict government. People use the land but they 
did not hold title over the land until recently when government introduced a land reformation project.
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businesses for the local Cambodians. Public sector management is also changing with 
the advent of neo-liberal economic policy.
In a rare empirical study of Khmer masculinity, interviewing thirty-four 
women and fifty-two men in Phnom Penh in 2006-2008, Jacobsen (2012) gives a 
snapshot of normative views held by Cambodians about the ‘good' and the 
‘successful' man. A good man upholds traditional traits of manhood: he is simple, 
dresses according to custom, thinks of others, and concentrates upon his work and 
family. On the other hand, a successful man is not bound by traits of a good man who 
asserts masculinity in the time-honoured traits. A successful man is expected to be 
wealthy, having a life plan, making correct decisions and holding higher social status. 
Jacobsen argues that the expectations for good and successful men are multiple, 
overlapping and often conflicting, and that men must struggle to negotiate or fail as 
men within these conflicting identities. She concludes that ‘Cambodian masculinity is 
unlikely to develop new models until cultural identity ceases to be as inherently 
bound up with the survival of a vision of Cambodia that is at odds with the process of 
globalisation.’ Her study does not, however, unfold how the social changes are 
influencing Khmer masculinities in terms of actual behaviour, or does it trace 
implications for intra-household gender relations, including domestic violence.
Domestic violence, particularly men's violence against their wives, has 
become more visible with the country's socio-economic changes. Domestic violence 
is now considered a social problem in Cambodia. The latest national demographic 
survey (NIPS, et. al., 2006) reveals that almost a quarter of married Cambodian 
women between the ages fifteen and forty-nine have experienced violence from their 
husbands. The Cambodia Gender Assessment -  a national report from the Ministry of
6
Women’s Affairs (2008) -  suggests that the prevalence of domestic violence in the 
country is not falling, and may even be rising5.
Neither the national survey and report, nor an independent paper (Kathryn and 
Jennifer, 2006) on domestic violence in Cambodia, explicitly addresses the interplay 
between domestic violence and masculinities in the changing socio-economic context. 
A recent study (GADC, 2010) attempted to examine the links between masculinities, 
gender and domestic violence. This study does not provide the historical background 
of particular patterns of masculinities such as men's patriarchal notions about family 
and family relationships. Nor does it address the dynamics of masculinities in relation 
to the significant economic and social changes that Cambodians have been 
encountering in recent decades.
No study has yet been conducted to explore the interplay between 
masculinities and domestic violence in a country that has experienced such a history 
of colonialism, civil war and globalization. In the developing world, despite the 
widespread prevalence of domestic violence, testing of competing theories about its 
causes has been very limited.
1.2 Purpose of the study
Gender-based violence is an acknowledged social problem globally. The 
overall objective of this study is to explore Khmer masculinities which emerged in 
course of country’s social changes and their implications for domestic violence.
Specifically, this thesis:
5 Cambodian government adopted an anti-domestic violence law in 2005 with the recognition of an 
increasing trend towards violence.
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(i) Explores Khmer masculinities that emerged in the course of Cambodia’s 
colonial rule (1863-1954) and during the increased militarisation and civil 
war (from the early 1970s to the early 1990s);
(ii) Identifies masculinities that Cambodian men have constructed in 
contemporary society;
(iii) Studies the configuration and reconfiguration of masculinities by the 
former perpetrators of DV ; and
(iv) Provides suggestions for policy and practice on DV.
1.3 Focus and plan of the thesis
This study looks at the construction of Khmer masculinities, particularly in 
relation to intra-family gender relations, that emerged in course of the country's social 
changes over a long period of time. It then explores the connection between 
masculinities and domestic violence. Historical documents (civil codes, administrative 
and policy documents) since the colonial era have been analysed to explore specific 
patterns of construction of Khmer masculinities and their legacy in the construction of 
contemporary masculinities. In order to examine contemporary Khmer masculinities, 
including the construction of masculinities in war time, the life histories of fifty men 
from different occupations and age groups have been studied. Life histories of a 
sample of former perpetrators of domestic violence who have been transformed into 
non-violent spouses after participating in the anti-DV programme are included.
The thesis consists of five parts. Part I provides background to the study.
Chapter Two consists of an overview of masculinities. This chapter provides a critical
overview of empirical work on masculinities, social, economic and political dynamics
in the construction of masculinity, and the relationship between masculinity and
domestic violence. Relevant empirical work is discussed and analysed in seven sub-
8
themes: masculinity -conceptual and definitional understanding, social construction 
of masculinity, revisiting masculinities among particular occupations, masculinity 
politics, women's paid work and men's negotiation of paid and unpaid work, 
theoretical debates on men and domestic violence, and methodological debates on 
interview of perpetrators of DV. Chapter Three introduces the methodology used in 
this study. It provides information about the data sources, research population, sample 
size, selection process, methods of data collection and analysis, and ethical issue.
The two chapters in Part II introduce the history of State and gender order in 
Cambodia: the colonial period and in post-independent Cambodia. Chapter Four 
discusses the establishment of the French Colonial Empire in Cambodia and the 
colonial rule regulated masculinities, gender order and family relationships. Two key 
colonial documents: Code Cambodgiens (1898) and Code Civil Cambodgien (1920) 
are examined critically and analysed discursively in this chapter. Chapter Five 
discusses increased militarisation, civil war, and social disruption in Cambodia in the 
period from the early 1970s to the early 1990s. It then discusses gender order during 
the war and times of civil conflict, and the construction of masculinities in a conflict 
situation. The discussion in this chapter is based on the historical documents and the 
life histories of men who were involved in the war and conflict in Cambodia.
Part III presents case studies of men from four groups to reveal the dynamics 
of Khmer masculinities in contemporary times. In particular, the case studies, used in 
this part, help to identify the themes or patterns of masculinities that are emerging 
among Cambodian men of today. Chapter Six provides a discussion of the 
masculinities of Cambodian men who are managers and business entrepreneurs. 
Chapter Seven shows how peasant masculinities re-assemble gender practices from
two eras of the country's history, the matrilocal marriage of the pre-colonial era and
9
the colonial concept of men as the family provider. Chapter Eight examines the 
dynamics of masculinities of urban workers who have moved to the city with the aim 
of earning a better income. Chapter Nine deals with the life histories of former 
perpetrators of domestic violence who are now non-violent. This chapter features the 
key aspects of their masculinities in both the violent and post-transformation periods 
of their lives.
Part IV discusses the issues that recur in the life histories of men from the four 
groups mentioned above. Chapter Ten discusses the issue of men's role in providing 
for the family and how they respond to their wives' outside paid work, with some men 
allowing and supporting their wives' outside work, while other men withdraw their 
wives from outside economic work. Chapter Eleven reveals men's relationships in the 
family and the reconfiguration of masculinities. Men's fathering skills, including 
virtual fathering are also explored in this chapter. Cultural interpretation of spousal 
rights within the family, gender division of labour, resources (including the personal 
capabilities of a spouse), and how best these resources or capabilities are being used in 
the labour market, and the gender regime in the workplace are all of concern to those 
men who need to configure and reconfigure their masculinities in daily life. Chapter 
Twelve reveals a specific pattern of post-conflict transition to masculinities that are 
peaceful and responsive and place an emphasis on the family.
Part V concludes the thesis by specific focus on the history of Khmer 
masculinities, the pluralities and dynamics of contemporary Khmer masculinities, and 
the connection of Khmer masculinities to the issue of domestic violence. This part also 
provides recommendations for policy and practice on DV.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Introduction
The discussion in this chapter begins with concepts and definitions of 
masculinity. The discussion then turns to social construction of masculinity. It, in 
particular, provides empirical evidences of masculinities that emerged in post­
colonial, post-conflict and neo-liberal economic settings in different social, cultural 
and geographical settings. The discussion then examines how men of rural and urban 
class settings configure masculinities.
The relationship between men and domestic violence is discussed in the 
following section. The discussion includes reviews of feminist theories, resource 
theories, demographic theories, integrated and ecological framework and structural 
theories. The next section reviews literatures on interview of former perpetrators of 
domestic violence, particularly the ambigiuities and contradictions that may arise 
when perpetrators’ self-account is used to weigh the changes they have made in post­
transformation period and to identify the reasons of their violence. Finally, the chapter 
concludes with themes that arise from literature reviews and are being addressed in 
this study.
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2.2 Masculinity -conceptual and definitional understanding
Generally, masculinity refers to a set of traits or patterns of behaviour that in a 
given society is considered typical for men. There is no fixed set of traits or attributes 
that can be labelled as being universally masculine. To Westwood (1997), masculinity 
exists in a plurality of forms which can be theorised as fluid and multiplex, and 
subject to changing contexts. Masculinity is composed of individual daily 
accomplishments that are constructed, negotiated and contested within the complex 
power relations of institutions, including the family, and related structures. 
Masculinities are constructed in many sites within which there may be competing 
understandings of masculinity; and these understandings can shift and change from 
time to time due to changing situations.
Masculinity is dynamic and can change over time, space and history. 
Masculinity needs to be practised within broader gender and social relations. Broader 
gender and social relations can be altered in the changing context of social institutions 
-  family, market and State. Today’s most practised and idealised masculinity can 
disappear in the future as social institutions adopt new structures.
Tolson (1977), a British sociologist who explores masculinity among working- 
class people, argues that men construct masculine identities from childhood and for 
this construction their fathers are their first role models. Fathers’ work and position in 
social and professional arenas are important differentiators in a son’s construction of 
masculinity. Tolson believes that masculinity is not simply the opposite of femininity. 
Masculinity, in his view, is more about psychological and cultural construction of 
gendered identities and expressions of these identities within and between different 
cultures.
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Morrell (2001), a South African historian who explores masculinity in colonial 
and apartheid Africa, suggests that masculinity is a specific gender identity belonging 
to a specific male person. Although the specific gender identity is developed using 
social processes and contexts, it does not necessarily mean that all men of that society 
possess the same identity. Individual men take up the identity which best fits, given 
their relative positions in social and gender relations. There is no prescribed procedure 
other than the determination to become a man.
According to Connell (2005, 2009), an Australian educationist and sociologist 
who was the first to talk about multiplicity of masculinity and trans-national business 
masculinity in the globalised world, defines masculinity as a configuration of gender 
practice. Configuration of gender practice is traditionally classified as personality or 
as personality traits by psychologists. Masculinity is about expressing gender in a 
culturally specific way. Connell (2005a) suggests that ‘masculinity is simultaneously 
a place in gender relations, the practice through which men and women engage that 
place in gender, and the effects of these practices in bodily experience, personality 
and culture' (p.71). Masculinity requires active engagement in practising gender. It is 
not something that someone ‘has' but that someone ‘does’ (Whitehead and Barrett, 
2001).
Connell (2005) further suggests that any masculinity is positioned in the
structures of a number of relationships simultaneously. Structures of relationships
include: power, production and cathexis. It means that structures of these relationships
are relevant to the configuration of gender practice. Masculinity is configured within a
unique structure of gender power relations -  patriarchy -which is characterised by an
overall subordination of women and domination by men. Similarly, masculinity is
constructed within an overall set of relations where men overwhelmingly do paid
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work and control resources and women do unpaid work. But this structure of power 
and production has been undermined since the women's liberation movement and 
consequent social, political and economic interventions in major institutions, 
particularly at State level.
Masculinities are plural and diverse. There is no single version of 
masculinities. Connell (2005) categorises masculinities as (i) hegemonic, (ii) 
complicit, (iii) subordinate, and (iv) marginalised. Hegemonic masculinity is ‘the 
configuration of gender practice which embodies the currently accepted answer to the 
problem of the legitimacy of patriarchy, which guarantees (or is taken to guarantee) 
the dominant position of men and the subordination of women' (p.77). Hegemonic 
masculinity is also adaptive to the context of a particular time without compromising 
the core value of patriarchy. Hegemonic masculinity does not necessarily need to use 
force or coercion to establish dominance.
Complicit masculinity refers to masculinity that enjoys patriarchal dividends 
like hegemonic masculinity without taking the risk and tension of gender relations 
conflict. Subordinate masculinity involves domination of a group of men over another 
group of men. This domination comes through a cultural ideal concerning gender 
relations and institutional power. Dominance of heterosexual men over gay men is an 
example of subordinate masculinity.
2.3 Social Construction of Masculinities
2.3.1 Masculinity as a social product
Like gender, masculinity is a social construct. Masculine identities are not
biologically developed, rather they are socially prescribed and ascribed. Human
agents are not free from social and cultural legitimacy in choosing identities and
behaviours. Dominant social discourses on gender criticise certain gender identity
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constructions and affirm others. Currently available or accepted masculinities need 
social scrutiny before they are accepted. According to Connell (2005), an exemplary 
masculinity is being produced as a cultural form which results from political struggle 
and defeat of existing alternatives. Masculinity is merged into organised social 
relations. It is an active social construction, a pattern of social conduct -  conduct that 
responds to the situation in which people find themselves (Connell, 2000).
Social institutions such as family, school, sport, politics, market and State 
produce and reproduce men’s and women's identities. The State is the most powerful 
single agent for change. The State creates gender categories and shapes them 
(Connell, 1990). It also simultaneously protects and changes the gender order 
(Morrell, 2001). Masculinity is not constructed in advance of social interaction with 
these institutions. Rather it is constructed through the interaction of these institutions. 
Structure (which is usually hierarchical, competitive, and target oriented) and the 
work culture of social institutions are involved in the construction of manhood.
Here is an example that shows how the interaction and structure of social 
institutions construct masculinity.
A study by Phillips (1980) reveals how colonial social processes in the 
twentieth century constructed masculinity around marriage and family life in New 
Zealand. He argues that white New Zealanders experienced a surplus number of men 
during the twentieth century because few European women arrived in New Zealand in 
the early colonial days. The surplus white men, however, gave rise to a turbulent 
masculine sub-culture. It posed a serious threat to social order at that time and in 
response the colonial administration adopted an agricultural policy to promote family- 
based agriculture. This policy resulted in family-centric masculinity organised
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through marriage. This particular pattern of masculinity has been reinforced over time 
in the New Zealand.
2.3.2 Colonial rule and formation of new masculinities in the colonies
European colonialism from the 15lh to the 20th century has brought tremendous 
changes in social, cultural, political, economic ideologies and practices among the 
colonised. Colonial processes and practices transformed the gender order of people in 
the colonies.
Nandy (1983) argues that until 1830, both the colonisers and colonised in 
British India had not realised the idea of colonial rule as being manly. It is noted that 
the British arrived on the Indian sub-continent in 1757 and departed in 1947. Until the 
1830s, British rulers came mainly from the feudal class and sexual politics were not 
central to colonial rule. But after 1830, the middle-class evangelical spirit became 
dominant in British rule. Class stratification became essential for colonial control of 
the local populations. British rule in colonial India started to create a hierarchy both 
between colonisers and colonised, and among the colonisers themselves. They 
labelled men of some specific ethnicities such as Bengali as effeminate and men of 
other ethnicities such as Pathan as hyper-masculine. This sort of ethnic distinction still 
affects Indian masculinity sixty years after the end of the colonial era.
The gendered practice of colonial empires in settlement, imposed economies
and administration gave rise to new gender markers. For example, as Connell (1993)
views, the colonial settlement which was mainly carried out by the men-only soldiers,
sailors, traders and administrators produced a frontier masculinity which combined a
notion of occupational segregation, egocentric individualism and violence. Similarly,
the colonial economies -  which were primarily based on plantation and mining,
maintained a strict gender division of labour: men in productive work and women in
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household services. Sometimes, women are left for reproduction of human labour in 
their home country. This type of gender division of labour introduced by the colonial 
empire was new to the colonised society in many instances. It gave men a new 
identity associated with the public realm and associated household providers with the 
money economy (Connell, 1993). Connell argues that colonial empire created two 
very different settings for the modernisation of masculinity among the local 
populations. The new structure of economies and the gender division of labour tended 
to individualise in the first case and rationalise in the second.
Hardin's (2002) discursive work on machismo provides a detailed account of 
how colonialism constructed specific forms of masculinity among Latin Americans. 
He argues that machismo is produced as a result of the specific processes and 
practices of Spanish colonial administration -  which began in the early sixteenth 
century. Machismo is the stereotypical masculinity attributed to Latin American men. 
characterized by an overt and active heterosexuality; aggressiveness; and a male 
bonding which includes physicality without generally questioning the male's 
heterosexuality.
According to Hardin, transformation of the sexuality of the indigenous 
population was an important tool of Spanish conquest, resulting in the construction of 
machismo. Homosexuality was present in the Latin American society in some extent 
before the conquest. But the Spanish colonial authority banned homosexuality. 
Individuals were even punished if they wore the dress of the opposite sex. Hardin 
concludes that repression and punishment by colonial rulers led the indigenous people 
to show/visualize heterosexuality. Strictness and an emphasis on heterosexuality 
gradually turned this emphasis into machismo.
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The gender order of the locals was another site of construction of machismo 
by Spanish conquest. After their arrival, the Spanish conquerors shaped and modified 
local gender roles and norms in line with their own standards. Hardin says, ‘when the 
Spanish arrived, they labelled everything based upon their own concepts of sexuality 
and gender roles’ (p.10). Local gender fluidity was abolished and replaced by strict 
gender norms and the social roles of Catholicism. The conquest stigmatised local 
men's traditional gender practices of sharing in household chores and respect women.
In his discursive study, Proschan (2002) explores how French colonial power 
and its associates contributed to the construction of contradictory and complex male 
and female identities in colonial Vietnam. French soldiers and administrators, 
missionaries, novelists, journalists and politicians characterised Vietnamese men as 
effeminate, hermaphroditic, impotent and inverted, and Vietnamese women as virile 
and hypersexualized.
Proschan's study is based on archival documents preserved from the first 
decades (1880s and 1890s) from the eastern entities of the French colony (Tonkin, 
Annam and Cochinchina). Archival documents include travellers’ accounts, 
ethnographers’ descriptions, administrators' guides, physicians’ monographs, 
journalists' reports, novels and literature that reflect the colonial view of Vietnamese 
sexuality at that time.
Colonial observers constructed sexes/genders and sexualities of Vietnamese
men and women in the areas of physicality including genitals, hairstyles and
costumes. They experienced difficulty in distinguishing the men from the women
physically. The males were perceived as womanly in physiognomy with an extra slim
bust; extreme fineness of joints, wrists, knees and ankles; misdistribution of hair -too
long and too much on the head and too little in other parts of the body; and lack of
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beards. Referring to the account of a French mariner in colonial Vietnam, Proschan 
says, ‘the physiognomy of the men is scarcely different from that of the women, since 
they have only very sparse beards; a few whiskers at the end of the chin' (p.440). 
Beardlessness of Vietnamese men was equated by the French men as a sign of 
incompleteness of manhood and even impotence. Even the French medical experts 
introduced a medical discourse in colonial Vietnam suggesting that beardlessness was 
an index of infertility. They introduced the discourse -Natura Glabrum Infecundrum' 
-  what is hairless is unfruitful by nature.
Vietnamese women, too, were perceived as incomplete and imperfect in terms 
of womanhood by colonial men and women. The local women were characterised as 
virile and hypersexualised. with large stature and narrow hips, stocky trunks and 
graceless busts. The French colonists' view of Vietnamese womanhood is reflected in 
the writing of a travelling Frenchwoman who wrote, ‘dresses herself almost like the 
man -that dream of our feminists -  she chews betel, smokes cigarettes, drinks 
tchoum-tchoum, and takes part in the most difficult of masculine labours' (p.442). 
Labelling local men as effeminate and local women as virile by the French colonial 
power was a tactic to create a hierarchy and establish dominance over the colonised. 
Proschan says, ‘by depicting the Vietnamese as gender-deviant -  the males as 
effeminate, the females as virile -the French colonials could justify their conquest and 
subjugation and the mission civilisatrice they arrogated to themselves' (p.459).
Gender, more specifically construction of particular patterns of masculinities, 
served as a key means for colonial power to establish and maintain their authority 
over the colonies. The literatures on colonialism and masculinities are important to 
study Khmer masculinities, particularly their link to the history, since Cambodia too 
was a colony for almost a century.
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2.3.3 Masculinities in war and conflict-situations
The relationship between masculinity and war is complex (Connell, 2000; 
Cockbum, 2010; Hutchings, 2012). Connell (2000) argues that masculinities are the 
forms in which many dynamics of violence take place. Although gender dynamics are 
not the whole story of war, they are involved to some extent. In earlier times, war 
could not take place without the physical presence of rival groups. Heroic masculinity 
was respected and idealised by the masses, and could be exemplary among post-war 
society.
But the heroic style of masculinity disappeared in the wake of high-tech war. 
The changing conditions of war require the armies to have more than one type of 
masculinity to be engaged (Connell, 2000). For example, the generals hold to a 
masculinity which is different from that of frontier soldiers. Maintaining more than 
one kind of masculinity (within a power hierarchy) is essential to maintaining 
command over the overall war situation. And wars in the contemporary world are the 
brainchild of world politics -  politics for the creation of a global market. Leaders of 
world politics do not hold to the same masculinity as the frontline soldiers. Rather 
they hold masculinity -  hegemonic masculinity -  which controls the rival 
nations/regimes into controlling armies of their own. We can argue, therefore, that 
war is a producer of masculinity, both during hostilities and in a post-war situation. It 
can give rise to protest masculinity (Connell, 2000) among invaded nations or 
societies that can potentially lead the victims to become aggressive and violent.
Cockburn (2010) links militarisation and war to three dimensions of power.
She suggests that economic power, ethnic or national power and gender power cause,
shape, achieve and reproduce militarisation and war. Hutchings (2012) argues that the
link between war and masculinity does not necessarily depend on the meaning of
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either masculinity or war but masculinity is linked to war in the way of providing a 
framework through which the war can be supported as a social practice and 
institution.
2.3.4 Post-conflict patterns in masculinity
Studies (Xaba 2001; Myrttinen 2005) on masculinities in post-conflict 
transitions give an overwhelming notion that former militias or soldiers often organise 
their masculinity around violence and notoriety in post-war times. Conflict and war 
leave these men without skills or education, which leaves them marginalised in a new 
post-war socio-political order. Finding no other course, they may follow war time 
habits, in order to survive in the new order.
Fernando, the main character of Xaba's (2001) study, is a typical example of 
how masculinity in conflict and transition is understood. Fernando, an African 
township youth, was treated as a ‘young lion' during the days of apartheid South 
Africa due to his struggle against the apartheid system. Many youths were recruited 
by political organisations such as the United Democratic Front (UDF) and the African 
National Congress (ANC) in the 1970s to strengthen the anti-apartheid campaign. As 
a result of this resistance campaign, a national unity government was formed in the 
early 1990s. The political transition also brought changes in society. The demand now 
was for respect for law and order, the restoration of public order, the presumption of 
paying for services, respect for State institutions, cooperation with police, and fighting 
crime.
Former ‘young lions' like Fernando, who were neither assimilated in the
national defence forces nor rehabilitated by the State, could not find employment as
they were left without any education at the end of the struggle. Being unemployed it
became hard for Fernando to find a place in the new gender order. Eventually he
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became a full-time gangster for survival, and came into confrontation with the police 
force. Finally he was killed by police.
Myrttinen’s (2005) study notes that the open conflict with Indonesian military 
forces was ended by Timor Leste’s independence in 1999. But the conflict has been 
domesticated in post-independence Timor Leste. Among Falintil -  the pro­
independence guerrillas -  after demobilisation a violent masculinity persisted, 
expressed in sexualised violence against their spouses and other women.
Thousands of Cambodian men were actively involved in the country's civil 
war that spanned from late 1960s to early 2000s. Many of them survived and are 
currently living in the society. What kinds of masculinities have they configured in 
war and post-war eras? The review of literatures in Sections 2.3.3 and 2.3.4 can 
provide empirical clues to study masculinities of Cambodian men who exclusively 
served as militias of Khmer Rouge and the armed forces of the People's Republic of 
Kampuchea (PRK).
2.3.5 Construction of masculinities in the nexus of neo-liberalism and
globalisation
Men can construct masculinity diversely in the nexus of neo-liberalism and 
globalisation. Connell (2009) provides an analysis of how neo-liberalism or 
globalisation gives rise to new masculinities. Her thesis is that neo-liberalism has 
created institutions such as transnational corporations, international states, global 
media and markets that operate on a global scale. These institutions have their own 
gender regimes. The gender regimes of these institutions create new gender orders in 
the areas of their operation. For example, transnational corporations have significant 
gender division of labour which are characterised by men in the management team
and women either at the front desk (in the service sector) or on a production line (in
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the manufacturing sector). The management team is strongly masculinised and 
characterised by men who are competitive, work-driven, and desperate for success. 
Toughness and dominance are central to the management team. Connell and Wood 
(2005) term the masculinity which characterises management teams of transnational 
companies as Transnational business masculinity'. The transnational business 
masculinity intensifies the discursive construction of masculinity in business sector.
Cases of men's construction of masculinities in the nexus of neo-liberalism 
and globalisation from two different geographical contexts are provided below.
Morrell (2001) documents how South African men responded to government’s 
gender equality policy -  generally advocated and imposed by international states -  
undertaken in the 1990s. Among other changes, significant number of women were 
elected to the national parliament and cabinet in the national election in 1994 and 
1999. 25% of Parliamentarians, including the Speaker of the House and three Cabinet 
Ministers, were women in the first democratic election in 1994. Morrell argues that 
South African men responded to the changing gender order in three ways -  reactively, 
progressively and accommodatingly -  in this situation of transition.
In response to the changing gender order, South African men. particularly 
white middle-class men, established solidarity groups to end discrimination against 
men, including black men, who were previously discriminated against by the whites. 
Men were organised through these groups to achieve the intended goal.
Some men are responding to the changing gender order progressively. They 
are supportive of women's rights and gender equality. They are attempting to 
challenge violent masculinities as being good role models, and they are raising 
awareness among other men. They are also organising their support in institutional
form. A number of men’s organisations have been established since the 1980s in
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South Africa to extend men’s support. Sonke Gender Justice Network is one of the 
leading men’s networks that support gender equality. Established in 2006, Sonke 
works to create the change necessary for men and women to enjoy equitable 
relationships (http://www.uenderiustice.oru.za/about-us/about-us/about-us, retrieved 
on 8 September 2012).
Some men neither react to, nor support actively, changing the gender order. 
They are creating a life-style which often goes between these two. In the changing 
life-style, they practice gender in ways that distinguish them from the ‘traditional' 
ones. At the same time, they do not let themselves be labelled as being supportive to 
the changing situation.
Alexeyeff (2008) explores the ‘styles of masculinity' Cook Islands men use to 
negotiate the economic imperatives that have arisen from neo-liberal economic reform 
undertaken by the Cook Islands government. In 1995, the Cook Islands experienced a 
serious economic crisis and entered into deep recession. In response, the government 
downsized the number of staff in government sectors, privatised many government 
services, and sold many government assets. Many men lost their jobs. As part of the 
economic reform, the Cook Islands government provided financial assistance (from a 
transition fund) to retrenched staff to develop private enterprise in some selected 
sectors. In this context, two patterns of masculinity emerged, called ‘dirty taro’ and 
‘entrepreneur' masculinity by Alexeyeff.
‘Dirty Taro' (or Repo Taro) is a term which is stereotypically used for men 
from outside the capital city, who work on the land and engage in manual work. It 
particularly refers to work in the wet taro plantations which leaves the workers 
covered with mud. In its derogative form, ‘Dirty Taro' refers to men who have no 
social position and importance.
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The ‘entrepreneur' masculinity is illustrated by the case of No'o. No'o owns a 
large piece of land where he grew taro before the economic reformation. With the aid 
of the transition fund he expanded his taro production, and exported taro to New 
Zealand. His business became hugely successful, and started travelling abroad. He 
gradually became the icon for other men in the country to follow. Men like No'o are 
often invited to business forums and appear in TV advertisements as ‘role models'. It 
is apparent that the Cook Islands society in the post reformation context emphasises 
an ‘entrepreneur' style of masculinity as the way for men to be successful. The new 
economic environment has facilitated the growth of the ‘entrepreneur' masculinity.
Cambodia has increasingly been globalised, both culturally and economically 
since democratic election held in 1993 when international community came forward 
with financial and human resources to reconstruct the war-ravaged country. Country’s 
entrance to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2005 further connected it to 
global trade and business. Country's economy has increasingly been connected to the 
transnational businesses with foreign direct investment (FDI). Local enterprises 
connected to transnational businesses are also growing. An increasing number of 
Cambodian men are being employed either directly in the transnational business firms 
in the country or local business enterprises. Being employed in the transnational 
business firms or owning local enterprises, Cambodian men are getting exposed to 
new work culture and environment. How are these local men configuring their gender 
practices, both in workplace and family? The review of literatures on masculinities 
and neo-liberalism and globalisation, which are drawn in other economic and political 
contexts can be helpful in exploring masculinities of Cambodian men who are directly 
engaged in the process of neoliberalism in the country.
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2.4 Revisiting masculinities among particular occupations 
2.4.1 Rural masculinities
To date, studies on rural masculinities have been limited in terms of 
geography, historical period and subject matter. Most of the available studies 
(Brandth, 2002; Coldwell, 2009) have been made in the context of large-scale farming 
practices in industrialised nations. The study of masculinities in farming began to 
appear in literature only fairly recently (Brandth, 1995; Phillips, 1998). These studies 
mainly focus on agricultural changes, technologies and peasant identities. The studies 
of rural masculinities, which are mainly drawn in Western contexts, cannot simply be 
applied to Cambodia -a  country where agricultural practices are still labour intensive 
and conventional, rules of land ownership have changed several times in recent 
history, and farmers follow a matrilocal family system. There is a dearth of studies of 
rural masculinity in a socio-cultural context that resembles Cambodia.
The dominant gender discourse that shapes rural masculinity is characterised 
by physical strength, the control of nature, tenacity, hardship, toughness, 
independence and individualism. Agriculture is a masculine domain of social practice 
for men. The term ‘farmer’ is analogous to the identity of men (Coldwell, 2009). 
Coldwell argues that peasant masculinities and farming practices are co-constructed in 
the interplay of human agency and the agency of non-human species; the land, plants, 
animals and machines.
Farming has become a fully masculine practice and space with the advent of
mechanisation. This transformation has reinforced men's identity as farmers by taking
away women’s farming activity and shifting women’s labour to the secondary and
tertiary sectors. This transformation has not always been good for men. Men are often
left to run farms alone and isolated, and are often seen as backward compared to their
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modem female counterparts who now have better-education, and multiple skills that 
they have acquired through having moved to non-farm activities (Brandth, 2002).
There is one available study on peasant masculinity in a developing country. 
Perry’s (2005) study in Senegal reveals a crisis of peasant masculinity. The 
government of Senegal financed the peasants for cash-crops such as peanuts until 
1986 when the government adopted neo-liberal reform. Traditionally all family 
members, including women and girls, worked on the rural farm and the man of the 
family controlled the family's labour force using his patriarchal power. After the 
government ceased to finance these farms, the production of peanuts declined. In the 
meantime, some informal economies such as small businesses emerged in the course 
of neo-liberalism. As men are less able to fulfil their role of providing for the family, 
and family members do not have much work to do on the farm, they allow their wives 
to run the small businesses. Women's entrance to small business brought changes in 
the family’s gender order and a crisis among peasant masculinities. In the changing 
situation men become dependent on their wives, new domestic tensions emerge 
around the issue of labour, financial control, mobility, space and sexual behavior.
2.4.2 Urban working class masculinity
A study of the masculinities of urban workers in China (Lin and Ghaill, 2012) 
suggests that the male formerly peasant workers in formerly female-concentrated 
occupations such as domestic cleaning and electric assembly occupations deploy their 
peasant masculine identities in order to construct their masculinities in the modem 
urban location. In their reconstructed masculine identities the peasant rural-urban 
migrants neither privilege themselves over women nor subordinate themselves to 
other men, but rather attempt to masculinise their specific tasks in female­
concentrated occupations.
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Fuller (2000)’s study shows how Peruvian urban men who formerly worked in 
very masculinised occupations (such as heavy industry, construction work, fishing, 
mining, agro-business, etc.) construct masculinities in urban life after they have been 
retrenched from their State jobs. Peruvian men generally construct manliness around 
work which imparts dignity, demonstrating capability and being responsibility. Work 
also turns the young men into men potentially capable of marrying and supporting a 
family. Peruvian working-class men construct masculinity as being able to be the 
breadwinner for the family. During the 1990s, the Peruvian government adopted the 
neo-liberal policy by downsizing their public workforce. Many men lost their jobs as 
a result of this economic policy. In the aftermath of the policy, they took up jobs 
either in partnership with their wives or in feminised work in the cities. For example, 
some men opened small businesses with their wives. In the changing situation, though 
they work in partnership with their wives or in feminised occupations, they do so to 
keep their role of breadwinning for the family intact.
2.5 Masculinity politics: Movements and Programs for Change
Masculinity politics refer to ‘those mobilisations and struggles where the 
meaning of masculine gender is at issue, and, with it, men's position in gender 
relations' (Connell, 2005, p.205). Masculinity politics is any form of struggle, from an 
intellectual project to field-based activism, where men’s position in gender relations is 
discussed and acted on. Masculinity politics is important for promoting gender 
equality as men overwhelmingly control all sorts of resources and retain power 
through society. Connell (2005) argues that since masculinity itself is multiple, 
masculinity politics can be diverse.
Messner (1997) traced out how issues like feminism, anti-feminism, socialism,
race, sexuality, spirituality and religion constituted masculinity politics in the 1970s,
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1980s and 1990s mainly in the United States. He precisely described eight different 
men’s movements, grappling with different meanings of manhood within their socio­
political perspectives. Movements like men’s liberation movement, radical feminist 
men’s movement, socialist feminist men's movement, and gay male liberation 
supported feminism and found gender equality helpful for men too. Organised by 
African American men, a racialized masculinity politics called for adult men to take 
care for families and to mentor the young black males who were at risk of 
unemployment, crimes, homicides and homelessness. The men's rights movement 
viewed feminism as a threat for men, in terms of power and status in families and 
other social institutions. Begun in the 1980s, the mythopoetic movement guided men 
to rediscover and reclaim the deep masculine parts of themselves that they believed 
had been lost. The Promise Keepers, a Christian men's organisation, ran various 
activities including sermons, singing and praying to call for men to retake leadership 
roles in families and re-masculinise of men. The work of Messner demonstrates 
plurality of masculinity politics.
The development of the overall concerns of this thesis -the multiplicity of 
Khmer masculinities, implications of social changes for the emergence of new 
masculinity, and the interplay between masculinity and domestic violence -  is 
influenced by masculinity politics. This study will contribute to promoting gender 
equality, the main thrust of masculinity politics, by providing knowledge about how 
masculinities are configured and reconfigured, and associated gendered power 
dynamics. This thesis will contribute to promoting gender equality, particularly in the 
form of addressing domestic violence by providing evidence-based cases on the 
interplay of masculine gender and domestic violence.
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2.6 Women’s paid work, men’s negotiation of paid and unpaid work, and
fathering role
Debates exist about the reasons for married women's participation to paid 
work. Hood (1986), Pearson (2000) and Kohara (2010) argue that the economic factor 
drives married women to join in paid work. They presume that married women enter 
paid work to ensure their families' economic survival. Eggebeen and Hawkins (1990) 
suggest that women’s labor force participation is not always driven by the basic 
family needs. They argue that women, particularly of comparatively better-off 
families, enter paid work to provide a higher standard of living for their families and 
themselves.
Irrespective of the reason of their entrance, women's paid work can potentially 
pose a threat to their husbands in family relationships. Men, when their wives are 
engaged in outside paid work, need to negotiate their own participation in unpaid 
family work, including child care and fathering. They also need to negotiate about 
authority in day-to-day family affairs.
Studies by Bolake (1997), Pineda (2000) and Slegh et al. (2013) document 
men's negotiation of paid and unpaid work and their position in intra-family gender 
relations in a situation of their wife’s paid work. Wall and Marinho (2007) and 
Nkwake (2009) provide rich evidences of how men in European and African contexts 
respectively engage themselves in child care when their wives are engaged in family 
breadwinning.
Bolake (1997) examines men's participation in the family’s unpaid work and
their negotiation of family gender relations among working class urban families in
Istanbul, Turkey. In Turkish culture, men are the breadwinners and women are the
house-makers. This gender differentiated role mediates intra-family gender
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relationships. Bolake interviewed couples in 41 families -  the wife in 58% of the 
families -is the prime breadwinner; and the husband in 60% of the families -is either 
unemployed or works in a part time job. All of the wives work full-time five or six 
days a week in factories.
Three kinds of responses from the men are revealed. The first group of men, 
who constitute 40% of the participants, respond to their inability to provide for the 
family by helping their wives in household chores. But their participation in 
household chores remains low. Despite men's limited share in household chore, the 
couples do not experience conflict because the wives refrain from using their financial 
leverage to press their husbands for greater participation and often take on what they 
consider to be men's responsibilities.
The second group of men, who constitute 40% of the participants, remain 
absent from household chores and use traditional gender ideologies to resist their 
wife's desire for a more egalitarian division of labor. The couples of this group 
encounter conflict and tension in the family. They experience most serious 
confrontations when men cannot ask their wives to quit paid work, and women claim 
some leverage in intra-family relationships as providers.
The third group of men, who constitute 20% of the participants, configure 
their status of unemployment or limited role of family providing, by moving towards 
equity in intra-family gender relationships. A relative consensus exists among couples 
of this group about the complementarity of breadwinning and household tasks, the 
benefits of the wife’s paid work, and the need for some sacrifice by the husbands. The 
couples construct an ideology of equity, and configure the ideology into practice.
Bolake suggests that the relationships between provider status, women’s
expectations, and the actual configuration of gender relations in the family are
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complexly mediated by cultural orientation, perception of women as providers, 
marital dynamics and extended family relationship. Structural conditions and cultural 
ideology interact to configure the gender relations.
Pineda's (2000) study, conducted among working class urban households in 
Colombia, shows a ‘mutual-respect model' of gender relations in the family in a 
situation of men's unemployment and women’s breadwinning role. Pineda 
interviewed 23 men and 18 women from 31 households, including 10 couples in Cali, 
Colombia in 1998 and 1999. Most of these men previously worked in the formal 
sector. They became unemployed due to Colombian economic recession in 1995. All 
these women have home-based small-scale businesses that received financial support 
from a leading micro-credit NGO. Paid work in the formal sector is a great means for 
Colombian men to organise traditional masculinity -characterised by providing for 
the family and getting out of the house. Being unemployed in the formal sector, all 
these men took job in their wife's business, as an alternative means of employment 
and survival. In the mutual-respect model of gender relations, these men accept their 
wives as the heads of the families, share in household chores and adapt to a new 
identity as home-based workers. Pineda argues that overlapping social and particular 
individual changes such as unemployment, women's self-empowerment, and 
provision of some associated social services facilitate the development of this mutual- 
respect model of relationship.
Slegh et al.’s (2013) study, which is based on an evaluation of a village 
savings and loan programme of CARE that targets socio-economic empowerment of 
Rwandan women, suggests that men cede their position in intra-household gender 
relations to their wives in context of new income generated by their wives. They not
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only cede power but are also supportive to their wife’s businesses by giving care to 
the young children.
Micro-credit programmes are conventionally women-only. The village savings 
and loan program of CARE is not an exception. But the programme considers men as 
the strategic partner for women's empowerment. Apart from supporting the women, 
the programme also provides group training to the male partners of the women to 
change their gender norms about family’s economic management. As a result, when 
economic transactions occur from small-businesses, these men start to consider their 
wives as co-partners of the family’s economy and thus co-leaders in the family.
The study of Wall and Marinho (2007) suggests the plurality of fatherhood in 
context of different types of family functioning. The study findings are drawn on in- 
depth interviews conducted in 2005-2006 among 24 Portuguese men from different 
social classes and employment statuses. The fatherhoods that are revealed in Wall and 
Marinho’s study include: joint fatherhood, supportive fatherhood, parallel fatherhood, 
equal fatherhood, appropriative fatherhood, time-condensed fatherhood and stay-at- 
home fatherhood.
Men of the ‘joint fatherhood' category jointly share tasks of family and child 
care. Joint parenting is not necessarily equal. It is rather performed within the concept 
of availability of the partners. In this category, gender equality is subordinate to the 
wellbeing of the family and, in particular, to the wellbeing of children.
Men of the ‘supportive fatherhood’ category provide supplementary 
caregiving to the children in addition to their role of prime breadwinning. Men of this 
category see the family as a place which is managed by the woman, but they no longer 
stand on the rigid norm of male breadwinning and female caring. They welcome their 
wives in paid work.
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Men of the "parallel fatherhood' category organise fatherhood by providing 
and monitoring children at a distance rather being actively involved in day-to-day 
practices of caring. They are a kind of disengaged fathers.
Men of the "equal fatherhood' category organise fatherhood on the principle of 
gender equality and individual autonomy of both partners both in family and 
professional life. Men of this category emphasise professional success for both 
partners and thus share family tasks equally. However, the practice of gender equality 
in household chores is facilitated by delegating a large amount of household and 
caring tasks to a maid, senior members of the family or commercial service providers. 
Fathers of this category provide intensive care to the children at weekends.
Men of the ‘appropriate fatherhood' category shoulder the main 
breadwinning role as well as the responsibility for some of the time-consuming 
household and caring tasks such as cooking, putting baby to bed. etc. Men of this 
category believe in women's autonomy in doing outside work. They see fatherhood 
and motherhood as very much the same thing. They are also educators of their 
children.
Men of the ‘time-condensed fatherhood' category, who are oriented to career 
success, limit their fatherhood to quality time such as playing with growing children 
or performing a specific task such as changing nappy for the toddler. They place more 
emphasis on success of their individual career.
Men of the ‘stay-at-home fatherhood' category, a minority group, take full­
time domestic and child care tasks. The wives of this category of men are prime 
breadwinners of the family. The reason for men taking sole responsibility for child 
care and domestic tasks is mainly financial.
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Wall and Marinho argue that the meanings and forms of fatherhood are firmly 
embedded in the complex dynamics of family life. Men’s greater role in giving care to 
their children is influenced by family interactions and events, gender division of work, 
tension between family and professional life, and men's and women’s differential 
investment in private and public spheres.
Nkwake’s (2009) study explores the circumstances under which Ugandan
working fathers take care of their young children in a situation of increased
engagement of their wives in paid work. Nkwake’s study involved 222 employed
fathers with working wives and 246 employed mothers with working husbands. Some
of the participants were couples. Participants were chosen randomly from the capital
city and a rural town. The research used a survey followed by focus-group
discussions. Most of the men (60%) and women (68.6%) participants of the study
were employed in the informal sector. The study defined child care activities as baby
sitting, taking children to and from school, and helping them with homework. Among
the male participants, 50% of fathers mentioned that they take care of their children.
Among the female participants, 41% of women mentioned that their husbands take
care of their children. Nkwake suggests that a number of factors: education, income,
work characteristics and the quality of marital life are associated with fathers’
increased involvement in child care. For example, men employed in the formal sector
are more likely to be engaged in childcare because of their exposure to gender-
egalitarian views on childcare. Women's employment also influences a fathers'
likelihood of giving care to the children. Most of the fathers whose wives were
employed in the formal sector were engaged in taking care of children as they
perceive that a mother who works in the formal sector is less able to blend childcare
with her job. Irrespective of the sector of work, fathers who earned the same as their
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wives, or more, were more engaged in taking care of children. This is associated with 
men’s sense of masculinity in relation to position in the family. When a man earns at 
least same as his wife, he does not consider his participation in childcare threatening 
to his status as the head of the family. This contradicts to the gender practices by men 
of the ‘stay-at-home fatherhood' category of Wall and Marinho’s study, who take full 
responsibility for domestic chores, including child care though their wives are the 
prime breadwinners. Men in these two studies -one conducted in a developed country 
and another in a developing country -  maintain contradictory gender practices 
because of their differentiated socialisation about family power relations and gender 
roles in different socio-economic contexts.
2.7 Men and Domestic Violence: Theoretical Debates
A growing body of theoretical literature has emerged about the reasons for 
domestic violence (DV). Among them, Pizzey (1979), Dobash and Dobash (1977-78 
& 1992), YllO (1993), Stark and Flitcraft (1996), Bettman (2009), and Harcourt 
(2009) whose work is mainly based on victimisation reports, argue that DV is part of 
a system of coercive controls through which men maintain social dominance over 
women.
Erin Pizzey (1979), who set up the first shelter for battered women in the UK 
in 1971, is one of the pioneering feminists concerned with the domestic violence 
issue, argues that certain personality-related weaknesses of women, such as affection 
and sympathy for a violent husband, put some women at risk of violence. She 
underscores the responsibility of institutions to address the issue of domestic violence. 
Gender blindness of social agents is damaging for women victims of domestic 
violence.
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Pizzey also links men’s violent behaviour to their experience of family 
violence in their childhood. If a boy experiences violence, he is highly likely to be 
violent as an adult. Pizzey describes this process as: ‘violence goes on from 
generation to generation' (p.74).
Pizzey’s analysis of domestic violence shades little light to the complexity of 
intra-family gender relations (Sen, 1990). Her concept that ‘violence goes on from 
generation to generation' conveys a notion that the construction of masculinity is 
fixed.
Dobash and Dobash (1977-78 and 1992), two American sociologists, 
expanded Pizzey’s account of domestic violence. The empirical work of Dobash and 
Dobash began in a Scottish context just a few years later. However, Dobash and 
Dobash (1977-78) also use police reports on victimisation to frame their arguments. 
Dobash and Dobash (1977-78) argue that men use violence against women in the 
family in an attempt to maintain a socio-historical hierarchical order within the 
family. In their later work, which draws on activism and research in British and North 
American contexts, Dobash and Dobash (1992) expand their arguments on how 
patriarchy works in relation to violence against wives. They argue that men develop 
four expectations under the auspices of patriarchy: possessiveness and sexual 
jealousy; expectations concerning women’s domestic work; men's sense of the right 
to punish their women for perceived wrongdoing; and the importance of maintaining 
and exercising their position of authority.
In a study in 1974, conducted through in-depth interviews, of 109 women in
Edinburgh and Glasgow who had been systematically and severely beaten on different
occasions by their husband or partner, Dobash and Dobash (1977-78) found that, for
most couples, violence did not occur until after they were married but it usually
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occurred very soon after marriage. A husband, through marriage, comes to feel that 
his wife should meet his demands at all times and in any situation. A man feels that 
marriage gives him the right to expect domestic service and sexual exclusivity from 
his wife. Dobash and Dobash argue that ‘the fulfilment of these behaviours is not 
only personally pleasant for him; it also becomes an outward sign of his “rightful” 
possession of her, authority over her and ability to control her (p.438).
The information on which Dobash and Dobash have developed their argument 
is drawn only from women. Men are ignored as informants. Why does violence occur 
more after marriage than during the time the couple spend together before marriage? 
Do factors like intra-household gender roles and relations other than patriarchy, 
matter for the occurrence of violence after marriage?
Harcourt (2009), in her recent book Body Politics in Development, claims that 
men's violence against women is rooted in patriarchal power structures, ideas and 
practices. Violence against women is manifested in social, economic and political 
practices.
Pizzey, Dobash and Dobash, and Harcourt clearly draw notions of domestic 
violence from the framework of second- wave feminism. Post-structural and post­
modern feminists hold different views of gender.
An example is the work of Bettman (2009), based on an ethnographic study
among the Semai, an aboriginal society in mountainous central Malaya, and the
Waorani, an indigenous tribe in Amazonian Ecuador, Bettman argues that domestic
violence in a society occurs when patriarchal ideology and gender stereotypes
characterise the idealised masculinities and social discourse prevalent in a society.
The prevailing discourse on violence in general does not necessarily cause violence in
intimate relationships. Bettman found that people in Semai society live in a culture of
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egalitarianism. The Semai people not only idealise a non-violent image but actually 
incorporate it into their discourse. Non-aggression, dependency and sharing are 
important cultural values which are manifested in the daily life of the Semai people. 
On the other hand, the Wairani people live in a discourse of general violence but they 
do not beat their wives. Like the Semai men, the Wairani men maintain non-violent 
and non-aggressive family relations. This is because the existing social discourse on 
violence in the Wairani society does not include patriarchy and gender stereotypes.
Pizzey, Dobash and Dobash and Bettman employ single variable analyses that 
concentrate on patriarchy and ignore the impact of other social, economic and 
historical factors that may affect roles and relationships in the family and thus 
perpetuate domestic violence.
Based on large-scale survey data, Straus et al. (1980), Smith (1990), Dutton 
(1994), and DeKeseredy (1995) argue that socio-demographic factors and psychology 
significantly affect men's violence against their partners.
Using the data of the National American Survey on Family Violence, 1975, 
Straus et al. (1980) found that a female partner of a family living under the poverty 
line experiences abuse from her partner five times more often than a female partner in 
an affluent family. The economic status of the household influences men’s violence. 
In terms of educational attainment, the abuse rate among males with some high school 
education is double the rate of males with the least (less than eight years of schooling) 
and the most (some college or more schooling) education.
In terms of occupational status, the level of violence among blue-collar men
(e.g., working class men) is twice as high as the level among of white-collar men
(e.g., professional men). Similarly, blue-collar women suffer twice as much violence
from their male partners (irrespective of the male’s occupational status) as white-
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collar women. In the survey by Straus et al., men who are unemployed or employed 
part-time are two to three times more likely to commit spousal violence than men in 
full-time employment.
The relation between household income and abuse of the female partner 
depends on intra-household gender relations. It seems that American men at the time 
of the Straus et al. survey were expected to be the family breadwinners. Apparently 
when they failed to fulfil that expectation, they resorted to violence. But the study 
does not provide information about how other members of the family, particularly the 
female partners, reacted to, and dealt with, his state of failure. What really provokes 
men to violence?
Based on data from the Second Toronto Survey conducted by telephone in 
1987 among 604 currently or formerly married or cohabiting women of ages between 
eighteen and fifty years of age, Smith (1990) suggests that family income, the 
husband's employment status, and the educational attainment and occupational status 
of both partners have significant inverse relationships with abuse.
Smith finds a reverse relationship between different socio-demographic factors 
and abuse of partners. The lower the income of the household, the higher the 
probability of abuse. A woman of low income family is ten times more likely to have 
been severely abused than a woman from a well-to-do family. Educational attainment 
of the husband also negatively correlates to wife abuse. For example, men with no 
more than elementary level education are twice as likely to have abused their partners 
compared to men with a university degree. The husband’s occupational status also 
affects the likelihood of his committing violence. Smith's work does not address the 
question as to why men of low education and poor occupational and employment 
status are more likely to abuse their female partners.
40
Dutton (1994) argues that violent acts and violence in intimate relationships 
have a common psychological basis. He bases his argument on a review of several 
papers published in the late 1970s and 1980s using data on spousal violence from a 
United States national survey. He finds that 80 to 90 per cent of men who are either 
court-referred or self-referred for wife assault have a diagnosable psychological 
pathology. According to Dutton, men who have severe identity problems and intense 
dependency on women use cultural teaching and orthodoxy to justify their abuse. 
Dutton argues that patriarchy does not elicit violence against one's partner directly. 
Instead, it provides the values and attitudes that, having been socialised into and 
learned by a personality-disordered man, are used to justify his violence. Similarly, 
not all men use violence and dominance to maintain their power. A man uses violence 
to maintain his power when he suffers from severe identity diffusion. In the condition 
of identity diffusion, he sees his intimate other as necessary for his identity integration 
and does not hesitate to ensure this integration even if this involves violence or 
coercion.
DeKeseredy (1995) questions the methodology of large-scale surveys on 
intimate abuse. He argues that researchers in intimate abuse surveys either use narrow 
definitions of psychological abuse or do not examine psychological abuse at all 
because they regard it as ‘soft-core’ abuse. He, on the other hand, views psychological 
abuse as equal to, or more injurious than, physical or sexual abuse.
There is a methodological drawback in the theories that connect socio­
demographic assessments and psychology to DV. As these theories are based on 
large-scale quantitative surveys, they ignore the context in which violence occurs and 
thus the issues of gender and power.
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Goode (1971), Felson and Messner (2000), and Yount and Carrera (2006) 
argue that violence is an ultimate resource used to derive power within relationship. 
Goode (1971) argues that men lacking other means of power, such as income or 
education, are more likely to rely on violence to achieve greater power within the 
relationship. Most men, when they have other means to dominate, are not likely to use 
overt force because force involves a negative cost in most societies.
Based on a multivariate analysis of data from the incident files of the National 
Crime Victimization Survey, United States, Felson and Messner (2000) argue that 
men abuse their female partners to control their behaviour both currently and for the 
future. They identify two reasons why men are more likely to control behaviour of 
their female partners compared to women toward their male partners. The first reason 
is that men have a greater desire than women to establish a patriarchal family 
structure. The second reason is that even when men and women have the same desire 
to dominate their partners, men are more likely to achieve their goal because they 
have the physical capability to employ violence successfully against women. In other 
words, men are more likely to use physical means against their female partners 
because they are bigger and stronger.
Like Goode, Yount and Carrera (2006) also draw a relationship between
family resources and violence in intimate relationships but there is a fundamental
difference in their arguments. Kathryn and Jennifer argue that poverty in men is not
sufficient reason to explain violence against women in an intimate relationship.
Women's comparative poverty and their overall dependency on a partnership are also
involved. Kathryn and Jennifer argue that the relative resources of spouses have a
significant effect on women's experience of domestic violence. Women who have
fewer resources are more likely to experience physical and psychological violence.
42
Women who challenge status expectations in marriage by having a higher education 
than their husbands or by possessing more capital resources than their husbands have 
higher odds of experiencing psychological, rather than physical, violence from their 
husbands.
Developed in the Indian context, Agarwal and Panda (2007) argue that lack of 
ownership of immovable properties such as a house or land makes women more 
vulnerable to domestic violence. They argue that immovable property provides a 
woman with economic and physical security, improves her fail-back position, and 
widens her options for a successful exit from a violent environment.
Heise (1998), O'Neil and Harway (1999), Jewkes (2002), and Walker et al. 
(2008) all argue that multiple factors are associated with men's violence in intimate 
relationship. Based on a review of North American academic research on violence, 
Heise (1998) provides an ecological framework in which to understand the origins of 
gender-based violence. The framework is ecological in the sense that it conceptualises 
violence as a multifaceted phenomenon -grounded in the interplay of personal, 
situational and socio-cultural factors.
Heise provides details of these factors. Personal factors such as witnessing 
domestic violence as a child, experience of physical or sexual violence as a child, and 
having an absent or rejecting father are considered predictors of future violent 
behaviour. Situational factors which often structure the traditional family are 
associated with the increased risk of violence; they include male dominance in the 
family, male control of family wealth, marital conflict and alcoholism. Socio-cultural 
factors refer to the social structures both formal and informal that impinge on the 
immediate setting in which a person is found.
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Heise suggests that socio-cultural factors are more influential in men’s 
violence when changes take place in the larger social milieu. Socio-cultural factors at 
"meso' level are unemployment or low socio-economic status, isolation of the woman 
and the family, and delinquent peer relations. Socio-cultural factors at "macro’ level 
that influence men's gender-based violence include male entitlement over women, 
masculinity linked to aggression, unequal gender division of labor, and social 
tolerance of violence.
O’Neil and Harway (1999) suggest multiple causes of men’s violence against 
women. They provide a multivariate model, based on review of literatures on violence 
against women across different academic fields, that explains the complexity of 
causes and risk factors of men's violence. The model identifies four major factors or 
contents: macrosocietal, biological, gender-role socialisation and relational.
The macrosocietal factors such as patriarchy and institutional structures, can 
cause men's violence against women, particularly in a situation of abrupt change of 
gender roles. Men may fear of loss of power when their role, mainly breadwinning for 
the family is reduced. The biological factors such as male hormone and 
neuroanatomy, can stimulate men's violence against women. The gender-role 
socialisation factors such as men’s sexual attitudes, emotions, and behaviour learnt 
over the life-span, can be responsible for men's violence against women. The 
relational factors defined as the interpersonal and verbal communication between 
partners, can re responsible for men’s violence. O’Neil and Harway argue that unlike 
other models of men’s violence against women, theirs emphasizes both men’s and 
women's socialisation and the couple's interactions.
Jewkes (2002) suggests that poverty, social notions of manhood, the status of
women's empowerment, alcoholism and social norms are pivotal to men's violence
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against their intimate partner. Jewkes’s suggestion is also based on a review of 
surveys on intimate partner violence mainly in North America, with a few from the 
global South, including India and South Africa.
Like Smith, Jewkes argues that violence is more frequent in lower income 
groups, and that this is mediated through stress. Jewkes further explores how stress is 
associated with social notions of manhood. Men living with poverty feel a sort of 
crisis of masculinity and are unable to live up to the ideas of successful manhood.
She also suggests that level of women’s empowerment affects their 
vulnerability to partners’ violence. Women’s economic, educational and social 
empowerment can be protective against violence. Jewkes also sees an association 
between alcoholism and all forms of interpersonal violence. The connection is 
socially constructed. Men are more likely to perpetrate violence when drunk, because 
they do not feel they will be held accountable for their behaviour.
Intimate partner violence is also perceived by Jewkes as a learned social 
behaviour for both men and women. It is argued that experiences of violence in the 
home in childhood teach children that violence is normal in certain settings. In this 
way, men learn to use violence and women learn to tolerate it. Violence rolls over 
generations. For example, the sons of women who are beaten are more likely to beat 
their intimate partners, and the daughters of women who are beaten are more likely to 
be beaten as adults.
The work of Walker et al. (2008) which is mainly based on a program of 
mental health promotion activity in Australia identifies three key determinants of 
men’s violence against intimate partners. The determinants are: (i) construction of 
gender roles and relations and gender equality, (ii) exposure to other forms of
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violence and social norms related to violence, and (iii) the availability of resources 
and systems of support.
Walker and his colleagues suggest that the way in which gender norms on role 
and relationship are constructed in a society is linked to men’s violence against 
women. Men who hold traditional views of gender roles and relationships and who 
have strong belief in male dominance are more likely to perpetrate violence against 
their partners. The construction of gender norms can take place within the wider 
gender regime of the community and society. Male economic and decision-making 
power is also linked to intimate partner violence. Violence is more likely to occur in 
couples with a clearly dominant partner and in countries where male dominance has 
strong cultural support.
Violence against women is also linked to the acceptance and perpetration of 
other forms of violence in a society. Violence against women is more prevalent in 
cultures where violence is used as a means for adults to resolve conflict. Men who are 
violent outside the home are also more likely to be violent towards their intimate 
partners. Men’s violence against their intimate partners takes place within the 
attitudes and social norms relating to violence against women.
Like Smith and Jewkes, Walker et al. suggest that men with low income or 
unemployment and/or low education are more likely to perpetrate violence in intimate 
relationships. Disparities between men’s and women's employment status in a 
relationship also matters to men’s violence. Alcohol and illicit drug use and men's 
social isolation following separation also lead them to perpetrate violence.
The work of Heise, O'Neil and Harway, Jewkes and Walker et al., taken
together, suggests that men's violence against their intimate partner is not single
factored. Multiple factors either personal or situational or societal -  function
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simultaneously in the perpetration of violence. All the factors can be evident as causal 
reasons of men’s violence against women in multiple cultures and social settings as 
the findings of these studies are done. Are all these factors concurrent in terms of 
causing men’s violence against women in a single case or in a single social setting? 
This remains unclear in these studies.
Although it is relatively new, having been initiated in recent decades, 
structural theory (the theoretical framework used in this research) is gaining more 
attention in analysis of domestic violence. Structural theorists (Messerschmidt. 1993; 
West and Fenstermaker, 1995; Segal, 2007; Connell, 2005 and 2009) argue that the 
structure of social institutions such as family, school, sport, religion, market, and state 
agency which legitimise social relations in general and gender relations in particular, 
is centrally involved in men's domestic violence. Men and women are differently 
placed in the structures of social relationships and men's dominance is reinforced in 
both a real and symbolic fashion (Connell, 2005). Structural theorists argue that men's 
violence is a way to assert masculinity or construct masculinity in the context of 
overall gender hierarchies in society.
Segal (2007) argues that violence cannot be simply equated with masculinity. 
Violent or aggressive behaviour is not instinctive in men. Men and women both 
display aggression and violence is common both in heterosexual and same-sex (gay 
and lesbian) relationships. Men’s violence in intimate relationships is part of a 
structural effect with Segal suggesting that prevalence of violence in society is related 
to men’s endeavour to affirm their masculinity -  demonstrated by men's dominance 
over women. This link is reinforced when masculinity is in a process of being 
challenged. According to her, men develop a sense of dominance and aggression
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through gendered social mediators and the almost exclusive male representation in 
most of the State institutions where force and violence are means of administration.
According to Segal, aggressive masculinity is a fantasy for the majority of 
men enthralled by images of masculinity that equate to power and dominance. Social 
mediators such as schools, jobs, friends, family, religion and politics affect the way 
fantasies may or may not be translated into active expression. It is men, rarely women, 
who represent and administer state institutions such as the police, the army, prisons, 
correction centres and other agencies that exclusively exercise force and coercion. It is 
almost always men who are trained and authorised to use force and violence in 
society. Men often see a linkage between masculinity and violence through having 
official roles in these institutions.
Connell (2009) argues that a boy growing up a violent family may not be 
violent in his adulthood. Instead, the boy may react against violence in building his 
repertoire of masculinity in adulthood. She suggests that overall gender hierarchies in 
society affect an individual's adoption of violent characteristics. Boys do not 
passively learn a particular gender norm such as violence. This means they are not 
socialised towards certain personalities automatically and without scrutiny. An active 
learning process is involved in the socialisation of a particular norm. A particular 
gender norm is imprinted on the individual after scrutiny so that he will survive in 
society as a man. Connell (2009) says, ‘gender patterns develop in personal lives as a 
series of encounters with the constraints and possibilities of the existing gender order' 
(p.101). The development of a particular gender norm such as violence requires a 
choice to comply with the overall gender hierarchy in the society.
A particular practice in relation to gender, such as violence in intimate
relationships, is structural and historical. Changes in the structure of social institutions
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such as family, market and state agencies due to overall social, political and economic 
shifts can pose a threat to the traditional gender order (particularly involving power 
relations and production relations). This can eventually bring about a crisis in men's 
doing gender, particularly in the household arena. Different men deal and respond to 
the crisis differently -violently or non-violently - based on their personal and social 
position. Some men, being unable to respond non-violently, take up violent means to 
configure gender. Only some men, therefore, not all men, in a given society 
perpetrate violence.
2.8 Interviewing the former perpetrators of domestic violence:
Methodological aspects
Tracking down real changes in the lives of former perpetrators of domestic 
violence is always a difficult task, particularly when using their self-accounts. There 
are academic works that attempt to find out the changes, including Adams et al. 
(1995), Gadd and Farrall (2004) and Mullaney (2007).
Adams et al. (1995) provide a rhetorical analysis of discourse generated by 
former perpetrators of violence towards women. They interviewed 14 men who have 
recently begun attending a stopping-violence program in Auckland region. In each 90- 
minute interview men were asked to give their views on (i) relationship, (ii) women’s 
rights, (iii) sexualities, (iv) causes of violence, and (v) wider social supports for 
violence. A range of rhetoric was picked up from the transcribed texts of interviews, 
and the strategic effects of each form of rhetoric were then analysed. The study finds 
that the rhetoric functions alongside the discourse of male dominance to generate a 
sense of naturalness and correctness of men’s power and position in the relationship.
Adams et al suggest that an increased sensitivity to the nuanced effects of
rhetoric can improve our understanding of how men justify, camouflage and maintain
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dominance within relationships with women. The rhetoric serves as a resource for 
male dominance and power and thus violence towards women.
Based on life stories of two men who appeared to be desisting from crime, 
Gadd and Farrall (2004) suggest that an interpretive approach to the narratives and 
sensitivity to the possibility of unconscious motivations can better explain the 
contradictory accounts of the men in relation to the heavily gendered issue of family 
formation.
Mullaney (2007) explores the discrepancy between accounts that battering 
men give to the researchers and to their female partners about the reasons of their 
violence. Drawing on in-depth interviews of 14 men in battering programs in the US, 
she argues that a great discrepancy exists between the account given to her about why 
the violence happened and those accounts given to their partners immediately after the 
incidents of violence. While men tend to repair the damaged relationship in their 
accounts given to their partners, they reconstruct these accounts to the researcher to 
rationalise their violence.
Mullaney concludes that the battering men use varying verbal accounts as 
different means to achieve the same end -  to save face as well as reconstruct 
masculinity they feel has been taken from them by their partners and/or state agencies. 
By tracing the changes in form and content across accounts given to partners and the 
researcher, she argues that the accounts may not be as irreconcilable as they seem.
2.9 Conclusion
From the review of literatures it can be concluded that:
Masculinity is a social product that exists in multiple forms in a given time in 
a given society. Currently available masculinities come into existence after social
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scrutiny. Specific patterns of masculinities emerge through the processes of 
colonisation, war, and economic re-structuring.
The gender regimes, which are essential for establishment and maintaining 
colonial authority and thus economy, of colonial empires give rise to new 
masculinities among the colonised. The new masculinities can prevail among the 
colonised long after the departure of colonial rule. The colonial gender regimes can be 
embedded among the colonised in a number of ways: creating hierarchy among 
different ethnic groups of the colonised, maintaining specific patterns of gender 
division of labour in colonial administration and economy of production, and 
transforming sexualities of the local.
War and conflict can produce masculinities during and after a war/conflict 
situation. Masculinity is linked to war in the way of providing a framework through 
which the war can be supported as a social practice and institution. The war leaves 
the warriors marginalised at the end of war. Finding no alternative means of 
livelihood, the former war veterans often organise themselves around violence -a war 
time practice, in a post-war period.
Neoliberalism which is operated within the ethics of ‘survival of the fittest* 
shapes the lives of the managers of business firms and companies in a gender-specific 
way. Being hectic with uneding efforts for professional success in competitive work 
environments, the managers of transnational business companies can hardly allocate 
meaningful time for their families. They virtually stay absent from household chores 
which is rationalised with their sole breadwinning role. The free-market economy also 
generates an entrepreneur masculinity among the locals which is further propagated 
discursively.
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The current pattern of neoliberalism is also implicating peasants’ livelihood 
and thus peasant masculinity. The peasant males are losing command over the family 
because of the dying of traditional farming practice, partly as a result of cessation of 
government subsidy in agriculture. On the other hand, the female members of the 
peasant families are gaining command over the family by running small-scale 
informal businesses which find a place in the new economy. In the face of 
neoliberalism, the urban working class men work in feminised occupations, a 
relatively new practice, to keep their identity as a breadwinner for the family intact.
Men's response to their wives paid work, which is an area of investigation for 
intra-household gender relations, are diverse. Some men are supporter to their wives, 
while other men are not at all. Likewise, not all men engage themselves in fathering in 
the same fashion.
The review of literatures on men and domestic violence links various reasons 
of men’s violence against their female partners: patriarchy, socio-demography, 
resources, psychology, a combination of all of these factors, and hierarchal gender 
structure of social institutions.
The bulk of the studies on men and domestic violence are done in the context 
of the global north. The social, political, cultural and economic situations of the global 
north are significantly different from those in the global south -where Cambodia, the 
case country of this study, is located. Broadly speaking, women in developed 
countries are more empowered in economic terms compared to their counterparts in 
the developing countries. Social services, including shelter and counselling for 
battered women, in developed countries are certainly better. Therefore, the choice of 
getting out of violent relationship for women in developed countries is wider and 
better.
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Men in developed countries practice masculinities in a consistent economic 
system -mainly a neo-liberal market economy. Thus the majority of men in developed 
countries do not encounter sudden changes in gender roles and relationship in intra­
household affairs. Contrarily, the construction of masculinities in developing 
countries like Cambodia traditionally took place in a subsistence economy -mainly 
agricultural based -  which has been radically changed. The findings of studies from 
the north cannot be directly applied to Cambodia. We must examine to what extent 
they are relevant.
The following chapters in this thesis are organised with the following themes:
■ The French colonial rule in Cambodia, regulation of local masculinities, 
and the masculinities that emerged among the locals.
■ Economy, social structure and violence in post-colonial Cambodia.
■ Configuration of masculinities among contemporary Cambodian men of 
different social and occupational groups: managers, urban workers and 
peasants.
■ How Cambodian men of different social classes respond to their wife’s paid 
work, negotiate in family relationship, and engage in fathering of their 
children.
■ Patterns of post-conflict transition of masculinities among Cambodian men 
who were involved in country’s civil war, and
■ The dynamics of men’s violence against their wives.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY
This chapter discusses the methodology of this research. First, it provides 
information on the sample population, sample design, selection of population and the 
methods used for data collection and data analysis. Then it provides reasons for 
choosing the method for data collection and analysis and provides information about 
ethical considerations, the research time frame and the scope and limitations of the 
research.
3.1 Methodology
3.1.1 Data collection
Two principal methods were used: a review was conducted of Cambodian 
archival documents, covering the periods of colonialism and civil wars; and life 
histories were obtained by interview with contemporary Khmer men. These sub­
studies were interlocked through the oral-history element in the life history 
interviews.
3.1.1.1 Review of Archival Documents
Archival Documents of the colonial period were examined first. The review' of 
archival documents investigated how colonialism transformed traditional roles, 
relations and the status of men and women in Cambodian society. In this context, the 
conflict between Khmer masculinities of pre- and early colonial Cambodian society
54
were examined, and then the new masculinities that were produced -whether 
patriarchal or egalitarian, during the whole course of French colonial rule.
Archival documents from the following sources were examined: 
o National Archives of Cambodia (NAC)
The National Archives of Cambodia (NAC) are contained in a government 
institution that is administered by the Council of Ministers. NAC accommodates 
hundreds of thousands of documents, including 34, 000 documents from the French 
colonial period alone. Documents include official reports and bulletins, laws and 
policies, newspapers, decrees, official correspondence inter alia. These documents 
are classified with titles, keywords and a combination of both in a digital database. 
Les Codes Cambodgiens (1898), Code Civil Cambodgien (1920) and L'echo du 
Cambodge (newspaper) are the key documents that were reviewed for analysis, 
o Archives of France
Archives of France {Archives de France) holds thousands of official 
documents on the French colony in Cambodia. Documents are electronically stored in 
a database (Gallica) and made available on line. Key documents have been retrieved 
from the online database for analysis. Convention Conclue Entre la France et le 
Cambodge (1884), Annual reports, Le Cambodge Passé, Présent, Avenir, Recueil Des 
Treaotés (1884-1902), Droit Cambodgien (1894), Le Cambodge Le Royaume Actuel 
(1900), Organisation Du Cambodge (1885), and Rapports Au Conseil De 
Gouvernement are the key colonial documents retrieved, 
o Other published documents (Journal and Books)
Other published documents such as journal articles and books on the topic of 
Cambodia covering the colonial period were examined, sourced by searches in 
databases such as Sociological Abstracts and Historical Abstracts.
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3.1.1.2 Life Histories
Life histories of Cambodian men of specific backgrounds were obtained to 
examine the impact of the country’s contemporary economic neo-liberalism on the 
traditional gender order in intra-household gender relations. Participants were 
interviewed individually and the interviews were both private and semi-public. 
Interviews covered childhood background, education, employment, important turning 
points in their lives and lifestyles, professional and family life, notions of manhood, 
and experience of violence.
The reason for choosing life history as a method for this research is that it is 
the most versatile method in social science (Plummer, 2001) if one is to gain a close- 
focus analysis of work, careers and identities in changing social, cultural and 
economic contexts (Connell, 2007). The life history method is a powerful tool for 
linking contemporary social experience to its historical roots. This method documents 
a person's life or a significant part of his/her life as narrative. The life history is an 
effective tool to gain an understanding of an individual's perspective and experience 
of identity from his/her own narrative. It makes it possible to analyse how changing 
social, political and economic structures impact on an individual's gender identity and 
how he/she accommodates himself/herself in a changing situation. The life history 
method provides rich evidence about impersonal and collective processes as well as 
about subjectivity through time (Connell, 2005).
Participants, recruitment of participants and sample design
Life history interviews were conducted with fifty married Cambodian men 
from different educational and occupational backgrounds and from rural and urban 
settings. They come from the following groups:
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Public sector managers
Public sector managers included member staff of government departments in 
Phnom Penh who hold mid-level managerial positions in the ministerial hierarchy. 
Public sector managers in this research come from four line ministries. One of them 
was working in the private sector at the time of interview, but had previously been a 
public sector manager.
Private sector managers and business entrepreneurs
Private sector managers (three) hold senior management positions in a 
transnational financial corporation, an IT company and a Non-governmental 
Organisation (NGO). Business entrepreneurs (two) own and manage their own 
business enterprises (a real estate company and an export-oriented agro-based firm). 
Urban workers
Urban workers include Cambodian men who work as labourers in the newly 
established urban sectors such as construction firms, manufacturing and garment 
industries and entertainment in Phnom Penh. Some of them live with their families in 
Phnom Penh and others live alone in Phnom Penh, having left their families in the 
rural provinces.
Peasants
Peasants in this research come from the central and eastern provinces and are 
mainly subsistence farmers. They practise farming only for subsistence mainly on 
their family land. Almost all of them have matrilocal marriages.
Men who were involved in DV and are now in remedial programmes
In order to establish a baseline of masculinities in relation to DV, the former 
perpetrators of DV were interviewed for this study. They are no longer violent after
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having participated in an anti-VAW programme run by an NGO. They come from 
three provinces. Currently they live with their families in peace and harmony.
Table 3.1 : Sample Design
SI. Occupational background
Sample
size
Geographical location
1. P u b l ic  s e c to r  m a n a g e r s 5 P h n o m  P e n h
2.
P r iv a te  s e c to r  m a n a g e r s  a n d  b u s in e s s  
e n t r e p r e n e u r s
5 P h n o m  P e n h
3.
U rb a n  w o r k e r s  ( e m p l o y e d  in n e w  
in d u s t r i e s  s u c h  a s  rea l  e s ta t e  a n d  h o u s in g ,  
to u r i s m ,  e n t e r t a i n m e n t  a n d  c o n s t r u c t io n )
15 P h n o m  P e n h
4 . P e a s a n t s 15
C e n t r a l  a n d  e a s te rn  
p r o v in c e s  ( th r e e  p r o v in c e s )
5.
M e n  w h o  w e r e  in v o lv e d  in d o m e s t i c  
v i o l e n c e  a n d  a r e  n o w  n o n - v io l e n t
10
C e n t r a l  a n d  e a s te rn  
p r o v in c e s  ( th r e e  p r o v in c e s )
Selection of participants
Participants were recruited by extending invitations through existing social 
networks in Cambodia. Snowball technique was used to expand the sample. Under 
snowball technique participants were requested after interviews to pass on invitations 
to other potential participants. I had access to these networks through previous 
residence in Cambodia. A local research assistant was recruited who also helped in 
this task of contacting participants.
3.1.2 Data analysis
The following two methods were used:
3.1.2.1 Discourse Analysis
Relevant historical documents from NAC and Archives of France, plus studies 
identified via Sociological Abstracts and Historical Abstracts, were analysed to see 
how colonialism gave rise to particular patterns of masculinities among the local
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Cambodians. Discourse analysis was used as a method to study the masculinities that 
emerged in the course of colonialism. Discourse analysis has become an influential 
analytical tool in discussion of masculinities (Petersen, 1998; Wetherell and Edley, 
1999; Edley, 2001; Toerien and Durrheim, 2001).
Discourse analysis is the study of language-in-use either in speech or writing 
(Gee, 2011) as forms of social practices (Wodak, 2007). The context of language-in- 
use is also considered crucial in the analysis (Wodak, 2000). Discourse is socially 
constitutive as well as socially conditioned. It constitutes situations and social 
identities. It is constitutive both in the sense that it helps to reproduce existing social 
practices, and in the sense that it contributes to transform the existing practices. 
Fairclough and Wodak (1997) suggest that discursive practices can potentially 
produce ideological effects and power relations among different social groups: men 
and women, ethnic groups and social classes.
The discourse analysis in this thesis addresses key legal documents, notably 
civil codes, promulgated by French colonial administration in Cambodia. Key issues 
raised and addressed in these historical documents were picked up. The key issues are 
related to gender roles and relations in the family and wider society.
The reason for choosing the civil codes as the material for the analysis is that 
they were probably the most effective resources that Cambodian society was provided 
to construct certain patterns of masculinities (Edley, 2001). As Wodak (2000 and 
2007) suggests, it is assumed that the issues raised and addressed in the civil codes 
existed at the time in Cambodia as social practices -  practices of men and women. 
The provisions made in the civil codes represented an attempt to transform the social 
status quo and produce new practices.
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The work on historical documents has great importance for studying the 
contemporary Khmer masculinities that are portrayed in life histories of men of this 
thesis. The analysis of historical documents was particularly important to connect or 
link particular attitudes or norms about gender practices of contemporary Cambodian 
men, for examples, the notion of household headship and breadwinning role, to their 
cultural history, i.e., the gender order installed in the course of colonialism in the 
country. The link is made via the notion that when people express an attitude, they do 
so using a repertoire of terms which have been provided by history (Edley, 2001).
One of the weaknesses of using civil codes as the material for the analysis is 
that we lack knowledge or evidence about the extent to which the civil codes were 
enacted in real terms. The less the codes were enacted in the society, the less it was 
likely to produce new discourses. It was impossible to find documents that reveal the 
level of enactment of the civil codes. However, the life histories of men in this thesis 
suggest that the civil codes were very much effective in producing discourses on 
gender roles and relations in the family. Men interviewed in this study often referred 
their gender notions to tradition -actually, to the colonial era.
3.1.2.2 Case Study
The interviewees were asked to narrate their lives. In this narration, focus was 
concentrated on the practices on which they have built their relationships with others 
in different stages of their lives. They were also asked to describe their relationships 
with institutions such as family, school, peers, associations, political parties, 
workplaces, etc. with which they have connected through their lives. They also shared 
information about gender order i.e., gender roles (who does what?) and gender 
relations or power (who makes decisions?) that obtained in different periods of their 
lives.
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In the first step, interviews were recorded. They were then transcribed and 
translated, indexed and assigned a case study identification. Each case study: (a) 
narrated the sequences of events, (b) analysed the structural factors, and (c) analysed 
the dynamics involved in carrying out certain practices. Each case study portrayed the 
person of the case and examined reflections of social change in that portrayal. In the 
second step, the life histories were grouped to explore the similarities and differences 
in the trajectories of men coming from certain social, educational and professional 
backgrounds in order to establish their collective locations in macro-level changes.
3.2 Ethical Issues
The field research involved living humans. Married men were interviewed on 
various aspects of life, including intra-family gender relations. Questions on gender 
relations, particularly on spousal violence, can potentially inflict tension between 
spouses. Measures were taken to ensure privacy and safety of the respondents.
The Human Ethics Committee, at the University of Sydney is the competent 
body at the university level to protect the privacy and safety of participants of all 
researches involving living humans. The field research of this PhD study has fully 
complied with the conditions of the Human Ethics Committee. The field research plan 
was screened and approved by the Committee. The following measures were followed 
to ensure privacy and safety of the participants of this study:
■ Participants were informed about the study in advance. A written Participant 
Information Statement on university letterhead, with details of study 
objectives, purposes, name of the university and the researcher, was provided 
to every participating interviewee. No coercion was used against participants 
of this study. Only their voluntary participation was invited.
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■ Written consent for their voluntary participation in the interview and 
permission to record the interview were taken in the Participant Consent Form.
■ Both the Participant Information Statement and Participant Consent Form 
were translated into the Khmer language. In the case of illiterate participants, 
the information statement and consent form were read to them.
■ Participants were interviewed individually although family members also 
attended the interview in some cases, the participants having given their 
permission.
■ For further protection of the participants' privacy (i) recordings have been held 
securely while in the field and at the university, (ii) anonymity of the 
participants is maintained in all stages of the study, including in published 
documents and during the field interviews, (iii) no one, except the researcher 
and supervisor have access to the data.
3.3 Timeframe of the research
Table 3.2 Timeframe of the Resear eh
No. Activity Timeframe
2010
( J a n - D e c )
2011
( J a n - D e c )
2012
( J a n - D e c )
2013 ( J a n -
M a r c h )
1. G e t  th e  r e s e a r c h  p r o p o s a l  a p p r o v e d F e b
2. G e t  e th ic s  a p p r o v e d M a rc h
3. F ie ld  w o rk
3.1 F irs t  f ie ld  t r ip M ar-A ug
4. T h e s i s  w r i t in g
4.1 D a ta  a n a ly s i s  a n d  th e s is  w r i t in g July-Dee J a n - D e c J a n - J u n e
4 .2 S u b m i t  d r a f t  th e s i s  ( c h a p te r  b y  
c h a p te r )  to  s u p e r v i s o r
J a n - D e c J a n - D e c
4 .3 S u b m i t  f ina l  th e s i s  fo r  e v a lu a t io n  o f  
e x t e r n a l  e x a m i n e r s
M a rc h
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3.4 Scope and limitations of the study
All parties, both in the field and the university extended their utmost support 
in regard to this research. However, I encountered the following problems in the field 
work:
• Some of the participants, particularly with the business entrepreneurs and 
public sector managers, needed to change their appointment times more than 
once, to fit in with their other commitments.
• When asked to tell about their life stories, some participants, particularly the 
peasants and urban workers, told their stories very briefly. They were not 
familiar with the format of the life history interview. This problem was 
addressed by prompting them to elaborate their stories during interview.
• According to the University's ethics approval, it is required to obtain the 
signed consent of the participants on the consent form. When asked to sign the 
consent form, some participants felt uncomfortable. The issue of signing the 
consent form conveyed a negative connotation for some participants, 
suggesting they might be giving an undertaking of some kind. One of the 
participants came to participate in the interview but left when I gave him the 
consent form for his signature. He was concerned that he might be signing 
some form of commitment.
Besides the problems encountered in field interview, the study has a few 
limitations -related to participants and definition of domestic violence -which were 
intentional but unavoidable because of scope and timeframe of the study.
The first limitation is that the study finding is drawn from life histories of men 
only. The perspectives of their wives, particularly about violence and post-
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transformation configuration of masculinities, would be a valuable addition but could 
not be included because of the limitations of time and resources. This would be 
desirable theme for follow-up research.
The second limitation of the study is its focus on physical aggression, not 
other aspects of domestic violence: emotional or psychological, economic and 
mobility. This focus was chosen because physical violence is the main focus of anti­
domestic violence programs and policies in developing countries. Given resources 
limitations, physical violence gets first priority. For example, the penalties for 
perpetration of domestic violence provisioned in the existing anti-DV law6 in 
Cambodia are exclusively based on physical forms of violence. Article 36 of the law 
says, ‘Criminal prosecution shall not be possible if there a request from a victim who 
is an adult due to the offences are minor misdemeanours or petty crimes’. Article of 
the law defines psychological and economic forms of violence as minor 
misdemeanours or petty crimes which are suggested to be reconciled with the help of 
local mediators such as monks, village chief, commune councillors and relatives.
6 The Law on The Prevention o f Domestic Violence and The Protection of Victims, Ministry of 
Women’s Affairs, The Royal Government of Cambodia.
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PART II
HISTORY OF STATE AND GENDER ORDER IN
CAMBODIA
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CHAPTER 4
THE FRENCH EMPIRE IN CAMBODIA AND THE 
REGULATION OF MASCULINITY
4.1 A brief of Cambodia’s overall history
As mentioned in the introduction chapter, Cambodian history records a great 
civilisation followed by colonialism, civil war and then political stability. The Khmer 
Empire had its golden time from the 9lh to the 14lh centuries, when the regime was 
expanded to the neighbouring territories. However, the Khmer Empire encountered 
territorial pushes from Ayutha and Champa kingdoms in the 15lh century. The 
Kingdom eventually opted to become a protectorate of France, which was then 
established as a colonial power in the Indochina region. Cambodia was a protectorate 
or colony of France from 1863 to 1954.
The status of women in pre-colonial Cambodian society was broadly equal to 
men, both in family and social life. Colonial rule, which was significantly influenced 
by the French civil code, promoted differentiated treatment of men and women in the 
family and social life in the country.
Sihanouk, the King of Cambodia, led Cambodia’s independence from the 
colonial power. The country experienced relative peace and development during 
Sihanouk's regime.
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The second Indochina war, which is best known as the Vietnam War, extended 
to Cambodia, giving rise to the Khmer Rouge. Taking power in 1975, the Khmer 
Rouge carried out an extreme revolution which eventually caused a toll of at least 
one-fourth of Cambodian population. The entire social system was disrupted during 
the Khmer Rouge regime.
Following an invasion by Vietnam, the Khmer Rouge regime was deposed and 
the People’s Republic of Kampucha (PRK) was established. The PRK regime 
followed a pro-socialist orthodoxy, and was isolated from the international 
community. After decades of political instability, war and isolation, the nation was 
returned to peace and political stability in 1993 when the country held its first 
democratic election.
Cambodia became a member of World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2005, 
and officially adopted the market-based economic system. New businesses and 
occupations have been emerging in Cambodia since the country moved away from a 
command economy. The emergence of new economic sectors and occupations is 
affecting the traditional ways of living: specifically the patterns of labor force 
participation, labor mobility, the household economy and thus intra-household gender 
relations.
4.2 Social Structures in pre- and early- colonial Cambodia 
4.2.1 Population and livelihood
According to Ayamonier (1900), -an official of the French colony in 
Indochina, Cambodia was home to some 2.3 million people by the end of the 
nineteenth century. Of these, two million were Khmer (Cambodian), and the 
remaining 300,000 were Chinese, Cham and some tribal groups. Khmer people were
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distributed all over Cambodia, except for the upland areas, where tribal groups were 
concentrated.
To Ayamonier the Khmer people are patient and tireless, skilled in manual 
work, including farming, climbing palm trees, and sports. They hold a real racial pride 
which is often translated into a popular adage sruk khmer min tel sun or ‘Cambodia 
will never die’. The major religion of the Khmer people was Buddhism and they were 
pious, tolerant, quiet and hospitable. But they could rise up in cruel and terrible anger 
when they were pushed to extremes. There was solidarity among the peasants which 
was practised on different occasions in the forms of free and mutual assistance.
The livelihood of the Khmer people at the time of colonisation was 
overwhelmingly agriculture-based. The Chinese people were occupied in non-farming 
activities mainly in fishing, fish processing, marketing and trade. The Cham were 
predominantly involved in commercial fishing, weaving silk and cattle trading. They 
were concentrated along the Mekong Delta and Tonle Sap -  the great lake.
4.2.2 Class and Hierarchy among Social Groups
Four social classes were recognised in pre-colonial Cambodian society. These 
were the monarch and dignitaries (other members of the royal family), bonzes, 
mandarins, and peasants. Apart from these social classes, there were slaves. 
According to Bonhoure (1900), a French historian, there was no distinct middle class 
in Cambodia during this time. In pre-colonial Cambodian society, a person could gain 
prestige and respect by righteous conduct and faithful service to the pagoda. But this 
sort of respect was more symbolic than denoting real power. Hierarchy and 
association were strictly observed among these classes. The monarch and dignitaries 
were at the top of the hierarchy. The king was the absolute authority and protector of 
the kingdom and his role and position were quasi-religious.
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Given that religion was an integral part of the nation and the kingdom, the role 
of bonzes in pre-colonial Cambodia was enormous. They were the essential spiritual 
force of the monarchy. They served as teachers through Vat-school (pagoda based 
school) -  the only education system that existed in the pre-colonial era. The head of 
the bonzes served as one of three members of the committee to select a new king for 
the kingdom. Bonhoure (1900) argues that the real power in the provinces was in the 
hands of the bonzes. They were tolerant and highly respected and lived on voluntary 
alms (Aymonier, 1900). They were free from any tax, or obligation to serve royalty.
The mandarins were administrative representatives of the King who performed 
certain tasks on behalf of the King. They formed the ruling class in the pre-colonial 
Cambodian society. They were recruited by the King. Their appointment was for life, 
but subject to the grace and mercy of the King. The title did not automatically transfer 
from father to son, as they needed to earn the King's favour to hold the title. They 
enforced royal decrees, collected taxes, carried out trials, and repressed crimes and 
offences. Their number reached a thousand before the colonial state was established 
(Aymonier, 1900).
Peasants made up the majority of the Cambodian population in the pre­
colonial period. They lived throughout the kingdom and their livelihood was mainly 
subsistence farming. Given the small population, there was sufficient farming land. 
Unlike contemporary British-India, a Zamindery (landlord-tenant relationship) was 
historically absent in Cambodia. The King owned all the land in the kingdom which 
means there was no land market in pre-colonial Cambodia. Peasants were free in their 
everyday life and in the making of their livelihood, but their freedom and civil rights 
were subject to their obligation to provide royal services when required.
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4.2.3 Marriage, Family and Intra-Household Gender Relations
According to Aymonier (1900), traditional wedding rituals and formalities 
were followed in pre- and early- colonial Cambodian society. Arranged marriage was 
commonly practised. The family of the groom usually sent an intermediary to the 
parents of the bride with the marriage proposal. The bride was then asked for her 
consent and upon consent by the bride, the groom served in the home of the 
prospective parents-in-law throughout his courtship, performed a kind of probation. 
The wedding ceremony was held when the groom had passed the probationary period 
and the husband was considered to be the natural protector for his wife. The husband 
would live for many years with his parents-in-law.
Most of the people were monogamous but polygamy was common among the 
elite who could marry as many as three wives (Aymonier, 1900). The wives in a 
polygamous marriage observed a hierarchy. The first wife was the head of the wives 
and enjoyed a number of privileges. No wedding ritual was performed for the second 
and third wife. The first wife also inherited a higher percentage of the family property 
than the second wife and the third wife did not receive any share at all. She was 
considered to be a concubine and was often purchased (Leclère, 1894). Adultery was 
also commonly practised, particularly among the rich.
The wife was subject to her husband, particularly in monogamous families but 
mutual respect was expected between husband and wife. Men and women, 
particularly in peasant families performed different yet complementary roles that 
tended to be valued equally (Jacobsen, 2008). Both men and women performed a 
range of productive tasks (Ministry of Women's Affairs, 2008).
Divorce was practised and the process of divorce was easy. Either spouse
could ask for a divorce. A wife could sue for divorce upon approval of her parents and
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either party could sue for divorce on the grounds of: violence and conflict, prolonged 
absence, or general difficulties in the household (Aymonier, 1900; Leclère, 1898).
Thierry (1955) suggests that Khmer women enjoyed a status equal to that of 
men in the family and in society for fourteen hundred years. Women held many 
different jobs in society, and estates passed through the maternal line. Women were 
fully capable from a legal standpoint. There was no question of intervention by or the 
need for the consent of her husband for any action by a woman. A woman enjoyed the 
same rights as her husband in the community and family. Thierry further suggests that 
the status of Khmer women was gradually degraded through the influence of other 
cultures, including that of China.
With anthropological analysis of a popular Khmer folk story dated back to 
pre-colonial era Ledgerwood (1995) sketches out status of women and intra-family 
gender relations in pre-colonial Cambodian society. She suggests that two notions: a 
man is always bigger than a woman; and men and women are relatively equal, existed 
simultaneously in Khmer society. Therefore, a woman needed to be both silent and 
well-spoken in the same time. A Khmer woman should be virtuous and demonstrate a 
state of high merit so that she and her husband can benefit from it in this life.
4.3 The arrival of colonialism
Over the 18lh and 19th centuries Cambodia suffered from territorial invasion
from the neighbouring countries of Siam and Vietnam. In 1853, Ang Duong, the King
of Cambodia, sought French help to protect Cambodia from further invasion and
potential extinction. The reasons for Ang Duong seeking help from the French rather
than the British and Dutch empires -  that were already in the region -  were probably
that (i) French missionaries were working in Cambodia at that time and the King had
a good relationship with them, (ii) France had already shown its power in the region
71
by establishing a colony in Indochina, and (iii) the British had a good relationship 
with the Thai -  the main threat to Cambodia's sovereignty.
In order to obtain France’s support. King Duong sent some gifts and offered 
his ‘humble homage’ to Napoleon III via the French consulate in Singapore. No 
progress regarding the King’s request took place for a decade during which Siam 
remained the main influence on the affairs of the Palace. King Ang Duong died in 
1860 and was succeeded by Prince Norodom. Finally the request was acted on, 
through a visit to the Kingdom in 1863 by a French naval delegation led by Flenry 
Mouhot. A protectorate treaty was signed on 11 August of the same year. The treaty 
was signed between Norodom (on behalf of Cambodia) and Henry Mouhot (on behalf 
of France) in Odong -  the capital of Cambodia at that time. Odong is 40 km northwest 
of Phnom Penh.
The treaty opened up trade opportunities for France in exchange for protecting 
the Kingdom. The treaty established a common pattern of transnational trade -  the 
collection of raw materials from the colonies, shipment of these materials to the 
Métropole, processing them and marketing the finished products in Europe as well as 
in the colonies. The whole process was operated by the colonial administration. Under 
the treaty the Cambodian King allowed duty-free import of foreign goods and export 
of local goods by the French traders. The French were permitted to establish a river 
port to facilitate shipment of goods to and from Laos -  already a French colony.
The treaty also transferred the Kingdom's authority for foreign policy and 
diplomatic relations with other countries to France. The French Governor of Cochin- 
china looked after Cambodian foreign policy.
The protectorate thus established was administered by a Résident Supérieur
(stationed in Phnom Penh) under the guidance of the Gouverneur Général for Indo-
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Chine (stationed in Saigon). France maintained the Protectorate until 1953 and during 
almost ninety years of Protectorate rule, Cambodia experienced a number of 
Résidents Supérieurs. The kings who ruled during the protectorate were Norodom 
(1860-1904), Sisowath (1904-1927), Monivong (1927-1941) and Sihanouk (1941- 
2004). Cambodia became independent from French rule on November 9, 1953 under 
the leadership of King Sihanouk.
The relationship between the monarch and the Protectorate Administration 
was not always the same. There were serious disagreements between the Protectorate 
and the King, particularly during the time of King Norodom. Disagreements arose 
when the Protectorate wanted to effect political and economic interventions.
The Protectorate carried out administrative, judicial, commercial and financial 
reforms in Cambodia. They developed infrastructures (mainly road and rail), 
established an education system, and health care services and facilities. They ratified 
the original treaty and promulgated new ordinances from time to time. They adopted 
legal codes, the ‘Codes Cambodgiens’ in 1898 and the ‘Code Civil Cambodgien’ in 
1920 which delineated codes of conduct for Cambodian women and men. We can see 
a paradigm shift in codes of conducts from 1898 to 1920. They are key evidence for 
public definitions of masculinity under colonialism.
4.4 Creation of the colonial state
In the first two decades of the treaty, i.e., until 1884. the colonial power could 
make little progress towards establishing a colonial state because of non-cooperation 
by King Norodom and some of his mandarins. Colonial authority was frustrated with 
the lack of progress in terms of implementation of the provisions of the protectorate
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treaty which were essential for running the economy by the colonial empire. 
Frustrations are reflected in colonial narratives7.
The foundation of a colonial state was laid down on 17 June 1884 through the 
forced assent by King Norodom to a reform Convention. Charles Thomson, 
Gouverneur Général in Saigon, arrived in Phnom Penh with armed forces, approached 
the Palace and asked the King to sign the reform Convention which was pre-designed, 
and laid out wide-ranging reforms. It contained provisions for immediate, drastic 
changes in administrative and political institutions, finance (tax and national 
accounts), property (land and building) ownership, and the judiciary system. The 
Convention limited the King's control over the kingdom (Chandler, 1982). It 
proposed reforms in the following areas: political organisation and administration; 
legal organisation; slavery, property rights; and taxation on farming land. It will be 
instructive to examine the details of this founding document.
4.4.1 Political organisation and administration
Decisive political and administrative reforms introduced a structured, 
hierarchical and multi-tiered public sector -  the first of its kind in Cambodian history. 
Under the reform, the Gouverneur Général and Résident Général held the real power 
over all functions of the kingdom.
The French Résident Général became the executive head of the country with 
broad administrative and judicial authority. The Résident Général was in charge of the
For example, Imprimerie Coloniale (1885) Organisation Du Cambodge, Saigon, narrates (page 4), 
‘Comme pendant vingt ans Font déjà été de promesses, par la mauvaise volonté des mandarins 
intéressés à maintenir l’état actuel.’
N Résident Général and Résident Général Supérieur are titles for same position. The title Résident 
Général has been used in the Convention.
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national treasury and accounts. He was assisted by an Assistant Résident Général who 
was also French. The Résident Général was responsible for regular implementation of 
the protectorate treaty, extending to all public services and regulations in the Kingdom 
without distinction. He was to establish a justice system and ensure public safety. The 
Résident Général was also responsible for the preparation of a state budget and for 
presenting it to the governor of Cochin China.
The provisions for the status and role of the King made in the Convention 
were ambiguous. On the one hand he was expected to control the kingdom as in the 
past9. On the other hand, he was bound to accept all reforms deemed necessary and 
important by the Government of the French Republic10- which meant, in effect, the 
Résident Général.
The entire Kingdom was concentrated from fifty seven administrative 
provinces into eight. Each province was headed by a Résident -  a Frenchman 
proposed by the Résident Général and appointed by the Gouvemour Général. The 
Résident of each province was assisted by a Secretary who was also a Frenchman 
proposed by the Résident Général and appointed by the Gouvenor Général. The 
Résident was in charge of political affairs and provincial administration, control of the 
Cambodian authorities, maintaining law and order and monitoring all public services 
in the province. There was a Chief of Province -a  Cambodian who was proposed by 
the Résident Général and appointed by the Gouvernour Général. He worked under the
9 Art. 2. (in page 7) -  ‘S. M. le Roi du Cambodge continuera, comme par le passé, à gouverner ses états 
et à diriger leur administration, sauf les restrictions qui résultent de la présente convention.’
10 Art. 1. (in page 7) -  ‘S. M. le Roi du Cambodge accepte toutes les réformes administratives, 
judiciaires, financières et commerciales auxquelles le Gouvernement de la République française jugera 
à l’avenir utile de procéder pour faciliter l’accomplissement de son Protectorat.'
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control of the Provincial Résident. The Chief of Province ranked highest among the 
indigenous (Cambodian) civil servants. He was assisted by an Assistant Chief of 
Province who was also proposed by the Résident Général and appointed by the 
Gouverneur Général. The entire country was further divided into thirty-two 
administrative districts headed by a Chief of District who was named by the Résident 
Général.
The lowest administrative unit of the reformed administration was the 
commune. Each commune was managed by a Council of six members who served 
crucial roles for the protectorate. Articles 30 and 31 delineated the responsibilities of 
the commune council: (i) to look after criminal justice in the commune, (ii) drafting 
peasants for Corvée labour11 and ensuring their participation, and (iii) collecting 
administrative fines. The commune council was allowed to use coercion to perform 
their assignments.
4.4.2 Legal organisation
Establishing a judicial system was one of the major thrusts of the reform. The 
reformed judiciary had three levels: courts of peace at the district level, provincial 
courts, and a high court in Phnom Penh. Article 2 set out the structure of the justice 
system. The justice system was supposed to follow the principles of equity, local 
custom, and French law which meant the colonial authority was trying to cultivate a 
French value system in the colony.
11 Corvée labour was semi-voluntary but mandatory engagement of rural peasants in public works 
carried out mainly in cities and infrastructure connecting cities. Every farmer was required to work for 
ninety days as part of the Corvée labour.
12 Art. 3. -  Les juges statueront suivant l’équité, en respectant autant que possible les coutumes 
cambodgiennes et en s ’inspirant des principes du Droit française.
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The judges were particularly strict in applying laws relevant to tax and 
customs. The court of peace at the district level was staffed with a Cambodian judge 
and a guard all of whom were appointed by the Résident Général. The court of peace 
was entitled to deal with disputes up to the value of five piastres, and could impose 
prison sentences of up to eight days. The court of peace served as judicial police but 
was not entitled to deal with any dispute between indigenous and French people, or 
involving other Europeans or Americans.
The Provincial Court was chaired by the Provincial Resident, a temporary 
Cambodian judge (named by the Résident Général) and also included a guard. The 
provincial court dealt with criminal cases related to taxation and customs duty as well 
as civil matters. It was responsible for cases referred from the court of justice at 
district level. The Provincial court was entitled to give verdicts of imprisonment up to 
two years or fines up to 200 piastres.
The High Court was based in Phnom Penh. The bench was composed of the 
Résident Général or his delegate, a French civil servant, and two Cambodian judges 
proposed by the Résident Général and appointed by the Gouverneur Général. The 
Résident Général served as the President of the bench.
4.4.3 Abolition of slavery
Slavery was abolished in all parts of Cambodia under the reform. It was 
previously practised throughout the country as a punishment for debts, crimes and 
offenses committed by oneself and or one’s ancestors. Provision was made for the 
immediate release of slaves for crimes or offenses by their ancestors or their family. 
These slaves were released with full rights without any compensation. People 
enslaved for crimes or offenses of their own were transferred to the Provincial Courts
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for judgement. Slaves for personal debts were forced to refund their debts to the 
creditors.
4.4.4 Property rights
The King traditionally owned all of Cambodian kingdom. Under the reform, 
all land became state property and was divided into four types: Crown property 
(belonging to the palace), public domain (i.e., roads, bridges, rivers, ferry-ways, and 
the spaces and buildings of civil administration, etc.), reserve fields (i.e., any facility 
that was deemed to be needed by the administration), and transferrable fields (i.e., 
agricultural and other ground). From this point on. farmers could hold title for the 
land they possessed.
The refonn of land ownership was motivated by the idea of commercialisation 
of agriculture through increased collection of revenue (via tax and export income). 
Peasants were persuaded by the colonial administration and their associates to 
undertake commercial production of rice and to grow other cash crops such as cotton, 
indigo, pepper, tobacco and rubber. The colonial administration considered that lack 
of land ownership was one of the reasons for the peasants' reluctance to engage in 
commercial-scale agriculture. The reform, therefore, gave land title to the peasants. 
The colonial authority brought some 60,000 Vietnamese into Cambodia to support 
rubber plantations (Chandler, 1982).
4.4.5 Tax on paddy
The reform banned the existing practice (Oknhaluong) of tax collection on 
paddy (rice-fields), and introduced a new provision starting from the standing crop in 
1884. The rate of tax for paddy was fixed at 10% of the yield but the paddy intended 
for alcohol production was exempt from the tax. The Protectorate took charge of the 
application of the new land tax.
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Cambodian peasants paid the highest tax per capita in Indochina. The higher 
the tax on paddy the peasants paid, the harder they had to work to produce enough 
rice to feed their families throughout the year. In fact, the peasants were pushed 
towards excessive work. This led to mass protests and violence by the peasants 
against the French protectorate (discussed in the following sections).
The real enforcement of the reforms began in the time of King Sisowath, who 
was officially crowned in 1906. The colonial state now came into full existence as an 
organisation. The education sector was developed and modernised. Health and 
scientific education, including an engineering faculty, were established during this 
time. But the rural economy was not developed to the same extent. State services were 
extended and expanded. Sisowath supported Protectorate policies and interventions 
without argument as he was the beneficiary of the protectorate who crowned him 
while simultaneously dismantling royal power. A number of royal decrees and 
ordinances were promulgated by King Sisowath from time to time to reinforce the 
colonial state.
4.5 Responses to colonialism
The Cambodians response to colonialism was broadly of two forms: complicit 
and protest. These two responses came from distinct positions in the system of 
colonial rule. Power and authority were central in forming both types of response.
4.5.1 Complicit responses
King Sisowath and Cambodian civil servants were complicit with colonial
rule. Sisowath, the half-brother of Norodom, gave unequivocal support to the
establishment of the colonial state. He maintained a positive relationship with the
colonial authority during the reign of Norodom. He was so successful in this, that he
was crowned the new king after Norodom’s death, bypassing Norodom's son.
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Sisowath’s complicit relation to colonialism resulted from negotiation of power at two 
levels: one between himself and the colonial power, and the other between himself 
and his subjects. He made himself submissive at one level to gain power at the 
second. Complicity to the colonial power was the best available option for Sisowath.
The native civil servants were also complicit with colonialism. They served as 
‘fonctionnaires indigènes’ and their collaboration and support were necessary if the 
colonial administration reforms were to function. The colonial authority seems to 
have been happy with their collaboration. A colonial report of 1910 suggests that the 
native civil servants were performing their responsibilities with zeal and enthusiasm13. 
The old civil servants were being replaced by a pool of talented young people who 
had chosen public service after being rigorously examined and evaluated.
Two factors worked behind the complicit role of native civil servants towards 
establishing the colonial state. First, serving in the French colonial administration was 
perceived as prestigious and honourable. The French had established a great Empire at 
that time and were already a colonial power in Indo-China when the Cambodian king 
sought protection. Second, their service in the colonial state gave them position of 
power over other natives. Specifically, this was an opportunity for Cambodians of 
non-mandarin background to work in state services.
The colonial state established and maintained racial and class boundaries. 
Different ethnic groups were treated differently. For example, a differentiated rate of 
personal income tax was introduced for Khmer, Chinese, Cham and other ethnic 
groups. This created class division among different ethnic groups. In official 
meetings, staffs of different ethnic backgrounds were not allowed to mix. For
13 Session Ordinaire Du Conseil Supérieur 1910, Imprimerie d’Extrème-Orient: Hanoi-Haiphong. P.39.
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example, in the quarterly meeting of the Municipal Commission of Phnom Penh, 
members of Khmer ethnicity sat in the second row (French staff sat in the first row) 
followed by Cham, Chinese and Indian members.
4.5.2 Protest response
Responses from King Norodom -  the signatory to the Protectorate Treaty - 
and lower-ranked native Cambodians, particularly peasants and monks, had 
demonstrated their resistance against colonialism. Colonial documents suggest that 
the colonial state was only a shadow until 1904 (when Norodom died) although the 
reform Convention was signed in 1884. Norodom signed the Convention under 
compulsion but his non-cooperation prevented the reforms taking effect. Because of 
the reform, the monarch would come under the control of foreigners. He held 
extensive power in his realm outside politics14, raised families with several wives, 
kept concubines, maintained a harem and enjoyed a luxurious life despite the fact that 
the monarch was supposed under the control of the Gouverneur Général and Résident 
Général.
Tax -  the ultimate means of performing royal power -  came under the direct 
control of the colonial administrators. The national treasury was seized and under the 
terms of the reform, the King was prohibited from raising in-kind taxation. The King 
was not allowed to receive any unauthorised loan and property. The colonial power
14 A M. Le Baron Benoist-D’Azy, Director, Colonial Department of Navy and Colonies termed King 
Norodom as Machas-che-Vit in the report presented to the Ministry o f Navy and Colonies. Rapport Sur 
Le Cambodge Presente Le 24 Janvier 1874 Au Ministère De La Marine Et Des Colonies. Imprimerie F. 
Debons ET C IE: Paris, p. 1.
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also set a limitation on expenses for the King and palace dignitaries15. All the 
provisions contained in the Convention threatened the King's power and authority. 
His non-cooperation was not surprising.
The peasants and monks were also against colonialism. They protested against 
tax, Corvée labour (a substitute for tax of ninety days of labour service) and forced 
recruitment of Cambodians to serve overseas in the French army -  all of them pillars 
of the colonial empire. They expressed their antagonism through means ranging from 
peaceful protest to fatal rebellions. Their protests resulted from systematic repression 
that took place through strict rules, regulations and disciplinary actions imposed on 
the population (in the form of Corvée labour and taxes on paddy), and mobility -  
important infringements of the perceived rights of masculinity. These sorts of 
regulations were new to Cambodians and conflicted with their traditional ways of 
performing as men. Key moments of protest are discussed in the following section. 
4.5.3 Resistance and repression
Not long after the major growth of the colonial state began, a wave of 
resistance and rebellion emerged. The main responses were:
The Ang Snguon Rebellion (1912)
15 Article 7 of Part I (in page 6) of the Convention reads, ‘A special arrangement will be adopted for 
setting the civil list o f the King and the Princes of the Royal family after the establishment of the 
definitive budget of the Kingdom. The civil list of the King is provisionally set at three hundred 
thousand piastres; the staffing of the Princes is provisionally set at xx thousand piastres. The 
distribution will be stopped following agreement between H.M. the King of Cambodia and the 
Governor General of Cochin-China. H.M. the King of Cambodia is prohibited from acquiring any debt 
without the consent of the Government of the Republic.’
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Ang Snguon was a defrocked monk who took the name of Ang Snguon -  a 
deceased prince and uncle of King Sisowath. He led an uprising in the early years of 
King Sisowath, in the northern region of the country (Stung Treng, Kratie and 
Kampong Thom province). He was able to convince a large number of fearful and 
credulous people that he was the ‘king of the country’. He carried out an attack on the 
French Residence at Thala-Borivet in Porong region and became an icon for other 
rebels in the country (Tully, 2002).
Sena Ouch Rebellion (1913-1916)
Ouch, another former monk, carried out a rebellion in the form of social 
banditry from 1913-1916. He was considered a Robin Hood. According to authorities, 
Ouch claimed to be guided by supernatural forces, and to have as his aim Cambodian 
independence and the expulsion of foreigners.
In 1914, Ouch had a group of at least 100 active and dedicated followers who 
were tattooed and carried amulets16. A number of peasants were complied in Ouch’s 
rebellion, providing information about the government's militia forces. Ouch's group 
attacked the Apostolic Mission's plantation at Chhlong and shot its chief, Father R.P. 
David (Tully, 2002).
Phnong Revolt (1914-1916)
Phnong is a hill tribe who live in the northern and eastern regions (Kratie, 
Stung Treng province) of Cambodia. They had been living in the mountains for 
millennia using shifting cultivation. As with native Cambodians, the colonial 
administration imposed tax and Corvée labour on the Phnong as part of a reform in 
1912. The imposition of tax and Corvée labour meant that Phnong needed to adopt the
16 Rapport au Conseil de Gouvernement 1916. Impr. D’Extrême-Orient: Hanoi; p.78
83
way of life of the plains population which seemed absurd and irrational to the Phnong. 
According to colonial documents17, the Phnong revolted in reaction against the 
imposition of tax. The Protectorate continued to impose its plan and a revolt followed 
with heavy casualties although statistics are not available for Phnong casualties. By 
the end of 1916, the revolt had caused the deaths of three Frenchmen, including the 
Chief Delegation of Kratié, and some 130 Cambodian militia and guards.
The 1916 Affairs
In January 1916, Cambodia experienced the biggest-ever uprising of peasants 
in its history. According to Tully (2002), an estimated 100,000 peasants from all parts 
of the country gathered in Phnom Penh to submit a petition to King Sisowath against 
the arbitrary and corrupt rule of commune council leaders and civil servants, the high 
taxation level, corvée labour and the forced recruitment of Cambodians to serve in the
French military overseas. Colonial authorities termed this movement ‘The 1916
• 1 8  • •  • , . . Affairs' . The revolutionaries sought intervention from the King on these issues.
Such a huge gathering of peasants in the capital city, directly approaching the king
without being organised by any mainstream political leader, was a surprise and a
warning to the colonial administration.
State response to protest
The internal report19 of the colonial administration reveals that the regime 
quickly changed its strategy in response to this turbulence moving their reliance on 
local government to dependence on the police force. They could not depend on local 
government agencies such as the commune councils, and police numbers were
17 Rapport au Conseil de Gouvernement 1915 and 1916. Impr. D’Extrême-Orient: Hanoi.
18 Rapport au Conseil de Gouvernement 1916. Impr. D’Extrême-Orient: Hanoi; p.76.
19 Rapport au Conseil de Gouvernement 1916. Impr. D’Extrême-Orient: Hanoi; p.78.
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increased during the years of revolt and protest. Ironically, the police recruits were
also local people and all of them were men.
Table 4.1 Number o f Police in 1914-1916
Year Number of members
1914 1,5002ü
1915 1,70021
1916 2,40022
The colonial authority had other tactics available, such as using native civil 
servants, commune leaders and neighbours in the forefront to tackle rebellion, 
banditry and revolts. For example, after the killing of the Chief Delegation of Kratié 
by Phnongs in July 1914, the colonial authority carried out both military and non- 
military campaigns. The official report of the colonial authority ' describes the 
strategy. Military security posts were installed under the direct supervision of French 
commanders. Each security post was equipped with improved arms, ammunition and 
motorised vehicles. At the same time a civilian campaign was undertaken: the 
officials, merchants and local residents were called on to penetrate the territory of the 
Phnongs. Markets were developed to promote trade and commerce with the lowlands. 
Local products which were formerly used for subsistence by the Phnongs were 
absorbed into the commercial market. The traditional way of living of the Phnongs 
was eventually disrupted.
0 Rapport au Conseil de Gouvernement 1915. Impr. D 'Extrêm e-O rient: Hanoi; p.78.
21 Ibid.
22 Rapport au Conseil de Gouvernement 1916. Impr. D 'Extrêm e-O rient: Hanoi; p.76. 
Rapport au Conseil de Gouvernement 1915. Impr. D ’Extrême-Orient: Hanoi; p.65.
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Violence and social tension could result from such tactics. Placing Cambodian 
civil servants in the front ranks of the campaign against the rebellion created rivalry 
among the natives (for example, peasants and Phnongs versus civil servants, police, 
and commune leaders). It was not just a matter of French violence towards 
Cambodians; violence among Cambodians was also generated.
There had been violence in pre-colonial Cambodia but the violence in pre­
colonial Cambodia primarily took the form of banditry (Tully, 2002). The violence 
during French colonialism was different in terms of scale, mode, people involved and 
the fatalities. Violence erupted from national to local level. People who had 
traditionally been peaceful such as monks, tribal ethnic groups (Phnongs) and 
peasants, organised and led movements which sometimes turned violent.
Although most studies (Tully, 1996 and Chandler, 1983) on colonial rule in 
Cambodia link violence with tax and Corvée labour imposed by the colonial 
authority, the leadership role of Buddhist monks -  who were usually exempted from 
tax24 and Corvée labour -  in two of the most serious rebellions gives reason to seek 
causes of violence beyond tax and Corvée labour. Furthermore, an internal report2^  of 
the colony published at the start of the period of major violence (1910-1916) suggests 
that people were paying taxes voluntarily and the administrative staff were able to 
collect tax without any difficulty.
An alternative explanation is that native Cambodians took the path of violence 
and social protest to remove the stigma of subordination -  which was institutionalised 
through a system of rules, regulations, and disciplines. French colonial authority ruled
4 According to the Royal Ordinance dated 31 December 1897 certain people including Monks 
(Bonzes) and their assistant/associates were exempted from personal tax.
25 Session Ordinaire Du Conseil Supérieur 1910, Imprimerie d’Extrème-Orient: Hanoi-Haiphong.
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Cambodia with the perception of a father-child relationship" where the child -  the 
native Cambodian -  needed to be disciplined to grow up with a French value system. 
The system was carried out by Frenchmen, native civil servants and local leaders. All 
of them were considered indifferent to the ordinary Cambodian people, particularly to 
the peasants.
The creation of a colonial state brought about many changes in the traditional 
ways of living. The people came under strict regulation in almost every aspect of life, 
ranging from restricted mobility, to mandatory Corvée labour, to paying tax for all 
usable goods, even for insignificant fishing gear. Civil codes that came into force on 
January 1, 1916 further regulated the life of Cambodians, particularly in their family 
and sexual life. Some traditional practices regarding family and sexuality became 
crimes in the civil codes.
Under the 1884 Convention, people's mobility was restricted. Commune 
councils issued identification cards to all residents of the commune. Commune 
residents were not allowed to stay outside the commune for more than eight days. If 
someone wanted to travel outside the commune, he was required to obtain permission 
from the Mayor of the commune council. Similar processes were required if someone 
wanted to go outside his/her canton, district or province. The reasons for putting 
restriction on people's mobility were to ensure that people did not evade tax or 
Corvée labour, and to control people's political organisation.
The colonial authority needed a huge workforce to carry out public works 
(construction of roads, railways, buildings, bridges, telegraph lines) for the colonial
Rapport Sur Le Cambodge Presente Le 24 Janvier 1874 Au Ministère De La Marine Et Des 
Colonies. Imprimerie F. Debons ET C IE: Paris, p.5.
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economy. Though the colonial administration abolished slavery, the provision of 
Corvée labour was another form of forced labour which was due to the State.
The development programmes carried out by the colonial administration were 
pro-colonial economy. The road, train and other infrastructures were targeted to serve 
export-oriented interests and took place in particular geographical locations (e.g. train 
services connected Phnom Penh to the Thai border via Battambang and Siem Reap -  
two rice producing provinces, and the port-city later known as Sihanouk Ville). The 
peasants found the colonial development of little benefit for them; but rather a 
systematic subordination in the form of coercive tax and Corvée labour. They rebelled 
in protest at their subordination, as many others did. across the colonised world.
Monks, who were previously respected and treated as holy man, came, like the 
peasants, under specific regulations. After 1884. they were obliged to carry an identity 
card" , and needed permission to visit places other than their residential pagodas. 
Their roles as teachers were also eroded with the establishment of modern secular 
schools. They were excluded from the state machinery. The rebellion of monks such 
as Ang Snguom and Ouch can be seen as a reaction against this control and an attempt 
to regain their social privilege and respect.
4.6 Legal construction of masculinity under colonialism
Colonialism was often figured as a gendered enterprise and was undertaken in 
a gender-specific way. The conquest and consolidation of the Kingdom of Cambodia 
by France was not an exception. Colonisation of Indochina, including Cambodia, was 
carried out by cadres of French men -  naval officers, soldiers and administrators 
(Cooper, 2001).
2" Royal ordinance dated 30 December 1916 promulgated identification card for Buddhist monks.
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Use of force was vital for French authority to establish the colonial state in 
Cambodia. Main events of colonial rule such as 1884 Reform Convention, tax 
collection, and enforcement of Corvée labour, all took place in a climate of 
compulsion.
Many administrative, legal, economic and social reforms took place during the 
colonial rule. Traditional gender practices of Cambodians were contested and 
restructured by the reforms. Men’s and women's relative position in gender relations 
was altered under Code Cambodgiens (1898) and Code Civil Cambodgien (1920), 
two notable legal instruments which had made tremendous changes in the ways 
Cambodian people made their common culture, tradition and living.
4.6.1 Codes Cambodgiens 1898
Codes Cambodgiens came into effect in 1898 through a Royal Decree by King 
Norodom under the auspices of M. Ducos, Resident Superior and M. Doumer, 
Governor General of Indochina. It laid out codes of conduct for the Cambodian 
people in various areas including family and marriage. The legal provisions adopted 
in the Codes Cambodgiens were partly influenced by the codes from pre-colonial 
times. For this research, the legal provisions of the Codes Cambodgiens surrounding 
the issues of marriage and family life are particularly important. There are numerous 
articles in the codes dealing with the roles and relations of spouses, polygamy, 
adultery, spousal violence and divorce.
4.6.1.1 Men as the Reciprocal Leader of Wife
Marriage was regarded as honourable in the Codes Cambodgiens. A man was 
supposed to get married, cohabit with his wife and have several children. Marriage 
was only allowed between two people of different sex and the consent of both 
intending spouses was required in the Codes Cambodgiens.
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The status of husband and wife was reciprocal. A husband must provide food 
and other amenities to his wife (Article 37, p. 278, vol. I). A wife could seek divorce 
in case her husband failed to support her and family. On the other hand, a woman was 
obliged to cohabit with her husband and help make a family (Article 44, p. 254, vol. 
I). A husband was entitled to seek divorce on the ground of non-cohabitation by his 
wife (Articles 20 and 21, p. 244, vol. I).
Though women were designated for family-making, there were no restrictions 
on women’s economic activities in the Codes Cambodgiens. Similarly, men’s 
entitlement in seeking divorce was granted mainly on the issue of wife’s non­
cohabitation. not on her failing the role of making the family. The productive roles of 
a husband and the reproductive roles of a wife were seen as complementary in the 
Codes.
4.6.1.2 Extra-marital sexuality, social disorder and legal sanction
Sexual fidelity was considered an important element of married life. The 
Codes Cambodgiens made significant legal provisions against adultery or extra­
marital sex by both spouses. This implies that there was a lot of adultery in early 
colonial Cambodian society. Adultery was considered illegal and was subject to a 
fine. The amount of the fine varied depending on the status in marriage of the woman 
involved in adultery i.e., whether she was a Prapon Thom (first wife), Prapon Kandal 
(second wife) or Prapon Chhong (third wife), and her social class i.e., whether she is 
the wife of a dignitary or an ordinary man. Men were allowed to have several wives in 
early colonial Cambodian society.
When adultery occurred with Prapon Thom the full fine was imposed. When
adultery occurred with Prapon Kandal or Prapon Chhong the fines were four fifths or
three fifths of the maximum, respectively (Art. 2&3, p. 238, vol. I). On the other
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hand, the fine was doubled when the adultery occurred with the wife of a dignitary. 
The dignitary was even entitled to kill the man who had adulterous relations with his 
wife (Article 10, p. 241, vol. I). The fine could be halved when the adultery occurred 
between a married man and an abandoned woman (Article 47, p. 254, vol. I) or a 
married man and a single girl (Article 2, p. 264, vol. I). The code required the man 
guilty of adultery to make full payment of the fine. The fine was deposited in the 
Royal treasury and a portion given to the husband of the adulterous woman. The 
provision of fines suggests that marital infidelity was more common among men than 
women as only men were made to pay the fine. It also suggests that the Codes 
Cambodgiens attempted to treat and fine adultery more rigorously than sex between 
non-married couples (articles 3 and 6, p. 264 and 265 respectively, vol. I). The fine 
for adultery was higher than the fine for sex between an unmarried couple. Social 
class further influenced the degree of correct sexual behaviour among married people, 
particularly women. Proper sexual behaviour of women of a higher social class such 
as the wives of dignitaries was more valued than that of women of ordinary men.
4.6.1.3 Spousal violence and the Codes Cambodgiens
The Codes Cambodgiens was completely intolerant of spousal violence. It was 
enshrined by non-violence Buddhist teaching which had been nourished by 
Cambodian society for long time. All sorts of violence, including psychological 
violence were punishable and punishments ranged from fines to the death penalty. 
Punishment could be imposed on any spouse depending on the offense. Usually, the 
punishment for a husband was harsher than for a wife. According to the Codes 
Cambodgiens, if a woman cursed, insulted or criticised her husband, she would be
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fined five damloeng . If a woman hit her husband and caused a bruise or injury, she 
would be seized and placed in chains. Then all her property would be confiscated and 
shared equally between her husband and the royal treasury (Article 43, p. 309, vol. I). 
The Codes also criminalise men’s violence against their wives by fines (Article 25, 
p.245, vol.I). A woman in a violent marriage was entitled to divorce her husband 
(Article 42, pp. 252-253, vol. I). The Codes Cambodgiens were created to establish 
and maintain harmony and non-coercive relationships in the family. It was concerned 
to enable the spouses to perform their roles with mutual respect.
4.6.1.4 Polygamy, Aristocrat Masculinity and Men’s Subjectivity to Prapan 
Thom (first degree wife)
Men were allowed to have more than one wife under the provisions of Codes 
Cambodgiens although Cambodian society was largely monogamous. National 
statistics of marriage registration in the years 1950, 1951 and 1952 suggest that only 
2.1%, 1.6% and 1.7% of the marriages registered during these years were celebrated 
as second degree marriage (Thierry, 1955). Polygamy was mainly common among the 
mandarins and other rich men. The Codes Cambodgiens made a considerable number 
of provisions regarding polygamy.
Prapon Thom (the first wife) enjoyed privileges in relations to both her 
husband and her husband's other wives. Even if her husband was considered an 
aristocrat, he needed permission and approval from the Prapon Thom in many family 
issues, including whether he can take another wife (article 26, p. 245, vol. I). She 
would seek divorce if her husband took another wife without her consent and she 
inherited almost all the family property on the death of her husband. She was the only
:x Damloeng is the unit of gold and is equal to 10 Gram.
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wife permitted to attend social and public affairs. Other wives were not allowed to 
take part in any social and public functions and were expected to respect and honour 
the Prapon Thom and provide her with services (article 26, pp-245-246, vol. I).
The consent of the Prapon Thom for another wife suggests that sexual 
promiscuity of aristocratic men was under the control and censorship of the Prapon 
Thom. Giving consent to her husband for another wife she could enjoy equal status in 
intra-household gender relations throughout her life. The place and status of the 
Prapon Thom in the household were equal to those of her husband. Men in 
polygamous marriages needed to co-operate with their wife of first degree. In some 
cases they might need to accept her authority, particularly if ambiguities arose in 
relation to their other wives.
4.6.2 Code Civil Cambodgien 1920
The Code Civil Cambodgien (or Civil Code for Cambodia) came into force on 
July 1, 1920 through a royal decree (Royal Decree no. 17). The 1920 Civil Code was 
endorsed on February 25, 1920 by Sisowath, the King of Cambodia with the approval 
of Baudoin, Resident Superior and Long, Governor General of Indochina. Drawing on 
the French Civil Code of 1804, it laid out codes of conduct for Cambodians in 
different spheres of life, including marriage and family life. The civil code adopted 
provisions particularly in the areas of marriage and family life which were more 
patriarchal compared with the provisions of Codes Cambodgiens, removing women's 
freedom of choice and reinforcing men's authority over their wives.
4.6.2.1 Men as Sole Breadwinner
The complimentary gender role between men and women which existed in 
pre-colonial era was replaced in course of colonial rule. The replacement took place
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within the view that domestic work is women’s work and is less important than the 
work that takes place outside the home (Aing 2004).
The Code Civil Cambodgien gave men power as the sole breadwinners of the 
family. This was achieved in two ways: first by obliging men to provide for their 
wives and families, and second by limiting women's participation in economic 
activities. Articles 193, 197 and 198 are relevant in this regard. Men are made to 
provide support and resources for their wives and families (Article 193) as per the 
need.
The Code Civil brought women’s participation in any economic activity under 
the control of their husbands (Article 198). They could only run a trade, business or 
any other form of economic activity with the permission of their husbands (Article 
197). According to the Code Civil Cambodgien (Article 207), a woman could seek 
divorce if her husband failed to support her and the family. The legal provisions 
combined to define men as the breadwinners for the family.
4.6.2.2 Men and Patriarchy
The Code Civil Cambodgien endorsed patriarchy. Cambodian men enjoyed 
increased authority in many new areas. The new civil code gave them more rights to 
exert their authority and became more flexible with reference to some conduct which 
had been subject to strict legal action under the Codes Cambodgiens. For example, 
according to article 336 of Code Civil Cambodgien, the father alone was vested with 
the parental authority to issue consent for their children to marry whereas the fathers' 
consent by itself had been insufficient in the Codes Cambodgiens.
According to the old civil code, a polygamous man needed consent from his
wife of first degree to take a wife of second degree. His wife of first degree could
seek divorce to the court, if he acquired a second wife without her consent. This legal
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provision in the old civil code had limited men's patriarchal practice. Furthermore, the 
requirement of consent gave an extra privilege to the first degree wife in intra­
household gender relations. This undermined the power and authority of the husband 
to some extent. This mandatory provision was omitted in the new civil code. Men 
could acquire second or third wives without obtaining the consent of the first wife. 
Polygamous men could, therefore, exert complete patriarchal authority over their wife 
of first degree.
The new civil code gave more flexibility to men in adultery. According to 
Codes Cambodgiens, adultery by any spouse could be the ground of divorce. But 
Code Civil Cambodgien limited this provision and made a distinction between 
adultery of the husband and adultery of the wife. A wife's adultery could be regarded 
by her husband as grounds for divorce whereas a husband’s adultery was not to be 
regarded by his wife as grounds for divorce. The Code Civil Cambodgien normalised 
men's adultery, giving sexual freedom to men.
4.7 Changes in the Cambodian gender order
The Code Civil Cambodgien produced new gender regimes in the course of its 
enforcement and application.
Both Codes Cambodgiens and Code Civil Cambodgien considered a husband
as the head of his wife and his family. He was entrusted to give protection and support
to his wife and other family members. Following the traditional way of making life in
the early colonial period in Cambodian society, men's positions as head of the family
was defined only by custom. With the consolidation of the colonial state, the life and
livelihood of the Cambodian people changed significantly. The country moved to a
real bureaucratic state through the modernisation of all sectors, particularly in public
administration, the legal and justice system, and the economy and business. People
95
interacted with the bureaucratic state and its institutions in daily life as the country 
became relatively modern. In such an atmosphere of social and political change, a 
husband's status as the head of wife and family became functional rather than 
customary. A wife’s subordination to her husband came into practice so that during 
the period of the Code Civil Cambodgien, a man could enjoy his position as head of 
his wife and family in a real sense.
A woman needed to recognise her husband’s authority in almost all spheres of 
life. She needed formal permission from her husband (as head of the family) for all 
affairs such as filing a case in a local court lodging a complaint, opening a business 
or trade, enrolling her children in school, arranging religious rituals and even for 
agreeing to her children marrying.
There was no provision in Codes Cambodgiens that arrested or limited 
women's freedom of choice in public affairs such as running a business or trading, 
filing any complaint or taking a case to the local authority or tribunal. But the Code 
Civil Cambodgien set provisions which eventually limited women’s freedom of 
choice in various areas ranging from opening a trade or business and filing a legal or 
official complaint. A woman was not entitled to pursue any case or engage in any 
public, social or other affairs or events without the permission of her husband (article 
195). Any act by the wife without her husband’s permission was voidable (article 
198). She could not take a case to court or engage in public or community affairs 
without prior permission from her husband (article 198). She was not empowered to 
open any trade or make any deal with others without the approval of her husband. Her 
freedom of choice came totally under the authority of her husband.
Imposition of these restrictions on women’s freedom by the Code Civil
Cambodgien was precarious for women’s overall freedom and emancipation. Women
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were excluded from mainstream society and restricted to domestic affairs only. This 
could make women fully dependent on their husbands in both economic and non­
economic terms. Their subordination to husband was reinforced. On the other hand, 
restriction of women’s freedom of choice strengthened patriarchal control. To a 
striking degree, therefore, the legal system of later French colonialism provided 
pressure towards increased gender inequality in the context of modernisation. The 
consequences of this shift will be traced in the later chapters of this thesis.
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CHAPTER 5
POLITICAL ECONOMY, SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND 
VIOLENCE IN POST-COLONIAL CAMBODIA
5.1 Cambodia’s Independence from French colonial rule and social 
structures in post-colonial Cambodia (1954-1970)
5.1.1 Background of Cambodia’s Independence
Cambodia became independent from French rule on November 9, 1953. 
Cambodia's independence was accelerated by national and global politics, particularly 
those of World War II. King Norodom Sihanouk is hailed as the architect of 
Cambodia’s independence. A brief account of Cambodia’s independence follows.
Prince Norodom Sihanouk was crowned as King of Cambodia on 25lh April 
1941 by the French Protectorate. He was only nineteen years old. Sihanouk was 
crowned at a time when the entire world was suffering the upheaval of World War II. 
France was invaded by the German army in June 1940 but the northern zone of France 
was able to maintain some legal authority from July 1940 to August 1944 through its 
subservience to the Axis Powers. The administrative centre of the northern zone was 
Vichy and the regime is commonly referred as Vichy France. French colonial 
Indochina was loyal to Vichy France during World War II.
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Vichy Indochina signed an accord on 22 September 1940 with Japan which 
allowed Japanese troops to be stationed in Indochina. The purpose of the accord was 
to prevent China from importing arms and fuel through French Indochina. The accord 
allowed up to 6,000 Japanese troops to be stationed in Indochina. Japanese land, naval 
and air forces were, however, barred from Indochina territory except as authorised in 
the accord. Hours after signing the accord, Japanese troops breached the conditions of 
the accord and closed the railhead at Lang Son, the gateway to China. Vichy 
Indochinese troops opposed Japanese troops and fought against them until 25 
September when Japan forces secured victory and opened the way to Hanoi.
On 9 March 1945, the Japanese armed forces delivered an ultimatum for 
Vichy Indochinese troops to disarm. Those who refused were massacred and the 
colonial administration was effectively dismantled. The Japanese pressed the Empire 
of Vietnam, the Kingdom of Laos and the Kingdom of Cambodia to declare their 
independence. Taking this opportunity, the new King Norodom Sihanouk declared 
Cambodia independent from French rule on 13 March 1945 and formed a national 
government with Son Ngoc Thanh as Foreign Minister.
On 15 August 1945, Japan surrendered to Allied forces. The Allied force
arrived in Phnom Penh on 8 October 1945 with British Lt. Col. E.D. Murray in
command. The Allied force arrested Thanh for his collaboration with the Japanese and
sent him into exile in France to remain under house arrest. In 1946, Khmer Issarak
(Independent Khmer), an anti-French nationalist resistance movement was established
in the north-western part (Battambang and Siem Reap) of Cambodia, an area that was
still under the control of Thailand. Khmer Issarak was a heterogeneous group
consisting of people from leftist factions, Vietnamese leftists, Khmer nationalists and
anti-monarch Khmers. Early leaders of Khmer Issarak such as Son Ngoc Thanh, Dap
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Chhuon and Norodom Chantaraingsey came from the elite class. Chhuon served as a 
Sergeant in Thai army before joining the revolutionary movement. Chantaraingsey 
was a prince. Due to the violent pressure from Khmer Issarak, the French authorities 
allowed Cambodia to form political parties in 1946.
Two major parties, namely the Democratic Party headed by Prince Sisowath 
Yutevong and the Liberal Party headed by another Prince Norodom Norindeth were 
formed. The Democratic Party modelled after the French Fourth Republic focused on 
civil liberties and parliamentary democracy. Ideologically, the Democratic Party was 
anti-French. The Democratic Party represented professional elites, intellectuals and 
the luminary classes. On the other hand, the Liberal Party favoured gradual departure 
from French rule and favoured moves to take power slowly from the French 
authorities. Unlike the Democratic Party, the Liberal Party attracted rural elites such 
as landowners, businessmen, civil servants and Buddhist monks.
The first national election was held in 1946 under French authority. The 
Democratic Party won the national election and formed a constitutional government 
with Prince Yutevong as the Prime Minister. Although a constitutional government 
was in power, France was the executive authority of the country. Prince Yutevong 
lied on 17 July 1947.
Due to conflict among the political elite, including conflict with the king,
Morodom Sihanouk dissolved the National Assembly on 18 September 1949 and
iigned a treaty with France that granted some independence for Cambodia. The new
reaty gave administrative power to Cambodians. In addition, Battambang and Siem
Leap gained autonomy and were administered by the Cambodian government. These
wo north-western provinces of Cambodia have experienced Thai invasion twice and
Thailand controlled these two provinces from 1795 to 1907. During the protectorate
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rule of France in Cambodia, Thailand returned these provinces to Cambodia through 
the French Siamese Treaty of 1907. Thailand regained the control of these provinces 
from 1941 to 1946 as part of a deal they made with the Japanese army during the 
World War II. After the defeat of Japan, Thailand returned these provinces to 
Cambodia. After the treaty, Cambodian politics experienced some internal problems. 
King Sihanouk went to France in March 1953 to ask for complete independence for 
Cambodia. The French authorities threatened the king with replacement if he 
continued to negotiate in the interests of Cambodian independence.
After being refused, king declared a 'royal crusade for independence.’ He 
lobbied with other major powers such as the USA, Canada and Japan for 
independence. King Sihanouk established his quarters in Siem Reap, an autonomous 
zone. Lieutenant Colonel Lon Nol was in command of Siem Reap at that time. In the 
meantime, the whole Indochina region was in turmoil over French rule. King 
Sihanouk and Lon Nol jointly resisted and fought against French rule. The Khmer 
Issarak movement also added its strength to the resistance. Finally, on 3 July 1953, 
the French authorities declared that they were ready to discuss full independence for 
Cambodia. King Sihanouk returned to Phnom Penh and Cambodia gained full 
independence from French rule on November 9, 1953.
5.1.2 Cambodia as an Independent State
Prince Norodom Sihanouk served as the first Prime Minister of Independent
Cambodia from 1953 to 1970. Sihanouk was King before becoming Prime Minister.
He relinquished his crown on 2 March 1955 to engage in politics and established a
political party named the Sangkum Reastr Niyum (Popular Socialist Community).
Khmer nationalism, loyalty to the monarch, the struggle against injustice and
corruption and protection of the Buddhist religion were the major ideologies of
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Sihanouk's new political party. He brought major contending political groups, both 
left and right-wing, under the one umbrella of Sangkum Reastr Niyum. Another reason 
for bringing different political groups under one umbrella was to avoid the political 
and military conflicts that had developed across post-colonial Indochina in this time.
National parliamentary elections were held in September 1955. Sihanouk's 
Sangkum party defeated the Democrats, winning 83% of the vote and all of the seats 
in the National Assembly. Sihanouk became Prime Minister of the National 
Assembly. In 1963, Sihanouk forced the National Assembly to approve a 
constitutional amendment that made him head of state with no fixed term of office. 
The next national election was held in 1966. Sihanouk’s Sangkum won in this election 
too. Unlike previous national elections, right-wing Sangkum leaders captured most of 
the seats. Lon Nol. a rightist who had been a longstanding associate of Sihanouk, won 
a seat in parliament, and became the Prime Minister.
Sihanouk's regime was relatively peaceful in terms of political stability and 
socio-economic development. Sihanouk attempted to modernise Cambodia through 
industrial development. The key strategies to achieve his aims were to maintain 
political stability, economic independence and infrastructure development, and to 
increase the people’s access to health and education.
The first and second two-year plans (1956-57 and 1958-59) and three five-year
plans (1960-1964, 1964-1968, and 1968-1972) were adopted to achieve the ambitious
plan for Cambodia’s industrialisation. The national budget was predominantly
foreign-aid-dependent, particularly from America and the socialist bloc. All these
plans emphasised development of physical infrastructure such as national road
networks, bridges, port development, and the use of Cambodia's human resources.
The road networks tripled to 16,697 km in 1969 from 4.805 km in 1955. A sea port
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(Sihanoukville) was established in 1958. In terms of human resources development, 
Sihanouk established an overwhelming number of schools at all levels. The purpose 
of establishing increased numbers of school was to produce educated and trained 
Cambodians to serve in national agencies. Although Cambodia became independent 
in 1953, Sihanouk depended on foreigners, particularly the French, for technical 
positions in his government due to lack of skilled local human resources. Table 1, 
shows the growth of schools during Sihanouk's regime.
Table 5.1 Number o f Schools in 1955 and 1968
Level of school Number of school in
1955 1968
Primary school 2,731 5,857
Secondary school 12 180
Technical and professional school 05 99
Universities 0 09
(Source: Ear, 1995)
Sihanouk also increasingly emphasised health care. Numbers of hospitals (59 
hospitals in 1968 compared to 16 in 1955) and clinics (553 clinics in 1968 compared 
to 103 in 1955) were established over the period. Increased number of hospitals and 
clinics over the period indicates that Sihanouk gave great importance to public 
welfare.
The political economy of Sihanouk's government was pro-socialist. The state 
took control of all economic production. Sectors such as energy, transport, electricity, 
education, health, industry, etc. were nationalised. There was, however, room for 
private ownership within this pro-socialist economic system. The mixed economic 
approach aimed to attract investors for industrial development. Slocomb (2010) 
argues that the coexistence of mixed private and public sectors created some
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ambiguities among the foreigners and locals. Table 2 shows growth of industries
between 1955 and 1968.
Table 5.2 Number o f Industries in 1955 and 1968
Category of industries Number of industries in
1955 1968
State-owned factories 0 28
Private-public owned factories 0 29
Small and medium scale private factories 650 3,700
(Source: Ear, 1995)
By 1968, industrial growth had tripled compared to 1955. The majority of 
industries and enterprises were agriculture-related and small and medium scale. 
Sihanouk introduced rural credit cooperatives and developed irrigation facilities to 
improve agricultural production. Agriculture-related industries included rice mills, 
distilleries, palm sugar refineries, fish sauce production, silk weaving, soya sauce 
production, etc.
Large-scale private-public owned factories were predominantly owned by 
foreigners, particularly French and British, and by local elites. Private-public factories 
included rubber plantations and rubber processing, brick and tile manufacturing, 
woodworking factories, cotton industries and electric power plants.
Growth of industries, and the development of infrastructures and expansion of 
service sectors such as education and health care, changed people’s engagement in 
economic activities over the period. In 1968, the agriculture sector accounted for 41% 
of economic activities in the country, whereas non-agricultural sectors (industrial 
sector 12%, commerce and trade 23%, service sector 17%, construction 5%, and 
transportation 2%) accounted for the rest (Ear, 1995). Shifts in economic activities 
brought a slow but significant change of labour force participation in different sectors
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in Cambodia during Sihanouk's regime. According to Slocomb (2010), the number of 
employees in the service sector became three or four times the number of employees 
in the industrial or manufacturing sectors by the end of 1967. The service sector 
employed some 400,000 people by 1967.
Urbanisation was growing during Sihanouk’s regime. According to the general 
census of Cambodia in 1962, 403,500 people lived in Phnom Penh compared to
120.000 people in 1942. Other municipalities such as Kep, Sihanoukville and Bokor 
were home to some 14.646 people according to 1962 census. Phnom Penh alone 
accounted for 70% of the urban population (Slocomb 2010). Nationally, 11% of 
Cambodian people lived in cities by the end of 1960 (Ear, 1995). Many of the urban 
population were seasonal migrants -  predominantly rural marginal farmers who came 
to the cities in the off-farm season. They worked as coolies, cyclo-drivers and 
labourers in construction work. Increased employment opportunities in cities attracted 
many rural inhabitants including some who migrated from Cambodia, particularly in 
Phnom Penh.
Although Sihanouk's regime was relatively peaceful, State violence 
occasionally took place particularly against communist clandestine and anti-Sihanouk 
groups. Sihanouk occasionally used his police forces to suppress communist groups. 
5.2 Civil War, Khmer Rouge and Social Disruption: 1970-1979
5.2.1 Lon Nol’s Coup and Beginning of Civil War
Lon Nol, the long standing associate of Sihanouk, became the Prime Minister
of Cambodia after the 1966 national election. By 1969, Lon Nol and the rightists had
become increasingly frustrated with Sihanouk. The main reason for Lon Nol’s
frustration was Sihanouk’s toleration of North Vietnamese activity on Cambodian
soil. Sihanouk allowed the NLF and the Vietnamese People’s Army to use
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Cambodian territory (eastern zone) to fight against the American army and ARVN. 
Sihanouk also made a secret trade agreement with Hanoi to use Sihanoukville seaport 
for shipment of weapons to NLF in exchange for guaranteed purchase of rice at 
inflated prices.
In early 1970, a large-scale anti-Vietnamese demonstration erupted in Phnom
Penh. Sihanouk was on tour in Europe, the Soviet Union and China at this time.
Crowds attacked the North Vietnamese and NLF embassies. The demonstrations
escalated beyond the government's control. On 12 March, Sirik Matak, Deputy Prime
Minister cancelled the trade agreement with Hanoi. No shipments were permitted to
North Vietnam through Sihanoukville seaport. On 15 March 1970, Lon Nol warned
all People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN, North Vietnamese regular troops) and
National Liberation Front (NLF, known to the US as the Viet Cong) forces to leave
Cambodian territory within 72 hours. On 18 March 1970. the army took up positions
around the capital. A debate on deposing Sihanouk as head of state was held in the
Assembly at the same time. All members of the assembly, except one, unanimously
agreed to depose Sihanouk. Lon Nol took over the position of head of state on an
emergency basis. Lon Nol renamed Cambodia as the Khmer Republic on 9 October
1970. Lon NoFs vision of the Khmer Republic was to eliminate widespread
corruption, restore the country's sovereignty in the eastern zones, and continue the
country’s economic development. The character of the Republican regime was right-
wing and nationalist. It allied itself with the South Vietnamese and the US, which was
probably involved in the political change. Lon Nol appointed himself as Marshal in
April 1971. He dissolved the National Assembly in October of that year, and declared
military rule. He founded the Forces Armées Nationales Khmères (FANK) -  the
republican army. In the wake of Khmer Rouge. Lon Nol finally resigned on 1 April
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1975 and fled to Indonesia and then to the United States. The Republic eventually fell 
on 17 April 1975 with the fall of Phnom Penh to the Khmer Rouge.
The Khmer Republic had deregulated State control of major economic sectors. 
The private sector was restored to expedite commercial and industrial development. 
Although economic development was one of the motivations of the Republic, overall 
economic conditions of the country deteriorated over the period. Agricultural 
production shrank dramatically due to displacement of families in rural areas. 
Cambodia changed from being a rice-surplus country under Sihanouk to being a rice- 
deficit country in 1972. Cambodia imported rice, corn, tobacco, rubber products, 
wheat and other basic essentials with American assistance. Prices of consumer goods 
rose, but a handful of investors linked to the political elites benefited from the 
wartime economy (Slocomb, 2010).
Lon Nol's regime resulted in little but increased militarisation, violence, 
disruption of social order, and civil war. Despite its ambitious aim, the republic was 
disastrous militarily, politically, economically and socially. The Cambodian civil war 
began in real terms during the Khmer Republic. Lon Nol’s regime could neither 
consolidate power nor gain legitimacy. People’s security and safety became 
threatened. The social order built during colonial rule and Sihanouk's regime was 
disrupted in the brief period of the Khmer Republic.
The Khmer Republic regime gave rise to militarisation in Cambodian during 
1970-1975. Different military groups namely, FANK, ARVN (South Vietnamese 
Army), CPNLAF (Cambodian People’s National Liberation Armed Forces), PAVN 
(North Vietnamese) and NLF (Viet Cong) as well as US Troops, often clashed 
fiercely in the north-eastern provinces in the late 1960s. FANK, ARVN and US troops
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formed an alliance to drive out the PAVN and NLF. CPNLAF- an armed force of
Sihanouk - helped the PAVN and NLF as a retaliation to Lon Nol’s coup.
A significant number of Cambodian men were voluntarily engaged in 
Sihanouk's CPNLAF and Lon Nol's FANK. Sihanouk's popularity among the rural 
people attracted many rural Cambodians to join in CPNLAF. Many of the peasants 
interviewed for this study reported that they had fought for Sihanouk's CPNLAF. 
Conversely, Lon Nol's anti-Vietnamese and anti-communist rhetoric attracted many 
nationalists, especially big businessmen, landowners and the army, to join in the 
FANK. By the end of 1970, the number of FANK members rose to 150,000 from 
35.000 during Sihanouk regime. CPNLAF and FANK clashed fiercely and regularly 
in the remote areas. If we combine the number of CPNLAF and FANK members, it is 
evident that significant numbers of Cambodians were engaged in direct fighting.
Lon Nol's alliance with ARVN and US troops brought Cambodia more deeply 
into the second Indo-china war. Not long after Lon Nol’s coup. ARVN backed by US 
troops entered eastern Cambodia in April-July 1970 under a ‘Cambodian Campaign’ 
to attack PAVN and NLF forces operating there. Despite the joint military campaign 
by ARVN and US troops, many PAVN and NLF forces escaped westward and deeper 
into Cambodia. At this level the ‘Cambodian Campaign' was expanded to take in 
more Cambodian territory and extended until 1973. The ‘Cambodian Campaign' 
caused a huge death toll of innocent Cambodians. 539,000 tonnes of bombs were 
dropped in Cambodia from March 1969 to August 1973, and nearly half of them were 
dropped around Phnom Penh between March and August 1973 (Tan, 1979; Pollock, 
1997). About 10% of the country’s population -  600,000 people were killed by the 
American bombardment in the effort to destroy the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese
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hideouts in Cambodia, and protect the Lon Nol regime (Pollock, 1997; Slocomb, 
2010). About one third of the rural population became refugees (Pollock, 1997).
Pro-Sihanouk demonstrations against Lon Nol’s coup in early 1970 also 
caused violence and many casualties. After Sihanouk, who was in Beijing, called for 
protests on 23 March 1970, large-scale demonstrations were held in Kampong Cham, 
Takeo and Kampot provinces. These were violent demonstrations especially in 
Kampong Cham province. Two national assembly deputies were killed by the 
demonstrators. In response Lon Nol used armed forces to crack down on the 
demonstrations and this caused the deaths of several hundred Cambodians.
Sihanouk's modernisation efforts during 1953-1970 ushered in new hope to 
the people. Cambodian families, particularly in rural settings, were improving their 
living standards by improving and diversifying their means of livelihood, through 
education and better health care. Their hopes were suddenly shattered by the frequent 
clashes among the different military groups during Lon Nol's regime. Life threatening 
insecurity, a refugee state, and violence all paralysed the life of the people, 
particularly in rural areas. Families were on the run to escape from ground fighting 
and American air bombing. Education of children was disrupted and schools were 
shut down.
Some of the Cambodian men interviewed for this study, who are in their late 
40s and 50s, experienced Lon Nol's regime. Their life histories in Chapters 6-9 give 
testimony of the social disruption and violence that occurred during this period.
5.2.2 Khmer Rouge, Social Disruption and Violence
The Khmer Rouge period of 1975-1979 is well researched and documented.
Pol Pot, Nuon Chea, Ieng Sary, Son Sen. and Khieu Samphan -  all men - were the
key players, as the leaders of Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK). After taking
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power, the Khmer Rouge renamed the country as Democratic Kampuchea (DK). Two 
women, Khieu Ponnary (wife of Pol Pot) and Khieu Thirith, alias Ieng Thirith (wife 
of Ieng Sary), also played a central role in the DK regime. They all came from 
middle-class families and had been educated at French universities.
These leaders acquired Marxist socialist ideology during their study in France 
as members of the French Communist Party. During the 1950s, Khmer students in 
Paris organised their own communist movement. Some 200 Khmer students in Paris 
formed the Khmer Students' Association (KSA) in 1951 -  a student organisation with 
nationalist and leftist ideology. In 1956, Hou Yuon and Khieu Samphan established a 
new group, the Khmer Students' Union, based on Marxist ideology. The political 
organisation of Khmer Rouge grew from the communist movement in Vietnam. In 
1930 Ho Chi Minh had founded the Vietnamese Communist Party which later 
changed to the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) to include revolutionaries from 
Cambodia and Laos. In 1951, the ICP was re-organised into three national units, 
including the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party (KPRP) for Cambodian 
revolutionaries. After returning from Paris, the future leaders of the Khmer Rouge 
worked with the KPRP but later they formed their own groups due to KPRP’s 
excessive devotion to the Vietnam Workers’ Party -  the Vietnamese wing of former 
ICP. Pol Pot founded the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) and organised 
some small-scale insurgencies against the Sihanouk regime.
Although the key leaders of Khmer Rouge were French educated, when they
returned from France they spent a significant amount of time with rural people -  the
social class who were considered ideal (Tan, 1979). They were already steeped in
Marxist theory by this time and started to live with the rural masses in remote areas to
organise them and to find out what they really wanted. Pol Pot, Ieng Sary and Son Sen
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were in the forefront of the first mission in 1963. Khieu Samphan led the second 
mission in 1967. It was a risky and life threatening effort as they were constantly 
under the watch of Sihanouk’s police.
Historians such as Etcheson (1984), Pollock (1997) and Kiernan (2002) 
suggest that American bombardment in Cambodian territory during Vietnam War 
(between 1965-1973) and the removal of Norodom Sihanouk as head of state in 1970 
by Premier Lon Nol significantly helped the Khmer Rouge to obtain the support of 
Cambodian peasants, particularly in terms of recruitment during the DK regime. The 
recruits to the Khmer Rouge grew from 3,000 in 1971 to more than 60,000 in 1973 
(Pollock, 1997).
The regime imposed an extreme form of social engineering on Cambodian 
society which was characterised by economic and class elements. They attempted to 
introduce a purely agrarian economy ideologically enshrined by Marxism and 
Maoism. Tan (1970) argues that the Khmer Rouge’s ideology of transforming 
Cambodia into a purely agrarian economy was heavily affected intellectually by 
Khieu Samphan's economic theory. Khieu Samphan completed a PhD degree in 
economics from the University of Paris in 1959. His dissertation focused on 
Cambodia’s economy and industrial development. In his thesis, Samphan argued that 
Cambodian economy could be independent and self-sufficient if it would be 
independent of the international economy. Samphan wrote his thesis in the context of 
colonial and early independent Cambodia, when traditional economic sectors such as 
agriculture and agro-based industry were shrinking. Samphan termed the service 
sector unproductive and suggested agro-based industrialisation through the transfer of 
human resources from the service sector to the agriculture sector to ensure an
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increased and sustainable supply of agricultural products needed for the agro-based 
industries.
According to Slocomb (2010), the economic policy of DK was experimental 
and failed. The DK regime abolished markets, the financial and banking system, 
currencies, and other means for the accumulation of wealth. They started cooperatives 
throughout the country with communal dining to ensure that the new economic policy 
was effective (Kiernan, 2002). All cities and towns were evacuated and urban people 
were deported to rural areas to adopt peasant life (Tan, 1979). The entire population 
was forced to become farmers and everyone had to work on collective farms. The 
peasants were treated as ‘base people’ and the urban deportees were treated as ‘new 
people' by the regime.
The Khmer Rouge attempted to turn Cambodia into a one-class peasant 
society. The official ideology of Democratic Kampuchea (DK) was that the ‘base 
people' i.e., the poor and the lower-middle peasants, were the only progressive 
classes. ‘New people' i.e., all other classes such as the urban population, were 
considered to be class enemies (Vickery, 1986). Professionals, intellectuals, civil 
servants of Lon Nol’s Khmer Republic and educated people generally were 
considered to be enemies of the DK. The poor peasants were more trusted by the 
regime as they had made up most of the Khmer Rouge forces, and they therefore 
enjoyed both political and economic superiority over the urban evacuees during the 
revolutionary period (Vickery, 1986).
Extreme measures were taken as the Khmer Rouge pursued the ideal of
economic efficiency. Currency was abolished and banks were demolished. A barter
system was introduced and foreign trade was almost completely halted. Rice
production was the key to self-sufficiency. Massive irrigation projects (digging canals
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and reservoirs and the construction of dams) were undertaken to boost agricultural 
production.
The entire country was divided into seven zones to facilitate smooth operation 
of the revolution. Each zone was then divided into regions. Each region was then 
divided into district, sub-districts and villages. The structure of each region was 
similar to the administrative structures during the regimes of Sihanouk and the Khmer 
Republic. The inhabitants of the villages were organised into groups composed of ten 
to fifteen families. On every level, administration was directed by a three-person 
committee. CPK members held the committee posts at the higher levels. Sub-district 
and village level committees were often staffed by “base people'
This attempt at political and economic engineering by the Khmer Rouge 
caused abrupt changes in the social structure. Aggression and violence were essential 
and were the ultimate tools to enforce the political and economic agenda. It seems that 
the Khmer Rouge was in a hurry to accomplish the revolution although it is not clear 
what caused this haste. The key leaders lost control (even the brother of Pol Pot was 
killed during the evacuation of Phnom Penh). Tan (1979) suggests that there was a 
kind of fear among the Khmer Rouge forces, particularly at the stage of evacuation, 
that Lon Nol forces might regain power through the use of sabotage networks in the 
city.
Killing, torture and forced labour were commonly practised by the Khmer
Rouge soldiers. People were required to work for twelve hours non-stop without
adequate rest or food. The treatment of the new people as well as the evacuation
varied depending on which military units and commanders conducted the specific
operation. There were targets for agricultural production for each zone but these
targets were usually several times higher than production figures for pre-revolution
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times. Leaders of the zones and their lower administrative units forced people to work 
hard and fast to achieve the target. By the end of 1979, the death toll was over two 
million (1 /5th of total population at that time) due to murder, torture, starvation, 
disease and overwork.
Those who were killed in the DK regime were mostly the old, the educated 
city dwellers and those who were westernized or had supported the Americans 
(Pollock, 1997). Men became the main victims of the massacre although women were 
also killed. This caused changes in the demographic pattern in post-Khmer Rouge 
Cambodian society creating a higher proportion of adult females compared to adult 
males. Due to the lack of adult males, many women of marriageable age remained 
single. They had been living with non-adult family members who had lost their 
parents during revolution and became de facto heads of households.
Adults were forced to marry a person chosen by the regime. No marriage was 
carried out without authorisation by the regime. Mass marriages were carried out at 
the village level under the guidance of Khmer Rouge local leaders. Marriage was not 
considered an individual and personal matter, but was regarded as an important 
ceremony involving an oath to the regime (Kasumi, 2008). The ritual of wedding was 
very formal and simple. No traditional formality and celebration of wedding were 
performed.
Violence against women, particularly in the form of rape and other forms of 
sexual assaults, was strictly forbidden. The study by Kasumi (2008) suggests that the 
high-ranking leaders of Khmer Rouge randomly raped young women, particularly 
from the 'new people’, but her study does not provide statistics.
Family relationships not sanctioned by the regime were also banned. Because
of regrouping of people at the village level, family members were split from each
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other, and sent to different places as deemed necessary by the committee members of 
each administrative unit of the Khmer Rouge. This occurred throughout the country 
although there were theoretically designated shelters for every family. In reality, it 
was hard for family members to spend a significant amount of time together at home 
every day. The small and school-aged children were sent to boarding schools where 
they studied and lived under the supervision of resident teachers.
Women were also involved in the Khmer Rouge, both as leaders and as force 
members. Khieu Ponnary and Ieng Sary were two key female leaders. Khieu Ponnary 
served as the President of the Women’s Association of the DK regime. Ieng Sary 
served as the Minister for Social Affairs from 1975-1979.
As mentioned earlier, men of rural and peasant background became the 
committee members in the lower levels (sub-district and village) of the Khmer Rouge 
administration. This is the level where ‘new people' worked and lived. In this way, 
the peasants held power over urban evacuees who overwhelmingly represented the 
previous higher class -  hereditary upper class, professionals, former civil servants and 
scholars.
It is apparent that four groups emerged despite the Khmer Rouges attempt to
turn Cambodia into a single-class society. These groups -  which did not have time to
consolidate as social classes -  were not necessarily based on property and wealth, but
rather on power, authority and survival. The top group was represented by CPK
leaders who exercised absolute power over the rest of the groups through holding
committee positions at zone and regional level. The second group was the committee
members at sub-district and village level. They were former peasants and
overwhelmingly young and they executed power and authority directly and face-to-
face over the urban evacuees, in order to carry out the projects of the DK. The third
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group is the urban evacuees whose lives were threatened, subject to death and torture 
at any time. The fourth group is peasants who remained in their old occupations. They 
were trusted by the Khmer Rouge and their lives were not as affected as those of the 
third group.
5.3 Cambodia After The Civil War 
5.3.1 PRK and SoC Regimes
The Vietnamese army invaded Cambodia and took control of Phnom Penh on 
17th January 1979. They ousted the DK regime and a new regime called the People’s 
Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) was installed immediately. The PRK regime existed 
until 1993 and was controlled by the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party 
(KPRP). Marxism-Leninism was the political ideology of the KPRP. Heng Samrin 
served as the head of both the PRK and the KPRP. The People's Republic of 
Kampuchea was renamed as the State of Cambodia (SoC) during the last four years of 
its existence, in an attempt to attract international recognition. There was certainly 
some public support for the PRK regime since they had liberated the survivors of the 
Khmer Rouge.
In the aftermath of the Vietnamese invasion, a Coalition Government of
Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) was established in June 1982 for national unity and
to oppose Vietnamese invasion. The CGDK included three parties namely the Khmer
Rouge, the Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF), and the
FUNCINPEC. Khieu Samphan, Son Sann, and Norodom Sihanouk signed an
agreement on June 22, 1982 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, on behalf of the Khmer
Rouge, the KPNLF, and the FUNCIPEC respectively, to form a coalition government.
The latter two groups had non-communist backgrounds. Sihanouk served as the
President of the coalition government. Khieu Samphan and Son Sann served as
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foreign minister and prime minister respectively. Following its establishment, the 
CGDK was recognised as the country's lawful regime in international forums. On the 
other hand, the PRK served as a de facto and puppet government. The DK regime 
retained its seat in the United Nations until 1982 in its own right and then until 1993 
as partner of the CGDK.
In response to mounting pressure from local, regional and global forums, 
Vietnam started to withdraw its army towards the end of 1987 and all Vietnamese 
troops had been withdrawn by 1989. During the decade of Vietnamese invasion, the 
Khmer Rouge and other coalition members of CGDK clashed with Vietnamese army 
on a regular basis. The existence of dual governments (PRK and CGDK) created the 
conditions for war. The western part of Cambodia bordering with Thailand continued 
to be a battle zone during this period.
Cambodia's economy was fragile in the PRK regime but it was better than the 
situation during Khmer Republic and Khmer Rouge regimes. The economy was State 
controlled and goods were rationed according to salary. Government subsidised 
certain commodities such as kerosene, cigarette, soap, rice, sugar and condensed milk. 
Since there was no Cambodian currency, Thai baht and Vietnamese dong were 
commonly used in the local market. By 1988, the riel was reintroduced as a local 
currency (Ear, 1995). Land ownership was nationalised under the PRK regime. But 
farmers who farmed a piece of land could continue farming. Rice production started 
to increase again after 1984. The industry sector, which had been totally destroyed, 
started to recover during the PRK regime. Fifty-seven plants (textile, mechanical, 
construction and light industry) were operated under State ownership, and employed 
some 154,000 Cambodians.
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Cambodia and eighteen other nations, including the UN Security Council and
ASEAN countries, signed the Paris Peace Agreement on 23 October 1991. The Paris
Peace Agreement was the result of a settlement reached among four factions: State of
Cambodia (SoC), FUNCINPEC, KPNLF, and the Khmer Rouge in an informal
meeting held in September 1990 in Jakarta (Slocomb, 2010). A United Nations
Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was then established with a specific
mandate to organise a free and fair election for a constituent assembly. The country
held its first-ever democratic election in May 1993 under the supervision of UNTAC.
The majority of people cast their votes for FUNCINPEC. Leadership of the
Cambodian People’s Party (CPP-formerly KPRP), particularly the current Prime
Minister, Hun Sen, rejected the election result causing a serious political stalemate.
Avoiding a possible return of the civil war. Norodom Sihanouk negotiated an
executive government led by co-premiers (Hun Sen of CPP and Prince Ranarridh of
FUNCINPEC) (Slocomb, 2010). On 21 September 1993, the Constituent Assembly
adopted the new Constitution which restored the Cambodian throne as a constitutional
monarchy. Norodom Sihanouk signed the new constitution and the State became once
more the Kingdom of Cambodia.
5.3.2 Cambodian Society in Transition in 1980s
For twenty years Cambodian society was governed under extreme forms of
class and gender regulation which caused a demographic catastrophe. The economic
restructuring and violence of the DK and the PRK regimes caused class and gender
chaos. The ‘new people' of the DK regime were allowed to come back to the towns
during the PRK regime. Schools, medical facilities and religious practices were
resumed. This meant that urban infrastructures started to grow again as they had
before 1975. The PRK intended to rebuild Cambodian society with normally
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functioning and interrelated urban and rural sectors (Vickery, 1986). Under the new 
regime, the State took control of all means of production such as factories, 
transportation and land. Financial institutions and foreign trades were monopolised 
under State control. In these ways the DK and PRK were similar but under the PRK 
the peasants could produce and consume agricultural products freely and were not 
conscripted as forced labour as they had been under the DK. But the peasants were 
not allowed to sell or transfer land to repay their debts.
Urban commodities and consumer goods were supplied through a free-market 
system. This meant that a bourgeois class re-emerged during the PRK regime which 
the DK wished to bring down and merge with the peasant class. The old privileged 
class who survived from the DK regime could hoard their wealth, particularly in the 
form of gold and diamonds, and were soon involved in trading in consumer goods and 
emerged as the new wealthy class during the PRK regime.
The rehabilitation and reconstruction of war ravaged sectors was a huge task
for the PRK to tackle but the regime, like other revolutionary bodies, lacked the skills,
education and expertise necessary to succeed. The regime leaders, therefore, partially
returned to pre-DK structures -  i.e., dependence on bureaucrats, administrators and
professionals (Vickery, 1986). They invited the administrators, professionals and
bureaucrats of the Sihanouk and Lon Nol regimes, whom they originally treated as
class enemies in the government, to return. Vickery in 1986 argued that although the
PRK regime recruited educated and trained professionals and administrators in
government, class divisions had only re-emerged to a very limited degree. This was
because the income difference among peasants, government officials and other
working class people was marginal at this time. For example, department heads in
ministries earned no more than factory workers. But he suggested that the educated
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and trained professionals and administrators of the PRK government enjoyed power 
and authority over others and were therefore considered as elite at least in their own 
estimation.
5.4 Neoliberal Cambodia
Cambodia became a member state of the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) in 2000. As a member of ASEAN, Cambodia eventually accepted 
the guidelines which included market deregulation and tariff exemption within the 
Asian Free Trade Area (AFTA). Cambodia's agricultural sector became compatible 
with other regional countries through its entrance into ASEAN (Slocomb, 2010). 
Cambodia opened its economy further to the global market in 2004 when it formally 
became a member state of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). As part of its 
membership of ASEAN and WTO, Cambodia's economy has been undergoing 
numerous changes, including deregulation of markets and structural adjustment of 
public sectors. Although it adopted a market economy a century ago by signing its 
protectorate treaty with France in 1863, Cambodia's membership with WTO is 
bringing market liberalism into effect in wider sectors. Through becoming a member 
of WTO and ASEAN, the country has eventually opened all sectors of its economy to 
the regional and global market. The country's economic production, growth and 
distribution are experiencing new dimensions. New economic sectors are emerging 
while old sectors are shrinking in the wake of free entrance of foreign products into 
the local market, and foreign direct investment. Industrial, manufacturing and service 
sectors are emerging as the major economic sectors. For example, these three sectors 
experienced 12.1%, 9.7% and 12.1% growth respectively in 2005 (CDRI, 2007). The 
share of these sectors in GDP has increased over the period.
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These emerging sectors are creating more jobs. For example, the industry 
sector employed 10% and 13.5% of the total labour force in 2004 and 2005 
respectively. The service sector employed 11.7% and 27.5% of the total labour force 
in 2004 and 2005 respectively, a remarkable apparent rate of growth (CDRI, 2005 and 
2007). Rapid growth of the service sector in terms of employment generation is 
creating white-collar workers whose social class and position are relatively new in 
Cambodia.
On the other hand, the agriculture sector, which was regarded as the only key 
sector for Cambodia's economy in the recent past, is declining gradually, both in 
terms of its share of the GDP and in employment generation (CDRI. 2007). Industrial 
sectors such as garment manufacturing, and tourism sectors, are gradually replacing 
the agriculture sector. The GDP share of agriculture sector declined to 31.4% in 2005 
compared to 45.6% in 1993. In terms of job absorption, the agriculture sector is going 
down rapidly. For example, 70% of the total labour force was employed in the 
agriculture sector in the year 2004 (CDRI, 2005), whereas this figure dropped to 58% 
in 2005 (CDRI, 2007).
CDRI (2007) report also suggested that the growth of the new sectors is 
unequal among people across class (rich versus poor) and geographical setting (rural 
versus urban). Rich people are becoming richer given their privileges and their 
preparedness to extract the most advantageous results from market liberalisation. 
Conversely, the poor are increasingly becoming marginalised. The growth is mostly 
urban-centric as the new economic sectors are urban-based. Most of the foreign direct 
investments are in non-agricultural sectors. It is clear that Cambodia’s economy is 
moving away from agriculture (CDRI, 2007).
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In the course of market liberalisation, the local economy, particularly in 
agriculture and handicraft sectors, is increasingly in contact with global and regional 
markets. Cambodian producers are usually small-scale and this means that local 
producers need to spend more per unit, compared to products of transnational 
companies who are involved in large-scale production. Prices of local products such 
as food, silk products, and handicrafts are apparently higher in the local market than 
those of imported competitors. Local producers are therefore coming under fierce 
competition with their regional and global competitors. Consequently, the local 
economy, particularly in agriculture and handicraft sectors, is shrinking gradually.
Workforces who previously worked in the agriculture sector are increasingly 
entering the newly emerging sectors. As a result Cambodia has been experiencing 
surges of rural-urban migration in recent years, driven by unemployment in rural 
areas. Migration of rural people to cities is creating new problems in family 
relationships, specifically marriages that often end in spousal conflict and violence. 
The peasants who previously worked on farms are being engaged in new economic 
sectors such as construction and manufacturing in the cities. Their new work places 
and changed environments require new practices which are often in conflict with 
existing gender norms. These issues will be explored in the following chapters.
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PART III
FOUR STUDIES OF THE DYNAMICS OF KHMER
MASCULINITIES
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CHAPTER 6
GLOBALISATION FROM BELOW: CONFIGURATION OF 
MASCULINITIES AMONG MID-CAREER MANAGERS AND
ENTREPRENEURS
6.1 Introduction
As discussed in the literature review, global markets and transnational 
corporations provide a default setting of masculinities for managers who work in the 
corporate business sector. The default masculinity is characterised by long working- 
hours, competitive achievement of personal and corporate goals and relegation of 
feminised family, social and cultural affairs to wives and employed carers. Power 
within the workplace and material possessions are of greater importance in the lives of 
these men than other groups in this study.
Studies of managerial masculinities are mainly conducted in the context of a 
developed economy. There is a dearth of empirical work on managerial masculinities 
in the context of developing economies, particularly in countries like Cambodia that 
are only now being gradually linked to global market forces. How do public and 
private sector managers and local business entrepreneurs in these economies organise 
masculinities?
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6.2 Cambodia and the Global Economy
As noted in Chapters 4-5, Cambodia experienced decades of political turmoil 
and civil war in 1970s and 1980s. The country’s economy was broken down. The 
Khmer Rouge (KR) regime in the late 1970s attempted to transform the country into 
an agrarian society. The post-KR regime followed the political economy of the 
previous regime and maintained a command economy throughout the 1990s.
Cambodia’s economy moved from a command economy to a market-based 
one in 2005 when it became a member state of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). 
Entrance to the WTO led Cambodia to become a site for foreign investment, 
particularly because of cheap labour. Profound social and economic changes have 
taken place since 2005. New sectors, particularly the service and manufacturing 
sectors are emerging with foreign investment. Local business enterprises are also 
growing as the backward linkage to the emerging new sectors. New jobs, both 
managerial and non-managerial, are being created for Cambodians.
The post-command economy of Cambodia is heavily dependent on loans and 
aid from transnational financial corporations, namely the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB), the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Loans and 
aid are granted for reforms such as the decentralisation of public administration, 
privatisation of public services, and public/private partnership. Following these 
reforms, changes in terms of both management and service delivery are occurring in 
the public sector.
6.3 Managers of this Study
This chapter is based on the life histories of ten managers and business
entrepreneurs. They are: Liang Kim (37), Regional Manager of a transnational
financial corporation, Bunthi Sar (37), co-owner of an export-oriented business,
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Sophea Mao (34), owner of a local real estate company, Prom Cham (38), Manager of 
an international IT company, Chhrem Hor (30), Deputy Director of a subsidiary of an 
international non-governmental organisation (NGO), Sok Srey (42), Deputy Director 
of a public sector department, Barom Ros (55), Director of a public sector department, 
Phyrum Ly (38), Director of a public sector department, Sopheak Mok (42), Unit 
Chief of a public sector agency and Mony Serey, Head of a public sector office.
All of them had gone through the KR regime and the post-KR civil war. 
Managers who are in their forties and fifties had also experienced social disruption 
caused by the Second Indochina War during the Lon Nol.
War disrupted social life and education. After the war, they restarted their 
ruined lives. Many of them worked hard in difficult and dangerous situations to 
reorganise their lives. They did whatever was necessary for survival in the post-war 
era. .
All private sector managers and business entrepreneurs are exposed to the 
global market either as employees of transnational business companies or as local 
partners of international or regional foreign investors. Liang, Prom and Chhrem work 
directly for transnational companies. Bunthi runs a business linked to several Chinese 
companies. Sophea opened his own business after working for a Chinese real estate 
firm in Phnom Penh. He established his own real estate company with capital invested 
by Japanese and Koreans.
These private sector managers and business entrepreneurs have all visited 
foreign countries for training, education and employment. They are familiar with the 
global society and the functioning of the global market.
Although public sector managers do not work directly for the global market,
they work on departmental projects that are funded by global financial institutions.
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They have visited foreign countries for education, training, professional meetings and 
other events that have enhanced their working skills. They have become familiar with 
foreign culture and value systems. They also work with representatives of aid 
organisations. They are directly involved in public administration and the processes of 
decentralisation and privatisation.
It was not always easy to arrange interviews with these managers. It took time 
to organise appointments with entrepreneurs who sometimes changed arrangements at 
the last minute to suit their own convenience. A few of the public sector managers 
were also difficult to pin down for interview.
Case Study 1: Barom Ros -Public Sector Manager
The interv iew
Barom was recruited for interview through one of his colleagues. The 
interview took place in his office by appointment, after-hours. Barom allocated a 
reasonable amount of time for the interview despite being busy. The interview lasted 
for one and half hours. He was fluent in speaking about his life, particularly about his 
experience with the KR regime, his life after the war ended and the pathways to 
becoming a manager. But he was cautious in talking about management practice and 
his working relationships with his superiors.
Life course
Barom comes from a central province peasant family. In his mid-fifties he is 
fourth among seven siblings. He is a living witness to the social changes that have 
taken place in Cambodia since the Lon Nol regime.
He left his family at the age of seven to be educated in another commune as
there was no school in his commune. He lived in a pagoda (a religious institution
127
providing shared accommodation for young boys of underprivileged families) during 
his primary education. Every morning he gave lifts on his bicycle to monks from the 
pagoda so that they could collect alms from the neighbouring villages. After giving 
these lifts, he went to school. He also attended religious classes and formal education 
in the pagoda.
Barom then went to a third commune, where his elder sister lived so that he 
could attend secondary school. He lived with his sister and her husband. His brother- 
in-law taught at the school. When his brother-in-law was transferred to Phnom Penh 
in Barom’s last year of secondary school certificate (SSC), Barom followed his 
brother-in-law and spent the final year of his SSC as well as completing the high 
school certificate (HSC) in Phnom Penh. He completed the HSC with a major in 
science. After completing the HSC, he enrolled in a public university in Phnom Penh, 
with a major in engineering. Education in public university was free.
The KR regime began in the first year of his university life. Aged twenty he 
was sent to a north-eastern province by the regime. In his first year he worked in the 
“mobile brigade”. These brigades were assigned the hardest, most laborious and 
dangerous tasks. He married in his second year with his wife being chosen for him by 
the authorities. After his marriage he was assigned to rice farming but the newly 
married couple spent very little time together as they worked in different communes.
Barom experienced and witnessed the harsh rule of the KR regime. According 
to him, two-thirds of the mobile brigade group members disappeared by the end of the 
year, possibly killed by the militias.
Barom and his wife were lucky to survive the regime and when the regime fell 
they moved to Phnom Penh. They were struggling to recover from the ruin of their
lives but Barom found a position teaching at a primary school in his home province.
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The country was now under a new regime and he was promoted to lower-secondary 
level teaching in his second year. In his third year, he attended a university in Phnom 
Penh to study pedagogy (science teaching) for two years. After completing the course, 
he taught secondary school science in the province. In 1994 he moved to his current 
workplace and in 2006 he completed a Master’s degree from a specialised university 
in Phnom Penh. He was sent to Malaysia, Vietnam, Singapore, Japan, and Korea for 
professional training.
His first appointment in the Department was as head of a technical unit. He 
was subsequently promoted to Deputy Director in 1998 and Director (his current 
position) in 2008. His current position as head of the Department is mid-level in the 
Ministerial hierarchy.
Barom has four sons and lives in his own house in Phnom Penh. His first 
three sons work in government departments, two of them having obtained Master’s 
degrees from English-speaking developed countries. The third son has completed a 
Master’s degree in Cambodia. The youngest son is an undergraduate in a Phnom Penh 
university. Barom’s wife looks after the home and no longer needs paid employment. 
Work, workplace and gender regime in work
Barom brings thirty years of professional experience to his current position, 
the first half in teaching and the second half in management. He worked as a teacher 
at a time when the education system in Cambodia was recovering from devastation. 
He taught science, at that time a gendered field as, in addition to there being few male 
science teachers, there were no females in that field. The shortage was so dire that 
Barom sometimes had to teach ten classes per day.
Barom*s science background was a considerable advantage in finding a
managerial job in his current workplace. As mentioned above, his first appointment
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was as head of a technical unit managing more than twenty staff. He did not give sex- 
segregated data of his staff in the interview. Presumably, they were overwhelmingly 
men as women were very rare in science education.
In his current portfolio as Director, he looks after nine units with help of three 
deputies. Each unit performs specific tasks associated with the Department's core 
function, i.e., production of educational materials. In the past, the Department carried 
out all its responsibilities internally -  a huge responsibility. Recently, many of the 
tasks have been privatised. Nowadays, key jobs like manuscript development, printing 
and supply are carried out by private vendors. The department's role is now limited to 
'approval' of manuscripts and quality ‘control' of the end product.
Barom’s department follows Ministerial gender policy. The Ministry has a 
gender policy which specifies strategies intended to integrate gender equality in all 
activities. All materials are screened for gender equality by the Ministry before they 
are printed. The Ministerial gender policy also sets targets for gender equality in 
management.
Despite this policy, gender equality remains a major challenge, particularly in 
management. The vast majority of managerial positions are still held by men. The 
gender equality situation in the management of Barom's department is better than 
most although the top position is held by a man. One third of deputies and general 
staff in Barom's department, however, are women.
Family, relationship and gender regime in the family
Barom’s life with his parents was brief. His young, fragmented memory of life
with his parents was ‘good' and 'non-violent’. This does not, of course, mean that his
parents had a relationship based on equality. Good spousal relationships can also be
maintained through women's submission to systematic patriarchal control.
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Nonetheless, Barom apparently did not experience any violence from his parents nor 
the sister with whom he lived for a long period. None of his siblings experienced 
violence or abuse from his parents.
Barom's parents were peasants and both worked on the family farm. His father 
was head of the family and the farm. His mother did all so-called reproductive work 
along with farming tasks.
Barom's own family followed a diverse trajectory of gender regime over the 
period. Both husband and wife were farmers during the KR regime. Barom taught in 
public school and his wife also worked providing jointly for the family in the post-KR 
era as Barom's income from teaching was too meagre to support the family. This 
supportive role of his wife was crucial, enabling Barom to come to Phnom Penh to 
upgrade his professional skills by taking a pedagogy course. In his current situation, 
when his income alone is sufficient to run the family, his wife's contribution has been 
acknowledged by withdrawing her from productive work. Her supportive work 
during his early career was a reasonable contribution. Although Barom is head of the 
family, his wife is better-off in intra-family gender relations, in his view.
Barom does not share in household chores. He is heavily occupied with his 
professional work from 7.00am to 7.00pm every weekday. Sometimes his duties keep 
him at work until 9.00 or 10.00pm. His absence from household chores is taken for 
granted because his sole duty is seen as providing for the family.
Place (rural/urban), peer relationship and wider social life or culture
Barom's life has included both rural and urban cultures and locations, having
grown up in a pagoda and learned how to live in communal social life. Urban life,
overseas training, and work experience in multilateral projects within the department
have enabled him to work successfully in the bureaucratic system. Participation in
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international forums as a government delegate has impacted on his knowledge and 
understanding of gender patterns.
Barom’s social value system is explicit in his personal and professional life. 
In his professional life his urban social orientation is predominant. His personal and 
family life, on the other hand, is typical of peasant culture.
Barom has two groups of friends and peers: one group is made up from his 
early life in rural setting, and the other is made up of peers from his career in urban 
settings. His friends come from different walks of life and both genders: peasants and 
bureaucrats, monks and business entrepreneurs, men and women.
He has reconstructed his social network through these two peer groups. There 
is a functional difference in the way he maintains his network and interacts with both 
groups. His relationship with the first group of peers, based on his early rural 
experience, is social and spiritual in nature. For example, he visits the monks of the 
pagoda, where he lived as a child. By contrast, the relationship with the second group 
of peers is career motivated. The group works through reciprocal invitations to family 
functions. Barom played a pioneering role in forming this group.
The viability and functional strength of the second group of peers depends on 
their uniqueness, and importance for their professions. Members of this peer group 
work in the public sector with many of them holding high level positions. About this 
group Barom says,
Lots of them are in the Ministry. Around twenty of them work in
Ministries. Some are at my level, some are in higher positions such as
Director General, Colonel and the Council of Ministers.
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Rank is important for everyone in the group. They keep in touch with each 
other and the group acts as a network supporting the professional success of their 
peers. They mutually benefit through their social and professional connections. 
Experience of violence
Barom experienced collective social violence during the Lon Nol and KR 
regimes. American bombing in Cambodia in the early 1970s displaced people from 
many rural provinces. Many of them took refuge in Phnom Penh. Schools in rural 
areas were closed. Barom, who was in secondary school, also left his rural province 
and came to Phnom Penh.
His university education was halted because of the KR regime. He could not 
continue his engineering degree and was forced to rural province. He bears the brunt 
of the harsh and totalitarian rule of the regime. He was forced to work hard for long 
hours sustained only by a spoonful of watery porridge. Failure to comply with any 
instruction could lead to execution. Seeing many of his group disappear without 
explanation, Barom followed the instructions of the regime in order to survive.
The relationship between Barom’s parents was non-violent but hierarchical. 
Although he raised his three older sons without any trouble, Barom finds it difficult to 
raise his youngest son who often goes out with friends and comes home drunk. Barom 
does not like his son’s behaviour and takes some disciplinary actions which lead to 
some measures of parental control over his son.
Construction of masculinity
Barom's construction of early masculinity was organised in a rural social
setting within normative Buddhist values. Having lived in a Buddhist pagoda at a
young age, he is still inclined to Buddhist practices. He occasionally visits the pagoda
he grew up in and he lives a simple personal life. For example, he drives an old car,
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though he can afford an expensive new one. His adoption of a modest way of life 
probably results from his upbringing in a monastic environment.
Managers like Barom in the public sector do not work in a ‘fishbowl.’ He is 
not under constant surveillance by his superiors. Rather, managers in the public sector 
work in a ‘black and white' system where performance is measured periodically based 
on reported results. There is always a discrepancy between actual and reported 
achievements and this discrepancy is an open secret. Covering up the discrepancy is 
important if the manager is to succeed professionally.
Barom uses a specific approach to cover up such discrepancies. When a target 
is not achieved he discusses it with deputies. He also addresses the issue within the 
department keeping superior authority uninformed. In this way, he puts the 
responsibility on his deputies to amend the situation. He also engages his deputies in 
the process of writing the crucial reports.
Barom's core management practice is to get things done through delegation to 
his deputies, holding weekly meetings and being informed every day about plans and 
progress. These practices are what he calls ‘my management.’ His style of 
management is not universal in the public sector although managers in the public 
sector do work under a single and standardised management system.
Neo-liberalisation of departments’ core duties has given new dimensions to 
bureaucratic masculinity. Under the new arrangement, the bureaucracy is expanding 
into the private domain. In the past, the Department fulfilled its responsibilities using 
its own staff, and management practice was internally focused and staff oriented. The 
bureaucracy involved authority within the public sector only. Under the neo-liberal 
process, the Department is emerging as an authority outside the public sector by
134
retaining the power of ‘approving’ manuscripts and ‘controlling’ the quality of 
materials produced by private vendors and individuals.
When external parties replace Departmental staff and the Department restricts 
its role to that of approval, the bulk of the Departmental responsibility falls to senior 
management, i.e., Barom and his bosses in the Ministry. Barom's management 
authority over his staff has been squeezed in real terms but his authority also been 
extended to private vendors and individuals.
Barom's fatherhood is organised around ‘preparing his family in good way’, 
and ‘equipping his sons to work in managerial positions.’ His own life experience 
paves the way for his children. He is putting his efforts into making his sons into 
future managers like himself. He is apparently succeeding. Three of his sons are now 
serving in the public sector. He has provided them with appropriate education to make 
them competent to become future managers. He thinks that ‘a manager works with 
brain, not physically, and he manages other.’ His notion of a 'manager' is also 
reflected by his zeal in serving in the public sector. He enjoys managing his 
subordinates as well as others who are concerned in the production of the materials he 
oversees.
Case Study 2: Liang Kim -Private Sector Manager
The Interview
Liang was recruited to this study through one of his colleagues. Although I 
had tried unsuccessfully many times to make an appointment with a private sector 
manager, obtaining an appointment with Liang was easy. He understands the 
importance of research.
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The interview took place in his office after-hours. He was articulate and 
enthusiastic in sharing his experience. He wanted to talk about the progress of his 
career. The interview lasted for an hour.
Life Course
Bom in a rural family of a southern province, Liang is thirty-seven. He is a 
father of one daughter (14) and two sons (8 and 6).
Liang's father, a community health officer in the pre-war era, was killed by the 
KR in 1979. Liang was just six at that time. The death of his father -  the only 
breadwinner in the family -  resulted in extreme hardship. Liang’s mother, who had 
neither an education nor a farming skill, found it difficult to raise eight dependent 
children. She took on a new undertaking, making and vending traditional noodles and 
pies in order to provide for her children. The income was meagre. In such a dire 
situation, ‘the priority of the family was to feed children, not to give education or 
anything else.’ Young Liang also participated in the family labour force in this dire 
situation. By looking after the family cattle, and collecting scrap metals, he added 
some income to family budget.
Liang completed his high school certificate in the rural province. He had taken 
a study break for two years before resumed undergraduate study. He worked with an 
international organisation in the province during the break. Eventually he moved to 
Phnom Penh in 1995 to a job in a foreign embassy. He began his undergraduate study 
in a public university while working at the embassy.
He was fascinated by the English language since secondary school although 
Russian, Vietnamese and French were taught as foreign languages in the school 
system. He attended English classes outside school. Proficiency in English helped him 
to obtain jobs in foreign agencies.
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He completed his undergraduate degree in Law with a major in Commerce in 
2000. In the following year, he went to a top-ranked foreign university with a 
scholarship to pursue his Master’s in International Law. Since he came to the global 
knowledge society, Liang has never looked back. He was one of the few Cambodians 
of his time to hold a Master's degree from a prestigious university.
Upon return to Cambodia after his overseas study, he joined as a Specialist in 
a social program operated by a foreign embassy in Phnom Penh. He worked there 
until 2006. He then moved to his current workplace, a transnational financial 
corporation. His first appointed was as a Management Trainee. After four months he 
became the Regional Manager, the position he has held for last two years.
Liang's career trajectory from social sector to financial/business sector is 
unusual. The reason for his switch to the financial sector is the decline in job 
prospects in his former sector. He foresaw a bright prospect by moving and is 
successful in his new job. His current portfolio in the corporate world is prestigious.
Through work and education, Liang has experienced many cultures, societies 
and nations. He has visited more than a dozen countries across the world. While on 
secondment to the highly developed country where his employers' firm originated, he 
gained management experience of regional and rural banking.
Liang's is an example of personal globalisation, and globalisation from below.
As an individual he has been linked to global society, first through learning English,
then by working in aid programs and finally through working in a financial
corporation. According to his own account, he was an introvert, but has become
extroverted as a result of acquiring leadership skills in the course of his profession.
The structure of work, particularly in aid programs, required him to lead and
coordinate people like government officials, local representatives and political party
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leaders. The leadership quality gained through employment in the social development 
sector is now getting best use in his current employment.
Liang married young and is the sole breadwinner of the family. His wife is a 
full-time housewife. He lives with his wife and children in his own house in Phnom 
Penh. All of his children study in foreign-owned English medium schools in Phnom 
Penh. He dedicates his time to his profession and has no time to share in household 
chores. This is taken for granted because of his sole breadwinning role.
Work, workplace and gender regime at work
Liang has had eighteen years of work experience: fourteen years in social- 
development and four years in the business sector. His career in the social 
development sector began as an English translator for a UN peacekeeping project and 
ended as an Expert for a foreign-aided project. His experience in the business sector 
began as a Regional Manager in his current workplace, a transnational financial 
corporation.
Liang did not provide any details about the gender regime in the aid programs 
he worked on previously. But given the history of institutional intervention on gender 
equality in Cambodia, it is highly likely that gender equality was one of the cross­
cutting issues in those programs. The emphasis on gender equality in post-war 
Cambodia was driven by the aid agencies. Until now, gender equality initiatives of 
both government and non-government organisations have been mainly supported by 
aid agencies.
Liang switched to the business sector in 2006. Factors underlying his switch
were the saturation of the job market in the social development sector and the
emergence of the financial sector with the influx of foreign investment (FI).
Thousands of jobs in the social development sector emerged in Cambodia in the
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1990s and early 2000s with foreign-sponsored programs for reconstruction and 
rehabilitation. But jobs in this sector dried up since the mid-2000s due to the phasing 
out of many projects. On the other hand, jobs in the business sector started to emerge 
since Cambodia became a member of WTO. Foreign investment created thousands of 
jobs for locals. Service sectors, particularly banking and telecommunication sectors, 
created very lucrative jobs for qualified locals.
After rigorous evaluation, Liang switched to the business sector. His current 
employer provides banking services. It is one of the fastest growing banking 
institutions in Cambodia. As a regional manager, Liang oversees six branches and one 
business development team with a total of seventy staff, including ten managers. His 
overall responsibility is to ensure best customer services by branches and to execute 
the institution's business plan.
Corporate managers like Liang work in a semi-autonomous environment. He 
regards himself as a "pretty much business owner' which has ‘profit and loss.’ 
Branches and businesses, as well as labour forces that work in these branches, are his 
business. His profit is service rewards. He gives ‘ownership' of their initiatives to 
branch managers. But they need to integrate his "focuses and priorities' in their ‘plan' 
and "day-to-day operation.' This condition that his priorities be integrated in the plans 
of branch managers is ambiguous in terms of Liang’s claim that he gives ownership of 
their initiatives.
Unlike public sector managers such as Barom, Liang invests lots of time and 
efforts in the supervision of his subordinates. His supervision is more as a facilitator 
who "adds value’ to managers to "make them better managers.’ He needs to equip 
himself with lots of ideas and skills to provide on-the-spot solutions. He "recognises
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and celebrates successes’ of managers. When a target is not achieved, he concentrates 
on one or two areas for improvement.
Liang's statements about his role and management methods reflect the 
management jargon of the neoliberal corporate world. Though the management 
phrasings are not bluntly authoritarian, they implicitly mean that everyone needs to 
perform his or her best for his or her job.
His current workplace is gendered. It runs for making profit through delivering 
‘best customer service’. It is officially gender neutral although in fact there are 
specific gendered patterns of labour force employment in branches and head office. 
Branch managers are men. Similarly senior management such as regional managers, 
and Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) are also men. Women hold a good proportion of 
customer service related positions working at the front desk. Putting a good 
proportion of female staff at the front desk is based on the gendered notion that 
women are better than men in customer relations. The official view is that no salary 
difference is maintained based on sex, and salary is absolutely performance based. 
But actually the incomes of men and women are not equal.
Family life and relationship, gender regime at home
Liang was born in a breadwinner/housewife model family. But at the age of 
six, due to death of his father, the family turned into breadwinner-cum-household 
maker model. His mother and eldest sister took these dual roles. Liang is sympathetic 
to his mother for her tireless efforts in bringing up the family.
Although he was brought up in a breadwinner-cum-household-maker model
family, Liang has modelled breadwinner/housewife family in his own life. The
breadwinner-cum-household-maker model family is usually a female-headed family
where the head of the family both earns money to support the family and performs the
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household tasks. The breadwinner/housewife model family is the family where a 
husband is sole breadwinner for the family and a wife performs household tasks. His 
wife is a full-time housewife from the very beginning. He does not mind this 
arrangement. Instead, he feels ‘good' with this arrangement as he can ‘spend longer 
hours at work.’
Liang separates work from family by ‘not bringing any work home.’ With this 
demarcation, he regards himself as distinct from the average manager. He is unaware 
about the relationship between work and home.
He maintains a ‘tight’ and ‘scheduled' life in the family. His involvement in 
family includes ‘forty-five minutes’ for three children per night for three or four 
weeknights to check their homework and academic record, ‘twenty minutes’ every 
morning with his daughter to wake her up. drop her at school on the way to his office. 
He also catches up with his children and their peers on different occasions, a "habit' 
he has adopted from his brief overseas career.
Liang maintains his family with absolute authority. His authority is perceived 
as altruistic, not authoritarian by the family, within the shadow of his endeavours for 
providing ever better living conditions. His authority is taken for granted for his sole 
role to give family members a rich life.
Place (rural/urban), peer relations, wider social life or culture
Liang is a sophisticated and articulate case of how a local Cambodian manager 
in the business sector works for a global financial corporation and is simultaneously 
being incorporated into the global culture.
Like other managers, Liang brings life experiences in both rural and urban
setting. He has been exposed to global culture more comprehensively through his
work and education. He has always worked in foreign agencies with multicultural
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environments. Higher education in a developed country, concurrent occupation in a 
transnational corporation with a foreign CEO, and overseas work experience have 
truly exposed him to global culture and its value system. He leads professional life 
everyday in accordance with corporate culture.
He does not have any peer group outside work except sport. He is work­
centric. He does not have any time to spend with other than family members. He 
comes straight back home from the office. On weekend, he spends one day on sport 
(soccer) to keep his mind and body healthy in order to work long hours during the 
week. He spends the second day of each weekend for socialisation with his family. 
Experience of violence
Liang's experience of violence is different from those of Barom and Bunthi. 
His experience of violence was a kind of ‘street fight' with other boys in the 
commune which often broke out in efforts to survive in the post-KR era. Fights broke 
out among young boys who were desperate to find means for survival. The fights 
were associated with scrap materials that these people collected to sell for a living.
Liang was active in the street fights as he needed to be ‘strong' for 'survival.’ 
He needed to socialise with other children even in a violent way as there was no other 
alternative. It was 'normal and part of life.'
In his family, the power-gap between husband and wife is huge. It seems that 
his wife is passive in the power dynamics of the family. Given the immense power 
gap and the passivity of his wife, any kind of violence or conflict is unlikely to 
happen within his family.
Construction of masculinity
Compared to his age and socio-economic background, Liang is very
successful in his profession. He holds a highly-salaried position in a prestigious
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transnational company in the country. He is inspiring and aspiring for many young 
locals as he also says, ‘all my nephews and nieces look me as their example/
Liang’s construction of masculinity has been shaped and reshaped in the 
course of his life. Global culture dominates his current construction of masculinities 
though he was brought up in a rural family. About him, he says, ‘global exposure" has 
changed the way he thinks nowadays.
He organises his managerial masculinity with the intention to ‘live by example 
for others' (subordinates). He needs to follow the standard practices of the neo-liberal 
corporate world and set an example. In this pursuit, he appears as a ‘mentor" to his 
subordinates who ‘adds value" to managers to enable them to provide 'best customer 
services.’ He does not appear bluntly authoritative to his subordinates. His specific 
management practices are not his instinct qualities, rather he follows what is expected 
by his CEO, as he says, ‘we (senior management team) drive or influence people 
(staff) in the way we are expected.’ In another account he accepts that he has been 
extroverted and gained leadership quality over his current service though he found 
himself to be introverted in the past.
He organises himself within a common neo-liberal notion of ‘negotiating his 
full skill" in pursuit of being an ‘above-average manager." He maintains a tight and 
scheduled life both in the workplace and at home. He works hard by paying full 
attention to work by closing his ‘brain to external or family issues.’ In pursuit of 
becoming a best manager among average managers, he equips himself with skills and 
ideas to become an on-the-spot problem solver.
He organises his fatherhood around altruism, at least in his own judgement. His
altruistic fatherhood is demonstrated by equipping children for competitive global job
markets. He foresees that the future job market would be ‘more competitive’ than in
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his time. With the aim of making his children competitive for global job market, he 
invests in education for his children despite opposition by his wife and in-laws. He 
sends children to expensive international English medium schools to ensure that they 
are educated to American or British standards. His fatherhood is largely assimilated 
with high quality education and living for children.
He has imported fathering skills from a rich and wealthy country context. His 
current ways of fathering are globalised. His practices of interactions with children are 
uncommon among other managers. Despite his limited free time, he tries to build 
rapports and emotional attachment with children. These are the practices that he has 
adopted from his brief overseas working life. He says, 'I have continued these habits 
until this day/
Case Study 3: Bunthi Sar -Local Business Entrepreneur
The Interview
Bunthi was recruited in interview through another manager of this study. The 
interview was held in his office. At first he did not allow me to record the interview 
and became very emotional at one point in our conversation about his fathering role. I 
took the opportunity at this stage to ask again if I could record the interview and he 
then agreed. He talked for an hour in the interview.
Life course
Bunthi, a father of three children, comes from one of the north-eastern 
provinces. He currently lives in his own house in Phnom Penh with his wife and 
children.
He was three when the KR regime began. He stayed at home with his elderly
grandmother during the regime. His parents were relocated by the regime to another
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commune for farming. The family was reunited after the war. Bunthi is eldest among 
six siblings (two boys and four girls).
He began school after the war and completed his primary education in his 
village. His family moved to a provincial town in 1982 after his father found a job in 
government. He completed his secondary and high school certificates in the provincial 
town and came to Phnom Penh in 1992 for tertiary education. He was enrolled in 
Khmer Literature in one public university learned English in a private school at the 
same time. He regards himself as ‘one of the few Cambodians who could speak 
English* at that time. His choice of English widened his occupational choices later in 
his life.
He lived in his uncle's house in his first year in Phnom Penh. Then he moved 
to a pagoda where he lived for three years. Living in the pagoda was free. He began 
teaching English in private schools in his second year. He also taught Khmer language 
to foreigners. Many of the foreigners who came to Cambodia for post-war 
reconstruction learnt the Khmer language. Bunthi, however, lived on his own at this 
time.
Three of his younger sisters joined him during his final year of university. 
They came to Phnom Penh to further their education. He rented a house where the 
four of them lived together. Along with the lodging, he also sponsored the education 
of his sisters.
After finishing his first degree, he studied pedagogy for two years at the same
university. He then became a high school teacher in his province. He quit the job after
one year and returned to Phnom Penh as he found it difficult to live in a rural area
though he had been brought up in a rural setting. He joined a private bank in Phnom
Penh where he worked for three years. Later he worked in an aid agency for three
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years, then in an international NGO for two years, and in a gold mine for one year. In 
2009, he started a business in partnership with some friends.
He married in 2002 after a five-year love affair. His eldest son is in Year 3 in 
public school and the second son is in a play-group. The children also go to English 
schools in the evening.
Work, workplace and gender regime in work
Bunthi brings occupational experiences in teaching, banking, social 
development and business sectors. Jobs in the business sector are usually gendered as 
this sector is profit-driven. His jobs in the social sector were gender responsive. He 
was directly involved on behalf of women's rights and gender equality through these 
jobs. He became familiar with gender equality issues.
Bunthi currently has two jobs. One is his own business and the other is a staff 
position in a foreign-owned company. His business assists local agro-entrepreneurs to 
export agricultural products (mainly rice) to mostly European markets, providing 
market and technological assistance to entrepreneurs. He works as a Manager of the 
foreign company. The company markets agricultural technologies in Cambodia. 
Bunthi cleverly use his own business clients (entrepreneurs) to market technologies of 
the foreign company.
His business is gendered. Gender division of labour in agro-processing 
industries, especially in rice mills, is explicit. The industry uses conventional 
technologies which are manually operated. Men operate rice milling plants and 
perform loading and unloading related tasks. Women work as a secondary labour 
force.
Given the nature of business, Bunthi needs a lot of field trips. Sometime, he
spends a whole week in the provinces. When he is stationed in Phnom Penh, he needs
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to spend after-hours for ‘business networking’ with clients and business partners. 
After-hour business networking usually takes place in popular entertainment places 
such as beer gardens and karaoke bars. Entertainments in these facilities are romantic, 
sexualised and commercial which primarily target men’s leisure. Through after-hours 
business networking, Bunthi comes across girls who serve in these facilities and 
shares emotion with them. His emotional relationships with girls outside his marriage 
affect his family relationship.
Family, relationship and gender regime in the family
Over the course of Bunthi’s career move from social development sector to 
business sector, the pattern of the family gender regime changed. He maintained his 
family with the joint-breadwinner model until 2009. His wife shared in providing for 
the family by running a stationery shop. Bunthi has reconstructed the joint- 
breadwinner model into breadwinner/housewife model since he switched to the 
business sector.
He is extremely busy in his two productive roles and finds it almost 
impossible to allocate any time for his family. He is particularly concerned for his 
growing children who need intensive care. Although he can afford to, he has not hired 
a nanny. He thinks a nanny cannot replace a mother. His wife eventually left her 
business and became a full-time housewife. She provides domestic services which 
enable him to fully concentrate to his work. The new model is precarious for her in 
family power relations. She has little authority in major power relations. She had 
negotiation power in intra-family gender relations when she shared in family 
providing.
He justifies the new family model for the sake of children who are now ‘given
care very well’ by his wife. His share in family chores has been reduced over this
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period. All he does is drop his eldest son at school on the way to his office. Nor does 
he do this regularly.
Place (rural/urban), peer relations, wider social life or culture
Like other managers, Bunthi has also had life experience in both rural and 
urban settings. Bom and brought up in a rural family, he gradually became 
accustomed to urban life through education and occupation. The urban life-style and 
value system are central to his present life. His aspiration for urban life first emerged 
when he had been living on his own from his earnings from teaching the local 
language to foreigners and foreign language (English) to locals. His aspiration was 
further reinforced through his jobs in international agencies with foreign employers.
He is a functionary of global market society, making globalisation happen 
from below. Agricultural economy, which has always been localised, is becoming 
connected to the global market through his business. Local technologies in the area of 
agro-processing are gradually being replaced by modern ones coming from the global 
market.
With his ‘tight daily life' Bunthi's peer relationships are rapidly becoming 
limited to his business partners. His peer affairs are mostly concentrated in after-hour 
business networking. He sometimes catches up with his old friends -  but they take a 
secondary place within his tight schedule. One of these friends sings well and goes to 
the karaoke club on the rare occasions that their leisure times coincide.
Experience of violence
Bunthi had a violent childhood. His father had beaten him severely on several 
occasions. He became unconscious at least once. He terms his father as a person of 
strict personality who was always scary. He thinks that his fathers' tough personality
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was constructed in situations of dire economic conditions for their family in post-war 
times. He is not, however, resentful of his father's violence.
In contrast to these experiences, Bunthi has constructed an adoring and loving 
relationship with his children. He is very much concerned for his children, particularly 
when they are away from home, in school or elsewhere. He cried during the interview 
when talking about his role as a father.
His relationship with his wife is not the same as it is with their children. The 
spousal relationship has become ‘jealous' recently. The development of this jealous 
relationship is discussed in the next section. The jealousy relationship may not turn 
physically violent but it suggests that verbal conflicts and arguments persist between 
husband and wife.
Construction of masculinity
Bunthi constructed early masculinity around family providing. He began his 
fathering role alongside his father through working in the family carpentry workshop 
during his secondary and high school education. His fathers' income from 
government job was too meagre to support the family. Construction of the fathering 
role in his youth was socially oriented. Being the eldest child, he was expected to help 
his father. Within this context, he had taken responsibility for the higher education of 
three of his younger sisters.
A man in a joint-breadwinner model family needs to maintain some sort of
close relationship with his wife to maintain his patriarchal position as she also shares
in generating family income. Bunthi maintained cooperation with his wife in early
years of their family life. Nowadays he obtains patriarchal power in a blunt and
aggressive way by altering the former family model to that of breadwinner/housewife
model. His current construction of masculinity is a reconfigured patriarchy, which is
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not based on profit maximisation; rather it is based on maximisation of power and 
authority over his wife. Keeping his wife away from her business has certainly caused 
loss of family income. But he does this in order to ensure his absolute power in the 
family. His decision for his wife to stop her business was a conscious stratagem. He is 
aware that any income earned by his wife may diminish his power and authority.
Bunthi’s move to the business sector is socially driven. Cambodian society is 
becoming more and more materialistic. A man, especially in the city, should have a 
house and a car (Sophea, another business entrepreneur bluntly holds this notion). 
Bunthi was concerned that he could not do so working in the social sector. He wanted 
to acquire wealth quickly from running businesses.
Engagement in the business sector is adding a new dimension to Bunthi’s 
masculinity. He is emotionally attached to women outside marriage through ‘after- 
hours business networking’. This is a new practice for him. He regards such 
relationships as ‘not so serious' and ‘comes along with business.’ When asked about 
family, Bunthi says, ‘family is one of my entertainments and work is for the family’s 
financial support.' But his emotional share outside marriage suggests that family is no 
longer a site of his entertainment.
Bunthi's practice and his wife's expectation are not consistent. There is a 
contradiction in the way he performs masculinity and the way his wife expects him to 
practice. His wife holds the notion of marital fidelity. In contrast, he shares emotional 
and sexual relationships with women outside marriage. This contradiction causes 
serious tensions in the family. His wife watches him closely and he strongly resents 
her vigilance.
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6.4 Managerial masculinities: divergences and relations to domestic violence 
6.4.1 Managerial masculinities: divergences and pluralities
Three patterns of masculinities are performed by Cambodian managers in this 
study. Each pattern is distinct from the others in the way it is constructed and 
practised. The nature of work, culture of work management and gender regimes of the 
workplace greatly affect the way managers construct and practice specific patterns of 
masculinities.
Barom represents the masculinities of most public sector managers, with the 
exception of Sopheak. Sopheak is an outlier whose practices do not fall in this type. 
The mid-career public sector managers work in a bureaucratic system with a rigid 
hierarchy. They work with less entitlement and authority than their senior 
management. A manager's performance is measured by senior management based on 
periodic report on the department or unit or office of which he is incharge. As the 
public sector manager does not work in a fishbowl, there is room to manipulate 
performance in the report. There is a common practice by managers to keep their 
senior management uninformed about exact performance by their department or unit 
or office. Managers use various strategies to cover up discrepancies. The strategies 
include discussing unfulfilled targets with subordinates within the department, solving 
the issue locally, and showing apparent honesty to the senior management. Different 
managers go with different strategies, and this validates the assertion that there is no 
standardised management strategy in the public sector. A manager picks up a strategy 
which works best within the department.
The public sector managers spend the bulk of their time at meetings (within
and outside department/unit/office), and on paper-work and reporting. They manage
their departments with hierarchy and authority. The subordinate can hardly find a
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manager as a mentor or coach. As one’s performance does not really matter, his/her 
professional or personal relation with the manager is really important for the 
subordinates.
The same ethics also flow to the relationship between the managers and their 
senior management in the Ministry. Patronage of senior staff in the Ministry is very 
important in achieving a promotion for a manager. For instance, Phyrum provides 
personal service to one of his Ministerial senior staff to secure his patronage. He 
picks-up his boss and his boss’s family at the airport upon their arrival from a family 
trip overseas. Though he knows that this sort of practice is submissive and beyond 
official responsibility, Phyrum consciously provides this service in the hope of a 
promotion. His boss has the power to nominate staff for promotion within his office.
But Sopheak, a medical doctor, does not follow the paths of other fellow 
managers. He neither provides personal services nor manipulates discrepancies for the 
senior management. He rather maintains a straightforward relationship. He expects 
promotion based on merit and competency. He is unlikely to make an undue 
compromise. He had a promotion due in his department but it did not happen as he 
could not convince the senior management in the usual way. He has shown a 
willingness to protest and has taken leave from his workplace when his promotion 
was rejected. He currently works in an international non-government organisation. 
This is a sort of protest against unfair treatment by his superiors. Sopheak's academic 
merit and professional skill have enabled him to be firm in his protest. Sopheak has 
ample opportunities to work in the private sector to keep his self-esteem intact.
As some services of many public sector departments are gradually being
privatised, the public sector managerial masculinities are gaining new dimensions. In
its new dimension as found in Barom’s case, the bureaucracy is being expanded to
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private domain. In the neo-liberal model, the managers are holding more power by 
holding approval authority over private sector services. At the same time, managers’ 
authority within departments is being squeezed in real terms as departments 
themselves play diminishing roles.
Having an official policy on gender equality and being directly involved in 
promoting gender equality within program such as by Phyrum, the public sector 
managers are knowledgeable about gender mainstreaming processes in government 
departments. They are also informed and aware of gender equality in family life.
Liang represents the masculinities of Chhrem and Prom. They work in a 
fishbowl with an exact target to achieve. Achievement of their targets depends on 
delivering best customer services by the staff in the frontline. Essentially, they need to 
supervise their subordinates so that they serve in the best way. The bulk of their time 
goes in face-to-face staff supervision, not relating to their seniors. In real terms, their 
managerial role takes place only in a downward direction, supervising underlings.
Liang. Chhrem and Prom's relationship with their subordinates is ‘complied.' 
They approach their subordinates apparently as ‘mentor' or ‘coach’ to make them 
‘better managers’. These management jargons are often used to label corporate 
management as people-oriented. However, the complicit managerial practice with 
subordinates is maintained for personal benefit, i.e., achievement of their targets. But 
their complicity does not take place in a vacuum of power and authority. The power 
flows to the subordinates as supervisors present themselves as problem solvers. The 
management jargons have different meaning to the subordinates. To them the 
meaning is synonymous with power and authority.
Unlike the private sector managers just mentioned, Bunthi and Sophea who 
own, and manage their own business bring different patterns of masculinities.
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Bunthi who co-owns an export-led business does not have many dealings with 
colleagues. In fact, there are few staff who work for his business. His business 
partners and local entrepreneurs are important to him. His management practices are 
more non-personnel. He needs to maintain networking with partners and 
entrepreneurs. He spends lots of time on field trips.
Sophea, who owns a local real estate company appears hostile to his 
subordinates. Commission from buyers and sellers of property is the main source of 
the company's income. He has problems with his subordinates who secretly deal with 
some clients and take commission from the clients bypassing the company. As a result 
the company loses income.
The approaches such as claiming to be “mentors” or “add value” are 
ineffective in managing his employees. Sophea maintains a commanding and 
authoritarian attitude to his employees. He uses different approaches with his 
subordinates to ensure income for his company earned from commissions. He uses a 
moral approach to prevent his employees from cheating. He makes his staff take an 
oath every morning in front of Buddha's statue that they will not take commission 
from the clients. He says,
We are Buddhist. They are afraid to cheat after taking an oath. I use moral 
action instead of legal action.
6.4.2 Managerial masculinities and domestic violence
Managerial masculinities, specifically how they are made and what is earned 
by a manager, have implications for intra-family gender relations and violence in the 
family. Income status of the wife of the manager powerfully regulates a manager's 
potential violent behaviour in the family.
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Bunthi has been undergoing tension and conflict with his wife. Although he 
did not mention whether the tension has ever turned into physical violence, there is no 
doubt that his wife’s personal wellbeing and freedom are in question. The potentially 
violent situation arose because of his sexual promiscuity which arose from his 
business procedures as detailed discussed in Case 3. He did not carry out these 
practices when he worked in social development.
Prom also encountered tension with his wife a few years ago on the same 
grounds. Their relationship disintegrated because of his sexual infidelity. He 
developed relationships with several girls at a Karaoke bar by visiting them with his 
colleagues. His wife, who is a businesswoman, did not accept his sexual behaviour. 
She left him and lived separately for a couple of weeks. This happened twice. Finally, 
Prom persuaded her to return by giving her a guarantee of marital fidelity.
Sopheak had also encountered family violence in his early conjugal life. He 
slapped his wife at least on one occasion. The grounds for his violence were not same 
as those of Prom and Bunthi. Sopheak grew up in a poor and needy family. He 
married a wife from a ruling class family. Sopheak wanted his wife to conform to his 
idea of womanhood. For example, he wanted her to respect and obey him and his 
family, not to argue with him, and to cook and serve meals when he came home from 
work. Being socially inferior, he attempted to use gendered norms of womanhood 
which he termed Chhbap Srey (traditional code of conduct for women) in an effort to 
maintain class difference as well as to exercise power and authority. Incompliance to 
Chhbap Srey by his wife seemed maltreatment of his class position. He then used 
physical violence to discipline his wife.
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His wife, however, who has an outside paid job, challenged his violent 
practice by virtue of her economic independence. Over time, Sopheak has given up 
his attempts to discipline his wife. He respects and values his wife these days.
Unlike the wives of Sopheak and Prom, Bunthi’s wife has failed to challenge 
the sexual privilege of her husband. Bunthi has maximised his power and authority 
over the family by making his wife economically dependent on him. His wife 
eventually accepted his privilege.
Private sector manager Liang, and business entrepreneurs Bunthi and Sophea 
have reconstructed patriarchal control over the family by reconstructing a patriarchy 
which is not maximising profit but maximising power and authority, particularly over 
his wife. Bunthi and Sophea, in particular have stopped their wives from taking on 
outside paid work. Their reconstructed patriarchy is made possible through their sole 
family-providing role.
Working wives of managers, including public sector managers are better off in 
family gender relations as well as in negotiation with their husbands on family affairs. 
Their contribution to the family budget balances the power and authority between 
spouses and safeguards them from potential violence.
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CHAPTER 7
LAND, FARMING AND LIVING: EXPLORING PEASANT
MASCULINITIES
7.1 Introduction
To date, studies on rural masculinities have been limited in terms of 
geography, historical period and subject matter. The available studies (Brandth, 2002; 
Coldwell, 2009) have been made in the context of large-scale farming practices in 
industrialised nations. The study on masculinities in farming began to appear in 
literature only more than a decade ago (Brandth, 1995; Phillips, 1998). These studies 
mainly focus on agricultural changes, technologies and peasant identities. There is a 
dearth of study in the context of matrilocal developing nations like Cambodia where 
rules on land ownership have changed several times in recent history. There is a 
dearth of studies in social settings such as these in relation to intra-family gender 
relations in general and domestic violence in particular.
As discussed in the literature review (Chapter 2), agriculture is a masculine 
domain of social practice. The term ‘farmer' is analogous to male identity. Farming 
has become more fully masculinised with the advent of mechanisation. This 
transformation has reinforced the farmer’s identity as male by taking away women’s 
farming activity.
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This transformation has not always been good for men. Men are often left to 
run farms alone and are therefore isolated, and are often seen as backward and non­
modem compared to their female counterparts who now have better educations, 
multiple skills and social advantages which they have acquired through their move to 
urban activities.
7.2 Land, land-ownership and farming practices in Cambodia
Land
Cambodia's landscape comprises a central plain with forested mountains 
along the borders. The Mekong River, Tonle Sap (Great Lake), and Bassac Rivers 
drain the central plain. The soil is humid to sub-humid with pronounced alternating 
wet-dry seasons of about six months. Areas adjacent to the Mekong River, tributary 
rivers and streams, and Tonle Sap are highly fertile with fine-textured recent alluvial 
deposits. Other areas of the central plain are low-fertile with sandy to silty clay and 
sandy loams as well as ancient alluvial deposits.
The landscape and soil type affect agriculture significantly. The central plains 
lowland is used for agriculture and the vast upland areas are used for plantation. 
Agriculture is highly vulnerable to both drought and flood and is practised mainly 
during the wet season. The dry season is unfavourable for agriculture, particularly for 
rice cultivation.
Land-ownership
As stated in Chapters 4-5, Cambodia has gone through radical political
changes, particularly in last four decades. Each government has introduced its own
system for the use and ownership of land.
In the pre-colonial era, all land belonged, de jure, to the King. In practice,
people held rights of possession. During the colonial period (1863-1954), private land
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ownership was introduced and this continued until 1975. The Democratic Kampuchea 
(DK) regime abolished private land ownership during its period of power from 1975 
to 1979. With little modification of the DK's policy, the post-DK regime followed the 
collective ownership (Krom Samaki) system until the 1990s.
A new Land Law was promulgated in 1992. It gave Cambodians the right to 
possess, use, transfer and inherit land that they had been occupying for at least five 
years. It also invalidated the ownership rights existing from before 1979. However, 
the 1992 Land Law had some weaknesses with regard to possession of land, including 
the possibility of claiming ownership solely on the basis of possession, the lack of 
documentation of ownership, and possession rights. These drawbacks led to massive 
land-grabbing by powerful government officials who acted as though vacant 
properties (land occupied by ordinary people was often taken by force as if vacant) 
and State property were theirs to occupy and therefore sell. A new law was 
promulgated in 2001 to address these drawbacks.
To this day, the majority of the population in the countryside occupies land 
without legal title. Lack of land title makes peasants vulnerable to easy appropriation 
of their land by the government and private companies.
Farm practices
72.3% of the workforce worked in the agriculture sector in 2010. The vast 
majority of these are smallholder farmers with a land holding averaging less than one 
hectare per household.
Rice is the main crop. Along with farming rice, rural families juggle a range of
non-farm activities which include rearing livestock (mainly cattle, buffalo, pigs,
chicken and ducks), catching fish and other aquatic fauna, and harvesting non-timber
forest products such as bamboo shoots, mushrooms and firewood. There is regional
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variation in the rice yield. Provinces alongside Tonle Sap and the Mekong River such 
as Battambang, Siem Reap, Pursat, and Bantey Meanchey produce the highest 
quantity of rice. Other provinces of the central plain produce less rice than the 
national average.
Farming is mainly for subsistence and farming methods are mainly manual, 
though mechanical ploughing is on the increase. Production of livestock is usually 
small-scale. Fish and aquatic fauna are important for food security and for nutrition of 
the rural population.
More than 80% of rice cultivation is rain-fed. The rainfall period is from June 
to October. The Mekong River swells to its peak in September to October which can 
lead to severe flooding. Many farmers come to the city during the off-farm season to 
work temporarily in non-formal urban sectors.
7.3 Peasants of this Study
The discussion in this chapter is based on the life histories of fifteen peasants 
from two generational groups: an older generation above 40 (group of eight) and a 
younger generation below 30 (group of seven). Peasants of the older generation are: 
Rathcma Kong (54), father of five children, Theara Kim (49), father of eight children, 
Chcmdareth Lam (60), father of nine children, Sophoan Chea (57), father of seven 
children, Sokha Yim (49), father of seven children, Samay Leng (50), father of six 
children, Sopath Kuy (49), father of seven children, and Vuthy Tep (42), father of 
three children. Peasants of the younger generation are Chantu Soy (27), father of two 
children. Vutha Eng (30), father of two children, Pou Pok (30), father of two children, 
Bunnak Ouk (26), father of three children, Syheap Srey (30), father of three children, 
Kosal Hak (29), father of two children, and Pyanet Cham (28), father of one child.
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They come from three provinces. Rice yield in these provinces is lower than 
the national average. Rice production is limited mainly to the wet season, although 
dry season rice production is undertaken in a limited area where groundwater or 
surface water is available in the dry season. Agricultural land worked by farmers in 
one of these provinces has been acquired by the government for a transnational agro­
processing company, as the farmers do not hold legal title.
Among the older generation group, Rathanak, Theara, Chandareth and 
Sophoan served in the militia of the Khmer Rouge (KR) regime, and Sokha, Samay 
and Vuthy served in the armed corps of the post-KR regime. Their transformation to 
civilian life will be discussed in Chapter 12.
Case Study 4: Vuthy Tep, a marginal peasant
The interview
Mr Vuthy was recruited with the help of one of his fellow farmers who was 
also interviewed in this study. The interview took place in his home. It was a semi­
public interview as some neighbours were present during the interview which ran for 
an hour.
In the course of the interview, I came to understand some of the tensions that 
have vexed his family for few years. I asked him to give me details of these issues. He 
spoke frankly despite the presence of neighbours in the meeting place.
Geographical, social and economic setting of Vuthy’s commune
Vuthy’s commune is 100 km from the capital and 60 km from the nearest 
provincial town. It is one of the remotest communes of the province. The commune is 
connected to the provincial town by an earthen road. This road was narrow until a few
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years ago when it was widened. The road was scheduled to be paved in 2010. The 
commune has now been connected to national power grid.
The infrastructure development is taking place as part of industrial 
development in the area. A foreign-owned agro-processing industry was established in 
the neighbouring district a few years ago and another foreign-owned agro-based 
industry is now under way in Vuthy’s commune.
The population of the commune is 8,020 people in 1.800 households. The 
commune's landscape consists of plains and forested hilly tracts with areas of 180.000 
hectares and 10,000 hectares respectively. A number of Stecmg (creeks) cross some 
villages of the commune. Originated in the mountains, these creeks carry water 
throughout the commune.
Agriculture is the main occupation of people in the commune. Rice is the main 
crop and cultivated mainly for subsistence. A few farmers produce surplus rice for 
sale. They also grow vegetables and fruit both for subsistence and cash. Men and 
women work together on the farms that rely on rain and creek water.
The rice yield of many families of the commune has been reduced in the last 
few years because of drought and low rainfall. In the past there was sufficient rain-fall 
and the creeks flowed plentifully throughout the year. The water level in the creeks 
even in the dry season was deep enough for the land to be irrigated for the cultivation 
of vegetables.
Families in the commune received land holdings following the Land Law of 
1992. Those who returned to the commune after 1992 or worked somewhere other 
than Krom Samaki could not receive any land.
Many families in the commune have long been dependent on the forest. They
usually collected various non-timber forest products for subsistence. Nowadays, as the
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rice yield has fallen, families are extracting timber from the forest to earn money. 
They log timber to make charcoal for sale in Phnom Penh.
Life course
Vuthy is 42 years old and the father of three children (two daughters and one 
son). He was born in a marginal peasant family in another commune and followed the 
matrilocal marriage custom of moving to his wife’s family.
He was nine when the Khmer Rouge (KR) regime began and had a hard life 
during the regime. Like other children, he worked hard, herding cows, cutting leaves 
and paddy straws, and preparing compost.
Both his parents died from sickness during the war and after the fall of the KR 
regime, young Vuthy lived with his eldest sister. He resumed his study and completed 
Year VI, by which he was already adult. It is noteworthy that in post-war Cambodia, 
adults and children attended the same classes.
Vuthy joined the armed forces of the post-KR regime. He joined the corps 
voluntarily and accepted the ‘obligation' to protect the country, though many others 
were recruited by force. The post-KR regime recruited thousands of adult males in the 
armed forces to fight against KR militias who were still holding some parts of the 
country.
He was mobilised as a serviceman in the commune where he currently lives 
and came to know his wife during this time. He married in 1992 while still in the 
armed services. He stopped serving in the armed force in 1996 because of a posting to 
a new location. This time his responsibility for his family came before his patriotism.
After being removed from the armed forces, Vuthy turned to full-time farming
and has been working as a full-time farmer ever since. He lived with his parents-in-
law for the first few years of his marriage. Then he and his wife started to live as a
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separate family unit with one hectare of land given to them by his parents-in-law. 
Both spouses farmed this land.
Vuthy’s wife has been living away from the family since last year. She works 
in the agro-processing factory in the neighbouring district. She lives there and visits 
Vuthy and their children at home once or twice a month. Vuthy is adjusting himself to 
the changing situation. As his wife lives away, he looks after the family and does the 
household chores along with his farming work. His eldest daughter who is sixteen 
assists him. The youngest child, a son, goes to school.
Work, workplace and gender regime in work
Vuthy's working life began through his service in the armed forces in his early 
twenties. According to his account, this service was violent and life-threatening. 
Fights often broke-out with the Khmer Rouge militias. Terror and cruelty were part of 
daily life.
The armed service was a gendered site. It was a world of men and was 
commanded and operated by men against men. Only men were recruited in the armed 
service as they were recruited primarily for fighting.
Vuthy’s farming occupation began after marriage, first with his parents-in-law, 
then on the one hectare given by them. Over time, he has expanded the land size and 
they currently own two hectares of land. Vuthy cultivated rice and vegetables in the 
past but has not grown vegetables for the past few years due to lack of water. 
Nowadays, he collects wood from the forest to make charcoal for sale.
Farming practices in Vuthy’s family are not gendered. According to him, "both 
husband and wife worked hard on the land every day.’ This was the gender scenario 
of farming until last year. His wife is now engaged in outside paid work as a result of
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the family’s low rice yield. In her current work regime, his wife adds cash while 
Vuthy makes a subsistence living to add to the family’s economy.
Family, relationship and gender regime in the family
Vuthy’s relationship with his parents was brief as he was separated from them 
by the KR regime at the age of nine. In post-war times, he was brought up as a 
teenager by his eldest sister. His relationship with his sister was good but life was 
hard and survival was often desperately difficult. Like Vuthy, many young survivors 
of the war were brought up either by the surviving senior family member or by foster 
parents in post-war Cambodia.
Vuthy has been making his own family for eighteen years. The family 
relationship is built on a gender regime which functions through specific gender roles 
and relationships. Until last year, both spouses had contributed similarly to provision 
for the family. Both spouses worked on the land inherited by his wife. Despite his 
wife's significant contribution to family income, Vuthy had been regarded as the 
default head of family and he bore the principal responsibility for providing for them. 
Being the family head he enjoyed privilege in the family hierarchy.
The family has been undergoing a change of gender regime since last year. 
The change began after his wife found a paid job because of the shrinking farm 
production. The family was in desperate need for an alternative income to feed the 
family as well as they had in the past.
By entering paid work his wife addressed the problem of the family’s economic 
need. The family economy has shifted from a pure subsistence farming to a mixed 
economy i.e., subsistence farming/cash economy. With her ‘salaried' job, Vuthy’s 
wife is emerging as the principal provider for the family and is replacing Vuthy’s 
gender role. He describes the changing situation as follows,
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My income is shrinking because of natural calamities. She has some 
salary. And I also have some income. We put these together for our daily 
living.
But her income could be higher than mine in this month. She earns a good 
amount at a time because she draws salary. But mine is not like hers. I 
earned more than she did in the past. Nowadays she earns more than me 
and supports the family more than I do.
The changing gender role has implications for gender relationships in the 
family. With her cash income from the newly non-traditional job, Vuthy’s wife is 
gaining more authority in family power. About the change of gender regime, Vuthy
says,
I am the head of the household. But the situation now is totally different 
from before. She depended on me before because I earned more. Now she 
makes more decisions in the family.
Vuthy did not give details of areas where his wife makes more decisions 
nowadays, but it is certain that the new gender order is precarious for him. In contrast, 
the new order is advantageous for his wife, particularly when any matter relates to 
both spouses.
Place (rural/urban), peer relationship and wider social life or culture
Vuthy was born, brought up and lived his entire life in a rural setting with a
peasant background. Although he served in the armed forces for a considerable time,
his life in the service was quasi-rural, as he was always based in remote communes.
Within the socio-cultural setting of rural peasant society, a man is expected to
provide for his family from the family farm. He should be able to feed the family
throughout the year. This is the primary target of maleness of a peasant. In addition,
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he should put all his efforts towards earning properties such as arable land and houses 
to be inherited by his children.
Vuthy’s peer relationships and leisure are gendered. His peers are men who 
come from his neighbourhood and are relatives. He drinks locally made fermented 
rice liquor with his peers in the evening after a hard farming day. He prefers peer 
drinking in the local grocery-cum-pub to lone drinking at home.
Given the remote location of his commune, Vuthy is not much acquainted with 
the contemporary social changes that are taking place and still holds typical gender 
norms of masculinities and femininities.
Experience of violence
Vuthy has experienced the collective social violence of the KR regime. He 
was separated from his parents and made to take part in forced labour even though he 
was a child. All children of his generation have experienced a gross violation of 
human rights. As his life with his parents was brief and at a young age, he cannot 
remember his relationship with his parents. His upbringing in the custody of an elder 
sister in post-war times was good and non-violent.
Vuthy’s experience as a family-maker was formerly healthy and harmonious. 
But the relationship in the family turned sour a year ago. Some ‘conflicts’ and ‘issues’ 
have been occurring between husband and wife over the course of his wife’s outside 
paid work. Conflicts and issues relate to the family’s living standard and mistrust on 
marital fidelity.
Vuthy’s wife has become accustomed to, and adapted to, an improved living
standard during the course of her work in the factory. She eats better food and lives
with good household amenities in the factory site. She does not feel comfortable with
substandard food and the household amenities during her visit to home. Sometimes,
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she expresses her discomfort explicitly and Vuthy feels her discomfort with his 
lessening ability to provide for the family. He feels unhappy and angry and this leads 
to further friction.
During the employment of his wife in the factory, the couple has been living 
apart, whereas before they had been cohabiting for their entire conjugal life. His 
wife’s new job requires her to be stationed in the factory site, to work with male 
bosses and spend work time with her bosses until evening. These factors worry 
Vuthy. Vuthy expects his wife to return home before the sun sets, and not go out with 
her male boss, especially in the evening. He suspects that his wife might have 
developed an intimate relationship with her boss who is educated, salaried and better 
off than he is. He monitors his wife’s whereabouts frequently over his cell phone from 
his rural home.
Vuthy's expectations of his wife are constructed within the labour procedures 
of an agrarian economy. Conversely, his wife’s current practices are made in 
accordance with the labour process in the industrial economy. His expectations and 
his wife’s practice are in conflict. And Vuthy lacks the understanding to accept the his 
wife’s new practices.
His wife's acceptance of outside paid work has addressed the family’s economic 
need but at the same time has brought about embarrassing and unexpected issues and 
conflicts. His wife does not feel comfortable with the quality of life he can afford. On 
the other hand, living at a distance is creating room for mistrust intertwined with 
gendered notions of femininities and masculinities.
Construction of masculinity
Vuthy’s case is an exceptional example of how masculinities of marginal
peasants in Cambodia are coping with the new gender order that has emerged from
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the country’s changing labour market. The current labour market in the industrial 
(particularly manufacturing) sector is absorbing more and more female labour. This is 
causing women to migrate from rural to urban areas.
Vuthy’s early construction of masculinity along the lives of those that I call 
"peasant masculinities’ was organised on the basis of peasant activities characterised 
by the head of the family supporting the family with food and other basic amenities. 
Arable land, labour, farming know-how and natural resources (particularly rainwater 
and river water in Cambodian context) are important factors in the construction of 
peasant masculinities. Vuthy provided food, housing, clothing and education for his 
children and wife by the use of farm land owned by his wife. The farm practices 
largely relied on rain and river water. He has now turned to the nearby forest to make 
up his support for the family.
In exchange for support of his family, Vuthy enjoys the privilege of family 
headship. Family headship gives him power over some personal choices to be made 
by family members. For example, his wife sought his permission to enter employment 
with the factory.
The core elements of Vuthy’s early construction of masculinity i.e., ‘family 
providing' linked to ‘family headship', were introduced to Khmer masculinities 
through civil codes adopted during French colonial rule in Cambodia, as discussed in 
Chapter 4. Vuthy's early masculinity was constructed within this gendered structure. 
But this structure came under challenge a few years ago when he could not provide 
sufficiently for his family due to low farm yield. The challenge was further 
exacerbated by his wife taking a paid job a year ago.
Despite all the efforts he has made, Vuthy’s peasant masculinity is not sufficient
to satisfy his wife’s needs, that have recently been affected by her exposure to the
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outside world. Having acquired the habit of eating "good and delicious foods’ 
(specially meat) with her ‘bosses’ she cannot eat the meals (of snail, crab, frog and 
vegetables grown locally) when she visits her home. Similarly, she does not feel 
comfortable with ‘substandard' household amenities at home. Having lived in the 
industrial environment she is becoming accustomed to a higher standard of living.
Why didn’t Vuthy find outside paid work to compensate for the drop in farm 
production? How does Vuthy respond to his wife's changing needs? Vuthy has tried 
to find work outside but he was unsuccessful. Conversely, féminisation of labour in 
industrial and manufacturing processes has favoured his wife in finding paid work.
As discussed earlier, there were conflicts and issues between the two spouses 
when the gender roles first began to change. His accounts give the notion that Vuthy 
has been gradually adapting to the changing circumstances. Two factors are central to 
his adaptation. One is his lack of skill. As he says, kI don't have any skill or 
knowledge other than farming' to enhance his ability to support the changing needs of 
his wife. Another is his realisation of the economic emancipation and empowerment 
of his wife which he describes in general in his account, ‘now women in rural areas 
have more rights than before.’
In the changing situation, Vuthy is reorganising masculinity in specific ways. 
He is managing the household, which he did not do in the past. He takes responsibility 
by saying ‘it is my mistake' when his wife blames poor arrangements in household. 
Likewise, he does not confront his wife when she expresses her discomfort with poor 
household amenities and family meals during her visits home. Rather he normalises 
the awkward situation by good humouredly reminding her of her poor living 
conditions in the past.
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Case Study 5: Syheap Srey, a marginal peasant
The interview
Unlike other peasants, Syheap was spontaneous, prompt and confident during 
his interview. He has experience of participation in this kind of research as he 
participates in a men's program run by an NGO and was recruited for this survey 
through the NGO. The interview took place at his home by appointment and lasted for 
an hour.
Socio-economic setting of Syheap’s village/commune
Syheap comes from a village of a central province. The province has a 
comparatively better road infrastructure connecting the communes and districts to the 
provincial town and capital city. Syheap's village is connected to the provincial town 
first by an unpaved road and then by a paved one.
Villagers usually commute to the provincial town by motorbike and locally 
improvised mechanised vehicles. There is no public or mass transport to and from the 
village and the provincial town.
The village is also connected to the national power grid. Good road 
infrastructure and electrification have widened the scope of income diversification for 
the villagers. Petty business and trading of consumer goods and house-building 
construction materials are emerging as occupations in addition to agriculture in the 
locality. Agriculture, particularly ploughing, has been mechanised in recent years. 
Some farmers, who own large-sized plots of land, no longer use draft animals for 
ploughing, using tractors instead. Many households own motorbikes for local 
communication.
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Life course
Syheap is third among four children of his parents. He is 30 years old and a 
father of three children. The eldest child is seven years old and the youngest child is 
three.
He was born in a peasant family. His father left the family after a prolonged 
quarrel with his mother. Syheap was just five at that time. He did not give detail of the 
quarrel between his parents but he confirmed that it had nothing to do with his father 
having a second wife. His father lived in another commune on his own.
Syheap was brought up in a family with his mother as the de facto head. 
Having no adult male in the family, young Syheap assisted his mother in farm 
activities. He learnt every aspect of farming by the time he was eleven. The family of 
Syheap lived on one hectare of land allocated by the state for household subsistence. 
The yield of rice from the land was enough to feed the family throughout the year.
Along with assisting his mother, Syheap also studied. He went to high school in 
the provincial town. All siblings have completed high school certificate (HSC). 
Completion of HSC was difficult for him despite his mothers' great enthusiasm and 
tireless efforts. He had to travel twelve km every day by bicycle to attend school in 
the provincial town. There was no fun and leisure for his cognitive development at 
this age. He worked for his family in the time left over from school. He says,
We just spent time for studying together, not for any leisure because I had 
to come back home to help my mum in the family.
He wanted to continue his study after HSC. But he could not do so because his 
mother could not afford to pay for his study away from home. There was no 
university in the provincial town at that time and he finally lost interest. His father
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reunited with the family when Syheap was in Year-11 and died four years later. His 
mother is still alive and lives in her home with her youngest daughter.
Syheap married after completing his HSC. His wife ran a grocery before 
marriage their and they came to know each other through this business. Like Ra, 
Syheap also followed matrilocal marriage.
He lived with his in-law family with his wife after marriage and worked at 
farming together with his in-laws. After a few years of living with his in-laws, Syheap 
and his wife began living separately. Currently Syheap, his wife and children, live in 
their own house. The house is built of wood on rod, cement and concrete made stilts. 
His family is regarded as middle-class by comparison with the local socio-economic 
standard.
His wife inherited one hectare of farmland when they separated from his in­
laws. Since then he has bought two hectares of land. He uses all three hectares of land 
for farming. Rice, which is rain-fed, is the main crop and he can produce a surplus 
amount of rice which he sells out to earn cash for family expenses.
In addition to farming, Syheap runs an auto-workshop in the premises of his 
home. He repairs motor-bikes, bi-cycles, power tractors and other mechanised 
vehicles and machines. This is his secondary occupation to add some cash income to 
the family budget. Recently he also worked with an agriculture-specialised NGO for 
three years. He worked as a farmers' facilitator but resigned from this job because of 
time constraints.
Syheap's wife is a full-time housewife who devotes herself to household 
chores and childcare. This is not her choice but she defers to her husband who wants 
her to ensure care for the children.
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Work, workplace and gender regime in work
Syheap's working life began at the age of nine, assisting his mother in family 
farming. Participation in the labour force at an early age is common to most of the 
peasants interviewed in this study. In Syheap’s case, his labour force participation was 
triggered by the lack of an adult male member in the family.
All Syheap’s siblings also worked on the family farm. The standard pattern for 
economic production of the pro-socialist State of Cambodia (SoC) was that all family 
members should work on the farm. Syheap's family used manual labour in their farm 
practices. They ploughed the land using hand tools as they had no draft animals.
Syheap began farming as an independent and full-fledged family unit after he 
separated from the family of his in-laws. Throughout his life he has experienced many 
changes in farming practices and gender division of labour in farming. When asked 
about the changes he has experienced in his lifetime Syheap said.
Nowadays, a farmer can hire someone who has power tractor to plough his 
land. Several years ago, farmers used manual labour to carry rice harvest 
on their shoulders from the field to their homes. Nowadays, they can use 
motorised vehicles. To help the fertility of the soil, we have received 
training from an NGO on soil quality improvement methodology. We have 
learnt how to make compost. Nowadays, farmers use compost as fertiliser.
By using this type of fertiliser, we can produce more by keeping soil 
quality better than before.
Syheap has been using three hectares of land for farming, mainly for rice 
cultivation. He is the principal/lead farmer. His wife assisted him a lot by contributing 
her farming labour in the first few years of their married life. Nowadays, she is 
virtually absent from farm activities, especially at field-level work.
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Unlike past practice, he now uses a power-tractor instead of draft-animals to 
plough and prepare land. He also uses locally improvised mechanised devices to 
transport farm products from field to home. Through his association with the 
agricultural specialised NGO, Syheap has learnt two new skills, namely the 
preparation of compost and systematic rice intensification (SRI). Cambodian farmers 
are encountering the problem of falling soil fertility because of excessive use of 
chemical fertiliser in the past. Falling soil fertility is causing a drop in the rice yield. 
Compost fertiliser and SRI are quick fixes for these. Having skill in these two areas, 
Syheap is able to continue farming successfully.
Skills training in the new areas such as composting and SRI are 
overwhelmingly male dominated. The resource persons are usually men. The time and 
venues of training sessions are not suitable for female farmers to participate. For 
example, potential female farmers from rural villages with young children cannot 
participate in a training session if it is organised at a provincial town for an extended 
period. In his family, Syheap alone has learnt the new skills. His wife did not. attend a 
single training session.
Syheap is a mechanic. He repairs motor-bikes, bicycles, power tractors and 
other machines in his workshop. He learned from his father the necessary skills to 
prepare conventional agricultural tools such as ox-carts. Mechanical skills are 
technical and gendered. Applying these skills in daily life is also gendered. Women 
lack the support networks and capital to establish an enterprise even if they acquire 
this gendered skill. In his case, Syheap's wife is not involved in his workshop as she 
has no mechanical skills.
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Family, relationship and gender regime in the family
Syheap's mother served both as a household provider and homemaker. He has 
restructured this model of family relationship to a breadwinner/household maker 
model in his family.
His mothers' model has not worked for him because of two reasons. One is that 
his mothers' model was a kind of de facto: she became the head of household because 
of abandonment by his father. The second is that the social definition of a man as the 
breadwinner. Syheap's hatred against his father was constructed within the social 
notion that a husband should support the family. He says,
I did not like my father. The reason that I did not like is that he did not 
care about mother and that he did not support us. He saved his earnings for 
himself only.
Syheap's breadwinner/household maker model has been reinforced over the 
period of his conjugal life. The gender division of labour has been respected in his 
marital life. His wife, who ran a grocery before marriage and shared in farm work 
extensively in their early family life, is now fully engaged in domestic home-making. 
This is an outcome of Syheap's choice.
Syheap has multiplied his income through income diversification. His wife is 
backing his serving as the sole breadwinner. The monetary value of her so-called 
reproductive household work is unaccounted in the family income-expenses ledger. 
Place (rural/culture), peer relationship and wider social life or culture
Syheap is calculating and selective in making peers, peer relations and using
his leisure. He considers the economic benefit or return for his time before deciding
how to fill his time. Unlike other peasants in this study, including Ra, Syheap does not
prefer to make friends with men in his neighbourhood. He is reluctant to drink or play
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sports, as he considers them a waste of time, though he likes soccer. He uses his 
leisure time for income-generating activities by working in the workshop.
He does have an unconventional but gendered peer network which is active and 
goes beyond his occupational group. Though his primary occupation is farming, he 
has professional peers who work in NGOs and banks and who live in the town. These 
are his ex-schoolmates who were fortunate enough to continue their studies to 
university level and then entered professional careers. He has the necessary skills to 
maintain a network with non-sector peers. About his peer network, Syheap says,
I have many friends from my school life who currently work in NGOs and 
banks in the provincial town. All my friends and I still communicate each 
other.
He uses this network wisely. He managed a job in an NGO a few years ago 
through one of his friends who works there.
The lives and careers of his peers significantly shape the life aspiration of 
Syheap. For example, he wants his children to have a career like his friends. He wants 
to achieve through his children what he could not achieve for himself because of 
poverty.
Experience of violence
Syheap went through a troubled parental relationship that culminated in the
separation of his parents. His father communicated with the family after separation.
According to his account, the troubled relationship had never become violent, to his
wife nor his children. It left Syheap, however, harbouring hatred toward his father.
He felt his father acted in a domineering way to his mother.
Syheap has been making his own family for ten years. When asked about his
spousal relationship he acknowledged the existence of arguments between them
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sometimes which left them not talking to each other for two or three days. This is a 
classical pattern of non-violent intra-family relationship that many families go 
through. The spousal argument is patriarchal in nature and stems from the notion of 
gendered roles and relationship. He describes the moment of argument as follows,
It usually happens when one of goes out without telling the other. 
Sometimes, she goes out to buy something without informing me. And at 
other times, arguments erupt when I blame her for not taking good care of 
the children.
Syheap expects his wife to report to him about her going out and any expenses 
and vice versa. Syheap also expects his wife to provide ongoing care for their 
children. The notions of gendered roles are taken for granted as a consequence of his 
sole breadwinning role.
Construction of masculinity
Syheap is a young, educated and hardworking peasant who has has adopted a 
hardworking lifestyle since childhood, given the dire situation in the post-war era. 
Over time, he has modernised his farming knowledge and techniques to cope with the 
loss of soil fertility and falling rice yield. He has been using technologies to replace 
manual labour. Over time, he has also diversified his occupations and emerged as an 
entrepreneur along with his farming practices.
Syheap's early construction of masculinity followed the social norm that a
man should support his family. This social norm exacerbated his construction of
masculinity when his father left the family in an irresponsible manner. He became
antagonistic to his father due to his failure to play the role of family provider.
Syheap's current practice of masculinity is clearly a reaction to his father's
behaviour. Contemporary social rhetoric of ‘men of success’ reinforces his current
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practices. The social rhetoric expects a man should exert his best efforts for his 
family. He should leave inheritable wealth or property and provide education that they 
can use for employment. Syheap's account exactly reflects the rhetoric as he says,
I am a Cambodian. I am the head of the family, who can lead and manage 
the family, and especially support my children to go to school. I am trying 
to do everything to offer better education to my children so that they will 
be better off than me.
Syheap's internalisation of the social discourse on men of success as well as 
his real efforts for making masculinities around that discourse is vibrant. Is it because 
of the way in which he has been made aware of the discourse? His peers who are 
professionals have played a powerful role in conveying the discourse to Syheap.
Although he blames his father for not holding the same values as his mother, 
Syheap himself is not far from following his father's example. He leads the family 
with patriarchal control and dominance. He reconfigures his fathers' model of 
patriarchy accommodating social rhetoric of maleness. His father tried to dominate his 
family without providing for the family. Syheap controls his wife through providing 
for the family. He regulates the mobility and labour of his wife and he regulates 
household expenses.
Control over the family, particularly of one's wife, is taken for granted for 
household headship. Women in Cambodia are responsible for petty purchases for 
family uses. They go to the local market to buy the basic necessities for the 
household. This is also a way for women to enhance their social networks. Syheap 
expects his wife to inform him about her possible comings and goings ahead of time 
which limits her socialising and networking.
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He expands his patriarchal control over his wife’s labour. He uses her as a full­
time household maker and expects her to give full care to their children, whereas his 
role for the children is limited to the provision of good and sufficient food and 
schooling. His patriarchal control is built on a strict gender segregation of labour.
7.4 Cambodian peasant masculinities: Patterns and relations to domestic 
violence
7.4.1 Patterns of Cambodian peasant masculinities
Despite differences in their current practices, Vuthy and Syheap show 
common patterns in the ways they have constructed and organised peasant life. Both 
of them followed matrilocal marriage, and began peasant life on land provided by 
their wives. The wife’s participation in the farm labour force was important. Both 
maintained a family with the belief that they were the head of the family, despite the 
wife’s significant economic role. Most other peasants in the study have followed the 
same trajectories. In this way. peasant masculinities in Cambodia are distinct from the 
masculinities found in other social settings.
Gender practices in two eras of the country's history affect peasant 
masculinities in Cambodia. One is the matrilocal marriage of the pre-colonial era. The 
other is the concept of men as family providers. Organised within matrilocal supports, 
the peasant masculinities are organised around providing for their families. Given the 
matrilocal basis, women have an important role in the construction of peasant 
masculinities. Roles and relations of women are reciprocal to the practice of peasant 
masculinities. A peasant can obtain a patriarchal dividend in family relationships only 
in exchange for providing for the family in a sufficient and timely manner. This is a 
pattern of masculinity not organised around direct power.
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All peasants in this study, except Pyanet, followed matrilocal marriage. 
Through matrilocal marriage, they began their early family life within their wife’s 
family. Most of them lived at least three or four years with their in-laws before they 
began an independent family life. They made their living by working on the in-law’s 
farm and under their guidance. All then began their independent peasant lives on land 
inherited by their wives. The making of an independent peasant was achieved on their 
wife’s land.
Despite some sex segregation in farm labour, women’s role in farming is as 
significant as men's. The wives of all the peasants in this study, except Syheap. 
participate in the labour force of the family farm. The Khmer term Kasikon (farmers) 
generally means both men and women. In Vuthy's account, ‘both husband and wife 
worked hard on the land every day.’
Matrilocal practice, the use of the wife's land to begin peasant life, and 
women's participation in the farm labour force, all give women a substantial stake in 
the practices of peasant masculinities. The wife of a peasant shares power in intra­
family gender relations. For example, Syheap's wife can still challenge him about 
going out and spending money as she owns one-third of the land by which he 
provides for the family. Vuthy, in his worsening capacity for family providing, adapts 
himself to the changing gender regime resulting from his wife's paid work in the non- 
agricultural sector.
All peasants in this study, no matter to what extent they provide for their 
family, believe that they are the head of the family. This is nicely articulated by 
Syheap, being ‘a Cambodian, a man is the natural head of the family and he is entitled 
to ‘head and manage the family’ by providing for the family members. Chantu and
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Vuthy despite encountering a shrinking role in providing for the family, currently 
hold a similar notion.
The peasantry as a whole is not exclusively patriarchal. As argued above, 
women's participation in the farm labour force is important. Another non-patriarchal 
aspect of peasant life in Cambodia is that peasants of the younger generation first 
learn farming from their mothers, not their fathers. They begin learning farming as 
teen-agers by assisting their mothers. This means that many of the peasants' early 
memories are of their mothers working as farmers. Though the peasantry is not 
specifically patriarchal, it can be argued that Cambodian peasants now work at 
farming to provide the main income for the family to actualise their patriarchal 
position as whead of the family’.
Given the heavy reliance of farming on climatic conditions, natural resources 
play important roles in the organisation of peasant masculinities. A peasant needs to 
be handy, skilful and a jack of all trades to best use local natural resources to keep his 
family provider role intact. Only a peasant who is skilled enough to switch from one 
sub-sector to another to make a living for his family can gain a patriarchal dividend in 
family relationships. Without these skills he will probably find himself suffering the 
challenges and troubles that Vuthy and Chantu are encountering. Vuthy, who does not 
have any skills other than rice and vegetable farming, has not been able to provide for 
his family for last few years, as the rice yield has been reduced due to drought. 
Chantu, who does not have any marketable skill other than farming, is having trouble 
feeding his family three meals a day, as his one hectare of farm land has been 
acquired (without compensation) by the State for an agro-processing company.
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Syheap and Vutha, on the other hand, who have multiplied their initial 
landholdings and expanded their occupations beyond farming, are organising their 
lives without going through any challenge.
Syheap, exceptionally, constructs a quasi-business masculinity although he is 
a peasant and lives in a rural setting. As discussed earlier, his current construction of 
masculinity resembles the core gender practice of business entrepreneurs, in reversing 
gender roles in his family.
Vutha who follows a radically simple life has multiplied his landholding over 
the period. He lived a monastic life for ten years, and so is accustomed to simplicity 
and a regulated/controlled life. Unlike other farmers, he does not use any amenities 
such as a motorbike or TV. locally considered as luxuries, though he can afford them. 
Instead, he invests and reinvests his savings in productive resources such as arable 
land and cattle to generate further income. He leads his family and improves their 
living conditions through hard work and a simple life.
Vuthy’s adaptation to the changing gender regime and Syheap's construction of
quasi-business masculinity indicate that Cambodian peasant masculinities can be
flexible and adaptive to the changing social structure. A specific pattern of
masculinity is constructed or reconstructed within the gender order of a family and is
maintained through gender roles appropriate to a specific time, an individual’s ability,
and influences imposed by external factors.
7.4.2 Peasant masculinities and domestic violence
The key feature of Cambodian peasant masculinities is that a peasant works at
farming to actualise the patriarchal position of head of the family by providing the
main income for the family. The norm of ‘head of the family' is a default in the
peasant construction of intra-family power relations. Peasant masculinities are not
183
violent in nature. Rather, the notions of 'head of the family’, and ‘main income 
provider’ which are made through peasant practices, can involve domestic violence in 
contexts when these notions are marginalised either by externalities or by internal 
forces such as changing gender roles. The cases of Chantu and Vuthy are testimonies 
to this argument. Both of their families are currently undergoing conflict and violence.
Chantu who has constructed an anti-domestic violence sentiment and has 
given protection to his mother from the ongoing violence of his father is currently 
encountering conflicts and some violence in the family. He maintained a non-violent 
relationship in his family for a long time but he cannot provide for his family 
nowadays as his only farm land has been acquired for industry. He cannot engage 
himself in any sector other than agriculture, as his only experience is in this sector.
The meaning of ‘head of the family’ to Chantu is to provide three meals a day 
to his family. But he cannot achieve this in his current situation. This leads to conflict 
in the family. He describes the situation in this way,
One day I was so angry after seeing my land taken. I came back home. I 
saw my wife did not cook. I cursed her. She also cursed me back. Then our 
problems began. (Men) need to earn money at least equal to the amount 
earned in the past. Conflict in the family occurs when we lack food to feed 
three meals a day to the family.
Chantu*s violence within his family is related to the peasant's gendered role of 
providing for the family. Despite his inability, he is still expected to perform the role 
as he did in the past. The rupture of the gender role is sudden and occurs without any 
preparedness. Chantu felt angry towards his wife, although he does not want to follow 
the violent path of his father. The violent situation could have been avoided if could 
have performed his role as expected.
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Unlike Chantu, violence in Vuthy’s family is implicated from a changing 
gender role which brings key features of peasant masculinities into challenge. His 
wife, who earns more than he does from her outside paid work in the non-traditional 
sector, questions his ability to provide for their family and expresses her discomfort 
with the substandard living conditions at home. Vuthy’s ability to provide for his 
family does not correspond to his wife's aspirations. His wife has been accustomed to 
an improved living standard because of her social mobility and paid work in a new 
sector.
In the changed gender role, Vuthy cannot obtain a patriarchal dividend in the 
family in the same way as he did in the past. His identity of ‘head of the family' has 
been disrupted at least in the eyes of his wife. His wife's outside paid work 
exaggerates conflict by giving room for mistrust in the area of marital fidelity. Vuthy 
thinks his wife may be having an emotional relationship with her supervisor. This 
mistrust is further exaggerated by the labour process in the industrial sector where 
Vuthy’s wife currently works. The labour process in this non-traditional sector 
requires her to work in specific ways which clash with Vuthy’s gendered notions of 
femininities.
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CHAPTER 8
FROM PEASANT TO URBAN WORKER: WORK AND 
MASCULINITIES AMONG CAMBODIAN URBAN MEN
8.1 Introduction
A study on the masculinities of urban workers in China (Lin and Ghailh 2012) 
suggests that the male former peasant workers in mainly female-concentrated 
occupations, such as domestic cleaning and electric assembly occupations, deploy 
peasant masculine identities to construct their masculinities in modem urban 
locations. In the reconstructed masculine identities the peasant rural-urban migrants 
neither privilege themselves over women nor subordinate themselves to other men, 
but rather attempt to masculinise their specific tasks in female-concentrated 
occupations. How do Cambodian urban workers with peasant backgrounds, who 
overwhelmingly engage in masculine-gendered occupations, reorganise their 
masculinities for urban life? How do their reconstructed masculinities relate to family 
relationships, particularly to domestic violence? This chapter explores these questions.
8.2 Urban workers of this study
The discussion in this chapter is based on life histories of fifteen male workers 
from two generational groups, who work in the city of Phnom Penh: an older 
generation above 40 (group of eight) and a younger generation below 30 (group of
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seven). They have worked in various informal and formal sectors. Some of them live 
with their families in Phnom Penh, and others live alone in Phnom Penh leaving their 
families in the rural provinces.
Urban workers of the older generation are: Saroeun Chea (49), a construction 
worker and father of six children, Samon Chham (61), a construction worker and 
father of eight children, Souen Kong (56), a tuk-tuk driver and father of four children, 
Souv Leng (50), a tuk-tuk driver and father of two children, Sytha Hem (50), a 
motodup and father of two children, Ra Ket (41), a motodup and father of four 
children. Bora Ouk (51), a construction worker and father of seven children, and Heng 
Yong (41), a construction worker and father of two children. (Tuk-tuk is a three­
wheeled mechanised vehicle which can carry at least four passengers at a time. 
Motodup is a motorbike taxi. Tuk-tuk and motodup are common means of public 
transport in Cambodian cities.)
Urban workers of the younger generation are: Sokheng Chet (25), a garment 
factory worker and having no child yet, Ang Ouen (28), a motodup and father of two 
children, Ishara Tan (24), an unemployed factory worker having no child yet, Yin 
Yong (29), a construction worker and father of two children, Sinai Hai (27), a 
restaurant chef and father of one child, Han Ly (26), a metal welder and father of one 
child, and Chan Leng (28), a warehouse assistant and father of one child.
All of them, except Chan Leng, have migrated from rural provinces. They 
were bom and brought up in peasant families. They worked in family farms before 
moving to Phnom Penh and many of them worked in other occupations before 
moving to their current occupations in Phnom Penh. All the older generation workers, 
except Bora Ouk and Samon Chham. worked in the armed forces of the post-KR 
regime.
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Although participants were eager to tell their stories, they told them briefly. 
This was not intentional. They lack the experience to tell stories to the extent a life 
history method is designed for. The problem, however, was addressed by further 
inquiry into their stories by the researcher. For example, when asked to tell about 
childhood, they just replied that the childhood was hard and difficult. Then the 
researcher asked for details of the hardship and difficulties. Initially they could not 
understand that detailed reply was needed for this research.
Case Study 6: Leng Souv, a tuk-tuk driver
The interview
Mr. Souv was recruited for this interview through another participant. The 
interview took place at the residence of the researcher and lasted for one and half 
hours.
Life course
Born in a marginal peasant family in a central province, Mr. Souv is in his 
early 50s now and a father of two sons. He was brought up by his mother with three 
sisters. His father abandoned the family when he was six and his mother became de 
facto head of household. Souv passed his childhood experiencing collective social 
violence: first by foreign military forces (American and South Vietnamese) in the area 
during the Second Indochina war; and secondly by the Khmer Rouge's (KR) 
totalitarian rule. He studied in a Buddhist pagoda school in his village. His education 
ended before he completed Grade IV because of disruption by war and civil conflict.
While the eastern region of Cambodia was healing from the Indochina war, the
entire nation gradually came under the rule of the KR. The DK came to power in 1978
in the area where Souv's family lived and began to enforce its ideology. He was
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seventeen at this time. Souv was separated from his family and sent to a labour camp 
by the KR. He was forced to do heavy labour such as the excavation of irrigation 
canals, and the building of roads. Failure at any task was liable to result in death. 
Souv was listed for execution once and ran to the forest to escape execution. He spent 
several months in the forest and was involved in robbery and piracy during this time, 
in order to survive. He joined a faction of the ruling party while he was on the run. 
This faction later formed the PRK regime after the Vietnamese invasion. Souv 
continued his affiliation with the faction. He joined the Kampuchean People’s 
Revolutionary Armed Forces (KPRAF) -the regular armed forces of PRK -  as district 
head. He recruited youths to the KPRAF and fought against KR militias in the north­
western provinces. Souv’s affiliation and involvement with PRK resulted from his 
reaction against the DK regime.
Souv married while he was in service with the KPRAF and his first son was 
born within a year. His departure from the KPRAF was involuntary, following closure 
of KPRAF operations by the PRK in the changing political situation. The overall 
living standard of Souv’s family was bad compared to many other families in the 
neighbourhood. His wife brought this issue to his notice. She often compared him to 
the men of other families.
Cambodians were gradually recovering from the ravages of war. Many 
families were able to make good progress, particularly in terms of possessing wealth. 
Souv’s wife was not an exception; she too wanted uplift for the family.
Souv had neither higher education nor professional experience to pick up a
good job in post-war Cambodia. Years of civil war and social disruption had left Souv
without any marketable skill. He did not know how to work on a farm even though he
was born in a peasant family. Lacking local work opportunity, Souv moved to Phnom
189
Penh in 1990, leaving his family back in the rural village. He found work as a 
motodup in Phnom Penh.
This was the turning point of Souv’s life, enabling him to fulfil gender 
expectations. He earned a good amount of money from the motodup. When Souv left 
for Phnom Penh, his wife did not keep herself merely as a housekeeper. She worked 
on the family farm and raised pigs to earn extra money.
Souv has transported many people in Phnom Penh, including many foreigners 
and Cambodians who work in government and other development organisations. 
When he came in contact with them. Souv learnt the importance of education. In 
1997, he bought a piece of land in Phnom Penh with the money earned from motodup 
work, and built a house there. Education for his sons was the ultimate aim of building 
a house in Phnom Penh. He wanted to give them the university education that he 
could not achieve for himself. The only universities were located in Phnom Penh at 
that time. Souv is on track to accomplish his plan. He brought his elder son to Phnom 
Penh and enrolled him in a university. His son is now in the final year of university 
and his second son is waiting to come to Phnom Penh next year after the completion 
of a high-school certificate.
Over time, Souv has upgraded his occupation. He bought a Tuk Tuk four years 
ago. Tuk Tuk is comparatively safer than the motodup and carries a higher degree of 
social status He is concerned about the increasing cost of education but he is 
determined to provide higher education for his sons at any cost.
Souv’s wife cannot come to Phnom Penh to live with him because of her 
responsibility to care for her elderly parents in the village. He has supported his wife 
in the village from the very beginning and visits her at least once a month.
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The geographical separation of the married couple caused some tensions, 
especially in the early years of Souv’s migration to the city. His wife was being told 
by some people that he had relationships with other women in Phnom Penh. Like 
other women, Souv’s wife expected him to maintain marital fidelity. Rural men like 
Souv who have newly arrived in cities to work in emerging urban sectors often pick 
up popular leisure and entertainment pursuits under peer pressure. Souv, however, 
dismissed the allegations. He is sympathetic to his wife’s position, recalling his own 
early life experience.
Souv considers himself a successful father and places himself above other men 
who are economically better off but have failed to provide higher education for their 
children.
Work, workplace and gender regime at work
Souv’s formal employment began as district head of the KPRAF. As 
mentioned earlier, his role was to recruit youths into the armed forces. The entire 
process of recruitment of youths was gendered. Many of the recruits entered 
unwillingly under coercion. All the recruits were male. The leaders such as Souv were 
also male.
His second occupation was motodup. This is another gendered enterprise. The 
high risk of accident (with almost no traffic laws), and of robbery and piracy (with 
poor law enforcement) created fear among motodup. Given the high insecurity and 
risks of violent crime, motodups became an enterprise for men only. About the 
dangers of motodup Souv says,
At the time when I came to Phnom Penh, there were lots of robbers and 
thieves. Many people died because of robbery. I felt so afraid, but I just 
tried. Even if it was dangerous, there was no other choice.
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Motodup was an occupation for both working class and non-working class 
men in the post-war era. Many survivors of war from formerly rich families entered 
this occupation in order to survive.
Souv has been driving a Tuk-Tuk for four years. An informal gender regime 
also exists in this occupation as it does with the motodups. But a Tuk-Tuk symbolises 
a higher social class position for its owner compared to the motodup.
There are social and class issues of these two occupations in relation to 
passengers and law enforcing agencies. The motodup and Tuk-Tuk drivers 
strategically need to be respectful to the passengers, especially to those known to be in 
the competitive transport market. They have to show respect and softness to regular 
passengers to ensure that they do not give their custom to other drivers. Similarly they 
have to build up rapport with new passengers by providing all-out services and polite 
behaviour to expand the market network. This kind of red defence is also crucial in 
earning tips from rich passengers. Though there is no formal gender order in motodup 
and Tuk-Tuk, their required defence to passengers matters to their self-esteem and to 
their pride as men.
Family life and relationship, gender regime at home
Souv was brought up in a women-only family. He was emotionally attached to 
his mother and three sisters. He lived in a female-headed-household. He did not 
experience any gender division of labour or gendered power relations in the family. 
But poverty and hardship were an integral part of daily life.
His relationship with his mother and sisters was relatively peaceful, except for 
his experiencing violence from his mother on some occasions. His mother is still alive 
and lives with his sister in the rural province. He visits her occasionally.
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Souv has been making his own family since 1986. He and his wife lived 
together for four years. Both spouses jointly provided for the family. He is expected to 
provide the main income and support the family like other men of well-off families. 
He could not do much to increase the prosperity of the family in the early years of 
family life as he lacked skills useful in the rural setting. He has overcome this 
problem in course of his migration to Phnom Penh. In fact, his migration to the city 
was inspired by his gender role expectation for prospering the family in the shortest 
possible time.
As the two spouses live apart, it is hard to explore the gender regime that rules 
Souv’s family relationship. But he holds the gender notion that a wife has entitlement 
to question or argue with her husband when he is wrong or fails to perform his 
legitimate role as the breadwinner. He also believes that a man should accept his fault 
or mistake in front of his wife and be patient in overcoming the fault. His notion of 
family relationships is gender-egalitarian.
Souv’s relationship with his elder son who lives with him can be used to 
measure infra-family gender relationships. He fathers his son in a non-violent and 
supportive way. He says, ‘I have never scolded my children. I have only advised 
them. They are good sons, they never hang-out and do things to upset their parents. 
They make me feel happy and I work with a good mood.’ It means that he establishes 
his command over the family in a non-coercive manner without diminishing his 
patriarchal position in the family power relationship.
Place, rural/urban, peer relations, wider social life or culture
Souv was brought up in a rural setting with experiences of collective social
violence. Although he grew up in a peasant family, Souv does not have farming skills
-  an essential means for making peasant masculinities. Being involved in political
193
turmoil and civil war at an important period (teenage) of his life is the main reason he 
lacks these skills.
In Phnom Penh Souv has a peer group. The peers are his rural friends who 
have migrated to Phnom Penh like him, and work in similar occupations. He follows 
popular urban culture and entertainment for working class men with peers for leisure. 
He visits karaoke restaurants and beer gardens with them. Men’s leisure in these 
entertainment establishments is highly romanticised and commercialised. Young and 
poor rural girls who are also immigrants to Phnom Penh provide services to the 
visitors. The company of these girls which implies sexual service is available in 
exchange for extra pay.
Souv claimed that he had never used the company of these girls. Although he 
rejected the company of young girls on the grounds of lack of money, his claim 
cannot entirely be accepted as he had encountered problems with his wife on the issue 
of having an extramarital relationship. He also shares entertainment and leisure with 
his peers in a way that reinforces peer bonding. He says,
My friends and I go to karaoke restaurants, which are cheaper because we 
don't have lot of money. My friends sing songs and I dance (I don’t know 
how to sing). There are also girls in the restaurants. But we don't have 
money for them. So we don't take them to sit with us. My friends and I 
just enjoy being together.
Experience of violence
Like many other older generation Cambodians, Souv was brought up
experiencing collective social violence. He has experienced social disruption caused
from increased militarisation during the Lon Nol regime. His particular geographical
proximity to Vietnam increased his vulnerability to the Second Indochina War. His
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life was further disrupted by the KR regime. His life, like many others, was 
dismantled by the regime.
Apart from collective social violence, Souv had also experienced parental 
violence. His mother beat him, which was associated with dire family conditions. 
About parental violence he says,
When I was a young child, my mother used to beat me. I did not know 
anything about life. I always wanted money from my mother to buy many 
things. I did not know how difficult her life was. Then she got angry and 
beat me.
Souv is not resentful about his mother. He rather feels pity for his mother for 
bringing him up in extremely hard conditions.
According to him, conflict occurred between his wife and himself on two 
specific occasions: one in early family life when he could not make as much family 
income as his friends did, and second in the early days of post-migration to Phnom 
Penh when his wife accused him of having relationships with women in Phnom Penh. 
Both these moments of spousal conflict are linked to masculinities. Being the head of 
family, Souv was expected to uplift the family’s living standard like other men of his 
society. He could not do this at the time, though he achieved it later.
Though his move to Phnom Penh fulfilled one expectation, it led to the 
accusation of marital infidelity. Living away from his family, Souv had developed 
relationships with women in Phnom Penh. His wife came to know about this through 
her relatives in Phnom Penh. Like other women, his wife also expected him to 
maintain marital fidelity. Non-compliance with the obligation gave rise spousal 
conflict. Souv did not say whether the spousal conflict had ever turned into physical 
violence.
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It can be argued that the geographical separation of the spouses, which was the 
effect of the effort to achieve the social expectation of men’s role in providing the best 
for their families, placed Souv’s obligation of marital fidelity under pressure. Living 
away from his family gave Souv the opportunity to fall into an emotional attachment 
with a woman in his area. This deviation from social expectations erupted in spousal 
conflict.
Construction of masculinity
Being brought up in a women-only and female-headed family, Souv 
constructed an early masculinity which is pro-motherhood. He is supportive to 
women, particularly to mothers. He is supportive to his wife. With supportive feeling 
for wife, he finally gave up the woman he came across in early immigrant life in 
Phnom Penh. He says,
I don't take other women because I have experienced suffering from my 
father taking a second wife and divorcing my mother. I won't do like him.
I saw my mother try very hard to raise four children alone. I feel pity for 
her. I can't do such a bad thing. I love my children and family so much.
Souv's case exemplifies a pattern of post-conflict transition of masculinity. He 
voluntarily joined the KPRAF in reaction to his marginalisation by the KR regime. He 
fought aggressively face-to-face against KR militias. He served there for several 
years. Despite years of service in paramilitary force, Souv returned to normal life 
easily as if nothing had happened in the past. Marriage was crucial for his transition 
and he left the paramilitary force after marriage. He did not translate his violent 
construction of masculinity as a paramilitary into the construction of his 
contemporary masculinity.
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His transition to normal life took place in the time when country was moving 
towards political stability, and under reconstruction and rehabilitation. The 
Cambodian society was gradually moving towards materialism at that time. In the 
changing social, political and economic context, Souv found that he did not have any 
marketable skills to obtain a job. He encountered mounting pressure from his wife to 
improve the family’s living standard. He describes the moment as,
She (wife) always complained and compared to other couples who were 
our contemporary. She said why living conditions of others were better 
than ours. My wife was a woman and she needed to look after children and 
family. [He implies that her complaints and comparisons were justified].
The abandonment by his father when Souv was a child and subsequent hard 
life have resulted in the construction of a new pattern of fatherhood. Souv’s 
fatherhood is organised around equipping his sons to the emerging job market by 
providing a university education. The elder son is in the final year of his university. 
The younger son is due to be enrolled in university. Souv is determined to ensure 
university education for his sons. His determination is rooted in his own life 
experience of lacking any marketable skill. His fatherhood comes with the cost of 
hard work and low occupational self-esteem. About his determination Souv says,
I need to work hard because I need money to support the education of my 
sons. Nowadays, education needs lots of money. I want both sons to 
complete their university education. I don’t want them having no skill and 
knowledge like me.
As he is on track to provide a good education to his children despite his own 
working-class background, Souv sees himself as a successful father, and places
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himself a degree higher than other men who are economically better off but fail to 
provide higher education to their children.
Case Study 7: Ouen Ang, a motodup
The interview
Mr Ang was recruited to this study directly by the researcher when he hired 
him to give him a lift in Phnom Penh during field work. The interview took place at 
the residence of the researcher. Since a rapport was built up before, Ang shared his 
histories freely and frankly. The interview lasted for around one hour.
Life course
Ang is 28 years old and a father of two children. He was bom in a marginal 
peasant family in Kandal province with a number of siblings (nine). His father died 
from prolonged sickness. Ang was 23 at that time. Ang's mother is still alive and lives 
in the rural village with her younger children. He completed Grade IV but could not 
continue his studies because of his responsibility for his family. He had to assist his 
mother on the family farm after his elder siblings married and left the family.
Ang migrated to Phnom Penh five years ago in search of finding work to earn 
some cash to support his mother and younger siblings in the rural province. His elder 
sister who came to Phnom Penh earlier helped him to find a job. He obtained his first 
job using a reference from a friend of his sister. He also lived with her in the early 
days of migration, when she was working in a garment factory.
Ang's first job in Phnom Penh was for a property developer. His task was
welding metal to prepare door and window frames. He did not have prior skill in
welding but learnt the skill on the job. By the end of the second year, he bought a
motor-cycle with his savings. He used the motorbike as motodup after hours (4.00am
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to 7.00am and 5.00pm to 9.00pm) to earn an extra income. His earning from the 
motodup was higher than his earnings from construction work. By the end of his third 
year, he left the job with the property developer because of a dispute when he 
demanded a higher wage.
After leaving the property developer, he joined in a second-hand and smashed- 
car repair workshop. He kept his part-time motodup job. Work in the workshop was 
also a new occupation. But his experience in motodup gave him some basic 
knowledge of car repair. It should be noted that use of repaired second hand cars in 
Cambodia is common. He worked there for a year and only quit this job because he 
was transferred to another city. He has been working as a full-time motodup since he 
quit his car repair job. He joins his wife in the rural province during peak rice farming 
season to help her with the rice farming. He then returns to Phnom Penh after the peak 
farm season and resumes his motodup.
Ang loved a girl in Phnom Penh during his second job. But the love did not 
end in marriage because the girl left him due to his poor economic condition. He then 
fell in love with his wife who worked in a garment factory and lived in his 
neighbourhood in Phnom Penh.
After marriage, they lived together for a year in Phnom Penh. His wife went to
a rural village in their second year to deliver their first baby. She has been living there
ever since. She wanted to return to Phnom Penh and resume work after delivering the
baby but Ang did not agree with her plan. He was concerned that there would be
nobody to take care of the newborn, if she resumed work. He also thought that he
could not save from his single income if his wife lived with him without doing any
outside work. Finally he came to the decision that she would live in the village and do
some income-generating activities in addition to taking care of baby. He bought
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farmland in the village and gave some capital to his wife to rear poultry and livestock 
for income-generation at home. She looks after the rice farm and rears poultry and 
livestock. They now have a second baby and Ang visits her every month.
Ang is firm about his family. He is building an economic partnership with his 
wife for raising their family. His wife plays an important role in the economic 
partnership along with bringing up the family. He lives with his sister-in-law’s family 
in Phnom Penh as a paying guest. He does not have any network in Phnom Penh 
except the in-law family and spends his leisure with this family sometimes.
Work, workplace and gender regime at the workplace
Ang’s working life began in family farming for subsistence under the 
supervision of his father and then his mother. His early role in family labour was as a 
cowherd. He assisted his mother in rice farming until he moved to Phnom Penh five 
years ago. As noted in Chapter 7, rice farming in Cambodia is manual and both men 
and women participate in the agricultural labour force.
Ang has worked in different sub-sectors in urban life. His first job for a 
property developer is predominantly a men's occupation though a small number of 
women now work in this sector. Women’s roles in building construction are 
secondary and subordinate to male workers. Unlike the situation in developed 
countries, most of the household-building procedures in Cambodia are manual. 
Welding and curving metal, Ang's specialty, is technical and highly hazardous and is 
only performed by men.
Repairing cars is also a gendered occupation in Cambodia. All stakeholders -
importers, workshop owners, and repairers - in the repaired-car industry are men. The
repairers are mostly from a working class background and they do not have any
formal training. They get on-the-job skills training. According to Ang’s account, these
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workshops are run with strict rules and working hours. Any faulty work, absence from 
work or lateness is subject to a deduction from the meagre wage.
Motodup, his current occupation, is also a gendered enterprise. He actually 
began motodup from the third year of his migration but at first he did it on a part-time 
basis. Now it is his full-time and only job. This informal urban work sector is 
overwhelmingly occupied by men -  mostly working class men, though most 
Cambodian adult women, specifically in urban locations, drive motorbikes for their 
daily transportation. Toughness and insecurity (both accident and robbery) are major 
causes that discourage women from participating in this sector.
Motodup drivers experience social stigma and their occupation is little 
respected. However, motodup drivers like Ang enjoy freedom and flexibility in all 
aspects as they own their own enterprise. He expresses his freedom of motodup 
driving in the following way,
As a motodup, I feel that I have more freedom. None can control me. I can 
work as per my ability and power. I prefer my current job than the 
previous ones. I could not help my family in rice farming when I worked 
for the property developer and car-repairing workshop. I could not get 
leave to join my wife during farming season.
Family life and relationship, gender regime at home
Ang was brought up with both parents and a large number of siblings in post­
war Cambodian society. His parents and some elder siblings survived from the civil 
war. The whole family was in a struggle to restart normal life from the war 
devastation.
The young Ang had lots of interactions with family members. He maintained
closer relationships with his mother and elder sister. Although he felt that his father
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loved him, he kept his distance from him as he found his father a scary person. His 
father was the head of family. All family members participated to the family labour 
force. His mother and elder sisters, too, worked on the family farm. His mother 
became de facto head of the family after death of the father.
Ang has been making his own family for four years. Gender roles and 
relations in his family have shifted over time. In the first year of being a family, both 
spouses shared to the family budget from their outside work. His wife worked in a 
garment factory. Over the period, her position and role have been partially reversed. 
Though she still contributes to the family budget from rice farming and cattle rearing, 
these roles are quasi- reproductive and less visible compared to cash earnings. Ang's 
cash income from his motodup is given more visibility in the family economy.
Ang's wife bears the greater part of the family burden as he lives far away. 
She performs both reproductive and productive (in subsistence form) tasks. His 
escape from practical involvement in day-to-day household affairs comes with 
compromises to the household gender-relation to his wife. For example, he is 
accountable to his wife for his income and expenses in Phnom Penh. Gender roles and 
relations in family are reciprocal and mutually respected. However Ang enjoys a 
patriarchal dividend from the reciprocal gender relations.
Place, rural/urban, peer relation, wider social life and culture
Ang has experienced significant changes in gender roles and relations in the
wider Cambodian society in his lifetime. He has seen women like his mother working
in unpaid household and family subsistence work in early life. Upon migration to
Phnom Penh, he has seen women, particularly of his own generation, increasingly
taking part in outside paid work. The country's economic shift from command
economy to market-based economy has opened up opportunities for paid work for
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women. As a result, women are increasingly playing household-providing roles in 
recent times. Ang himself was also pulled to Phnom Penh by the increasing income 
earning opportunity in the city.
Cheap entertainments such as beer gardens and karaoke restaurants with sex 
services are growing and widely available for men in Phnom Penh. These 
entertainment facilities target men's leisure and recreation. Working class men usually 
visit these places with their peers and colleagues after work. According to his account, 
Ang does not visit these places. He does not meet any peers or close friends to visit 
these places. He has not been able to make good friends in Phnom Penh. He has lost 
his rural network through his migration to Phnom Penh. Although he has many co- 
moto-dup drivers, he does not consider them as peers or close friends.
The only network that he uses for his leisure is the family of his sister-in-law. 
He shares accommodation with his sister-in-law in Phnom Penh, an arrangement 
made by his wife to minimise his living costs. He sometimes goes to popular sites in 
Phnom Penh with this family. Ang's living with sister-in-law is not exceptional in 
Cambodian society, which is traditionally matrilineal. Ang's way of living with an in­
law is an adjustment of traditional matrilineal social arrangement.
Experience of violence
Ang was brought up in a family with apparently no violence between parents. 
But his elder siblings used to encounter anger and toughness from his father in doing 
their tasks for the household. Ang himself never experienced the toughness of his 
father. This was probably because he was quite young at this stage. Despite feeling 
loved he always maintained distance between himself and his father. He was closer to 
his mother and elder sisters.
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Ang is extremely averse to violence, particularly violent situations. He always 
avoids people who are violent and leaves any violent scene. According to his 
account, ‘when they (friends in childhood) fought each other, I never stayed there. I 
ran away. Even in Phnom Penh (nowadays), when people fight each other, I never 
stay there. I cannot help my friends when they fight each other.' Ang is scared of the 
violence of others. But this does not mean that he is a holy man. Like other layman, 
he has anger, particularly in family affairs. He gets angry with his wife when she 
handles their children roughly or fails to give care to children in the way he directs. 
Construction of masculinity
Ang's early masculinity was constructed in a peasant setting characterised by 
providing for the family by working on the family farm. He took up a parenting role 
in teen-age in capacity of providing subsistence to his mother and younger siblings. 
This sort of proxy-parenting role is common among young Cambodians in 
construction of their masculinities.
In his post-migration period, he adopted a life of multiple occupations and 
long hours of work to increase his income. After the breakup of his first love, he 
realised that economic solvency is important for a man, for making as well as 
sustaining, a family, and in order to be valued by others. He describes his breakup of 
affairs bluntly,
I used to love a girl when I worked in metal work (welding). The 
relationship did not turn to marriage because I was poor and did not have 
enough money. She needed money. At first, she did not know that I was 
poor. After several meetings she knew that I did not have money. Then she 
left me.
204
Ang has successfully addressed his poor conditions by making a good income. 
By working long hours in multiple occupations every day, he earned good money 
compared to his earlier situation. He developed love affairs with another girl. This 
time the love affair turned into marriage. He bought a piece of land in rural village to 
build a house and also bought some pieces of farmland with his savings.
He compromised with his emotional needs for the sake of his family. He feels 
saddened when he sees other families living and enjoying life together. By living 
alone as a paying guest, he can save money from rental and utilities. Similarly, his 
wife can earn some money from poultry and livestock by living in the rural village. 
Living apart is a strategy to maximise family savings by lowering living cost and 
increasing income.
Ang has developed fatherhood beyond the basic necessities of the provider 
model. He is concerned about the wellbeing and cognitive development of his 
children. He changes nappies, feeds and plays with his children when he visits his 
family. He brings them out for cognitive recreation. As his rural province is close to 
Phnom Penh, he sometimes brings his children to popular sites in Phnom Penh. To 
ensure full cognitive development of his children, he advises his wife to allow them 
what they want and support them in what they want to do. He advises his wife not to 
treat their children in a violent manner in any situation. He has improved his fathering 
skill over time. He did not know how to give care to his first child. But over the 
course of having second child, he has become efficient to at changing nappies, feeding 
them, and playing with them.
Ang has been selective in making friends since his childhood. He considers 
himself gentle and honest. He makes friends with people who are what he called
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‘good persons/ The good persons are those who are not rude. He cannot find any 
good persons for peer relationships in Phnom Penh.
8.3 Cambodian urban workers’ masculinities and domestic violence 
8.3.1 Patterns of masculinity
There are significant differences between the older and the younger generation 
urban workers in their upbringing and life experiences. Most of the workers of the 
older generation went through social and political upheaval, experienced collective 
social violence and were involved in large-scale State violence. The younger 
generation workers were brought up in the period of country's transition from war to 
démocratisation. However, many of them were brought up without fathers, lived in 
extreme poverty, and played a fathering role at a young age. Broadly Souv and Ang 
represent the older and younger generation urban workers respectively, though of 
course there are variations from case to case.
Though they represent different age groups and have had different life 
experiences, Souv and Ang embraced urban working life for a common reason, 
gender role expectation. The family, primarily the wife, has conveyed the gender role 
expectation. The expectation involves comparison with other better-off men who 
have made progress with their family’s economic status. A man’s performance in 
providing for his family is scrutinised socially under the lens of gender role 
expectation.
The migration of a number of urban workers in this study to Phnom Penh was
motivated by the quest for a better and higher income to improve their family’s
economic condition. This motivation was triggered by expectations from their family,
which were conveyed with variations of tone and temperament. For example, Souv
was made aware of the expectation through a kind of ‘complaint' by his wife as spelt
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out in Case Study 6. Sytha who was originally born in Phnom Penh but was sent to a 
rural province by the KR regime, was told of the need for a higher income by his wife, 
angrily. He says, 'one thing that causes her (wife) to be angry with me most is that 1 
don’t earn much money like others.’ Ra, a motodup, describes the expectation in this 
way: 'When I am very late sending her (wife) money, she calls me and asks about it. 
She asks why I couldn't earn money like other people do.’
Being single at the time of their migration to the city, other urban workers like 
Ang and Yin internalised the need for a higher income within their proxy fathering 
role for their parental families. They had played a fathering role long before they 
made their own families. Either abandonment of the family by their father, or sickness 
of their parents, led them to take up responsibility for providing for the family. Yin, 
whose father abandoned the family, came to Phnom Penh at the age of sixteen in 
search of a better income to support his sick mother and younger siblings back in the 
rural village. Yin describes the reason for his migration to Phnom Penh as: 'I lived in 
a rural village. My mother was a farmer. My family was poor. As the family condition 
was poor, 1 had to find some work to help my family. That's why I came to Phnom 
Penh. I worked in some small jobs in Phnom Penh. When I earned some money, I sent 
it to my family.’ Ang’s migration to the city was also triggered by the same reason as 
Yin. However, his failure to turn his first love into marriage because of his poor 
economic condition reinforced his motivation for earning a good income and gaining 
material possessions to make a family, as spelt out in Case Study 7.
The urban workers of both age groups are not working alone for the economic
development of their families. Their wives are also making important contribution,
whether they live together with their husbands in Phnom Penh or live alone in the
rural provinces. All urban workers of the older generation, except Saroeun, live alone
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in Phnom Penh. All of their wives are engaged in various farm activities in the 
provinces. By working on the family farms, they provide subsistence for their 
families; and by rearing livestock and poultry or running small-scale trade, they add 
cash to the family income. Saroeun's wife who lives together with her husband in 
Phnom Penh runs a small mobile food-stall to earn cash for the family budget.
The same pattern of economic partnership is common among wives of the 
younger generation group. Unlike older generation workers, all urban workers of the 
younger generation, except Sinat and Ang, live together with their wives in Phnom 
Penh. Sokheng and his wife work in the same factory, but they work in different units. 
The wife of Ishara works in a garment factory. She has been the sole provider for the 
family since Ishara became unemployed a month ago. Yin and his wife work for the 
same construction company. Although his wife’s earnings are lower than his, her 
income is crucial to send their two children to an English-language school in Phnom 
Penh. Han's wife sells vegetables in a market located in the outskirt of Phnom Penh to 
add money to his family's income. Chan who lives on the outskirts of Phnom Penh 
lives together with his wife and children. His wife rears cows along with doing 
household work and caring for two young children. Likewise, the wives of Sinat and 
Ang contribute to the family’s economy though they stay in the provinces. Sinat's 
wife contributes to the family by working in a garment factory in the province. Ang's 
wife provides subsistence by working as a full-time farmer. She also adds some cash 
to the family’s economy by rearing livestock and poultry.
Though the role expectation towards urban workers is gendered, the economic
partnership of their wives suggests that there is a sharp gender division of labour. The
expectation is actualised through a joint-breadwinner model, where a wife also makes
significant economic contribution. The expectation is gendered in the sense that a man
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is expected to provide the main income. The concept o f ‘main income' is standardised 
by comparison with other men who are privileged and improving their family’s 
economic status. The comparison and expectations of the wives are socially 
constructed.
Not all urban workers are taking their work in the urban spaces in same way. 
Those who work in formal sectors, particularly in garment factories, where labour 
processes are maintained with strict rules, do not like the work regime. Having 
worked on farms in the past, they are used to flexible work practices. Sokheng, a 
garment worker, does not like strict work hours. He works in the garment sector as an 
interim means to earn some money that he plans to invest for small-business and farm 
activities in a rural village. When he has achieved this he will settle down there 
permanently.
Ishara, who has been unemployed for a month, worked in a garment factory. 
He does not want to enter the garment sector again. He is obsessed with the strict 
rules of assembly line production. He prefers to work on a construction site, though 
construction work is heavier than work in the garment sector. He prefers a job where 
the work regime is flexible. But his wife, who works in a garment factory, wants him 
to work in the garment sector.
There is a generational difference in parenting between two groups of urban 
workers. The older generation workers are rarely interactive and communicative to 
their children. They are emotionally detached and their fathering role is limited to 
providing basic necessities. Samon, a worker of the older generation group, does not 
see anything special in fathering. He thinks fathering is all about ‘giving food and 
comfortable life to children.' Saroeun, another worker of the same group, holds a 
similar notion about fathering.
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The urban workers of the younger generation see fathering beyond the basic- 
necessities-provider model. They are emotionally attached to their children. They are 
concerned for the cognitive development of children. As found in the life history of 
Ang, they are interactive and communicative with their children. They play with their 
children, go out at weekends and after-hours, feed their children and change nappies.
The differentiated fatherhood of urban working class men of two generation is 
implicated by their differentiated experience of childhood, exposure to gender 
relations in the wider society, particularly in the workplace, and the influence of 
fathering by contemporary men of other social classes. As mentioned in the life 
histories of men in the thesis, the majority of the younger generation men were 
brought up without a father and proper parental care. They went through hardship and 
took up the role of providing the family even at the age of child. Growing up in 
adverse and extreme family conditions has implicated the young urban men to adopt a 
fatherhood which is organised around nurturing and emotionally attached to their 
children.
Men like Liang and Bunthi, who are contemporary to the younger generation 
urban workers and also represent upper social class organise fatherhood which is 
similar to the one the younger generation urban workers follow. Liang and Bunthi 
spend quality time with their children. Liang has learnt this skill during his brief 
professional life in a developed country. Bunthi, though he did not mention how he 
learnt his fathering skill, has probably come across his fathering practices from his 
foreign colleagues of his previous jobs. However, the number of young fathers who 
spend quality time with their children is steadily growing in the country. The fathering 
practices of this group of young men, who come from socially privileged class, are 
trickling down to men of other social classes such as urban workers.
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Another reason for adopting a nurturing fatherhood by the younger generation 
urban workers is their exposure to the gender regime, which is comparatively 
egalitarian, in the wider society, particularly in the workplace. Study (Brickell, 2011) 
shows that the post-war Cambodian government has adopted gender-responsive 
policies and strategies in government machineries. Women represent more than ever 
before in leadership positions in government administration, local government and 
other institutions. Similarly, an increasing number of women are entering to paid 
work in formal sectors such as manufacturing industries, where a significant portion 
of urban workers of younger generation work. The younger male urban workers are 
increasingly being engaged in female-concentrated occupations. Contrarily, the urban 
working class men of older generation work in male-concentrated occupations.
The urban workers engage themselves in various occupations, including 
construction, transportation (motodup and tuk-tuk), garment manufacturing, restaurant 
and warehouse work in the urban spaces. All these occupations, except garment 
manufacturing and restaurants, are highly masculinised and gendered. Work in these 
occupations is manual, laborious and risky.
When we compare the two age groups, it is found that the older generation is 
highly occupied in the masculine-gendered occupations. For example, all workers of 
the older generation work in construction and transportation occupations. Three out of 
seven of the younger generation urban workers work in these two occupations. 
Among the other four of the younger age group, two work in the garment sector, one 
in a restaurant, and one in a warehouse. The labour force in occupations like garment 
manufacturing and restaurants is mostly feminised, with a sharp gender division of 
labour, particularly in the garment sector. These two sectors, particularly the garment
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manufacturing sector, are absorbing an ever-growing number of urban female 
workers.
Engagement of all of the older generation workers in masculine-gendered 
occupations does not necessarily reflect their notion of gender division of labour and 
work. The choice for masculine-gendered occupations was situational. Construction 
and transportation were the emerging occupations at the time when they migrated to 
city. Having gone through social disruption in a vital period of life, they lack 
specialised skills to engage in other contemporary emerging occupations. The garment 
manufacturing sector, the sector of growth now, does not employ a workforce from 
the older generation. They cannot, therefore, find employment in sectors other than 
construction and transportation.
Urban workers of both generations usually help their wives in doing their 
productive work. Saroeun wakes up late at night to assist his wife to prepare 
traditional pies and noodles that she sells in the morning. After assisting his wife, he 
prepares to go to his own work. Han’s wife is a retail vegetable seller. She needs to 
buy vegetables late at night from a wholesale market in the city-centre every day. She 
then brings the vegetables to the local market located in the outskirts of the city. Han 
gives her a lift on his motodup to the market and then home with a motorbike load of 
vegetables. After giving her a lift he resumes his motodup service. This is his regular 
schedule. Workers, who work in transport services and have left their wives back in 
rural village, join their wives during the rice harvesting season to help them with their 
farming.
Though an overwhelming proportion of workers work in masculine-gendered 
occupations in the urban areas, the de facto nature of occupational choice, the
cooperation of the workers with their wives’ occupations, and above all joint work by
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spouses on family farms, suggest that unlike Chinese urban male workers, the 
Cambodian urban workers do not masculinise their occupations. It is apparent that 
Cambodian urban male workers emphasise command over the family rather than 
masculinising their occupations. The emphasis on command over the family is 
operated within the notion that a man should provide the main income to lead the 
family -a  gendered notion installed in Cambodian society through French colonial 
rule. This socially constructed gendered notion shapes the way Cambodian urban 
male workers negotiate their occupations and family relationships differently from 
their Chinese counterparts. Rather than working in specifically masculine occupations 
-  a choice imposed by external factors and assisting their wives’ occupations, 
Cambodian urban male workers attempt to provide the main income for the family. 
By achieving this gender role expectation, they maintain command over the family. 
8.3.2 Urban workers’ masculinities and domestic violence
Through their move to the city, urban workers attempt to achieve their gender 
role expectation. But they often suffer problems with their spousal relationships in the 
course of their migration to the city. Adaptation to an urban working environment and 
being accustomed to the popular urban male culture are central to the troubled marital 
relationships.
The majority of the older generation urban workers live alone in the city, 
leaving their wives back in the rural village, and the majority of the younger 
generation urban workers live in the city together with their spouses. In the course of 
their absence from family and spouse, however, some of the urban workers of the 
older generation have developed emotional and sexual relationships with women in 
the city. Their peer network acted as a catalyst in constructing this specific behaviour.
213
When their wives come to know about this marital infidelity, problems spark between 
the spouses.
Among the older generation Souv, Bora and Ra are particularly suffering the 
problem of marital infidelity. As noted earlier, Souv's wife raised allegations against 
him having relationships with other women, in the early years of his migration to 
Phnom Penh. Over the period, the problem has been addressed.
Bora also encountered troubled times with his wife on the same allegation. He 
goes to a beer garden to drink with his peers. After drinks he visits sex workers. 
Sometime, he brings sex workers home after drinking. His neighbours tell the story to 
his wife when she visits him. This leads to conflict between Bora and his wife. About 
the situation. Bora says,
When I go for drink and have girls from outside, some people will tell her 
(wife) about this. She becomes very angry by learning the fact. She blames 
me. I just keep quiet until she calms down. But if she blames me too much,
I cannot keep myself controlled.
Given the subject matter at issue, it is likely that the conflict can potentially turn 
to physical violence. But he mentioned that he has never beaten his wife.
Ra slapped his wife once hard enough to make her deaf. His violence to his wife 
was not directly based on the issue of marital infidelity. But it had an element related 
to his outmigration. It was because his wife lent his hard-won earnings from his 
motodup to one of her relatives, who did not return the money.
Among the younger generation urban workers, Ishara and Sinat have
encountered troubled relationships with their wives on the grounds of marital
infidelity. Ishara lives together with his wife. Sinat lives alone in Phnom Penh.
Despite living together with his wife, Ishara secretly maintains relationships with his
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female co-workers. He hides his marital status from his girlfriends. He dates them 
after hours. He mentioned that he has had these relationships because of peer pressure. 
His wife, however, came to know of his promiscuous relationships and became very 
angry. Ishara maintains he can work with his wife to tackle the situation. His extra 
marital relationship has been halted as he is currently unemployed. His wife is looking 
for a job for him in a factory where she has some friends or peers who can keep an 
eye on him.
The cases of conflicting and troubled family relationship among the urban 
workers described above suggest that the chance of family violence is high when the 
urban workers live alone. In the absence of their wives, urban workers look for 
alternative sources, sex workers, to share their emotional needs. Peers and colleagues 
play the matchmaking role in this regard. Commercialisation of men's leisure, which 
is often marketed through beer garden and karaoke club, exaggerates men's desire for 
emotional gratification.
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CHAPTER 9
TRANSFORMATION FROM VIOLENT TO NON-VIOLENT: 
EXPLORING MASCULINITIES OF FORMER PERPETRATORS
OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
9.1 Introduction
As discussed in the literature review, various socio-economic factors have 
been identified as the cause of men's violence against their wives or partners. These 
factors include patriarchy, men's socialisation as victims of violence at a young age, 
socio-demography, poverty and the gender hierarchy in social institutions such as the 
family.
Which of these factors are centrally involved in men's violence against their 
wives in Cambodia, a society which has gone through enormous social, political and 
economic disruption in recent history?
9.2 Program on Violence Against Women (VAW) and men’s participation
There is an increasing number of programs on Violence Against Women in 
Cambodia. These programmes are implemented by government agencies and non­
governmental organisations (NGOs). Overwhelmingly, women are the target group of 
these programs. In recent times, however, we see a shift to target men and boys.
One of the national NGOs in Cambodia launched a program on VAW in late
2007 for a period of three years in selected communes of three eastern and central
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provinces. Domestic Violence (DV) is one of the key foci of this program. The 
program targets men and boys for primary prevention of DV. It also targets 
perpetrators of DV, seeking to transform them into non-violent men. Some of the 
perpetrators of DV in this program were recruited in this study. The program is 
designed within the framework of legal and policy instruments that exist to protect 
women from violence and to promote gender equality.
Community-based men’s and women’s groups are established under the 
programme. Local men who are considered "good' by the community are recruited 
into the men’s groups. Grassroots women who have literacy skill, leadership potential, 
and are committed to women's rights are recruited into the women’s groups. 
Members of men’s and women's groups are recruited in consultation with the 
commune council, the administrative unit of government at commune level. The 
members of these two groups do not necessarily represent a specific social class, but 
they might have affiliation with political institutions like the commune council.
Members of these groups are trained in basic gender concepts, women's 
rights, masculinities, and relevant laws and policies. They are also trained in inter­
personal communication and leadership skills.
The groups work in close collaboration within the commune. The program is 
operated with a two-pronged approach -  prevention and protection. For prevention of 
VAW, men's groups hold meetings, forums, campaigns, and individual counselling 
with men in the community. These activities raise awareness and responsiveness of 
men about women's rights and men’s roles. Likewise, women's groups carry out 
similar activities with the participation of women in the community to raise awareness 
among women about their rights.
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For protection from VAW, the groups work jointly. They are vigilant with 
regard to the incidence of violence against women in the commune. When case of 
violence occurs in the commune, they should immediately report to the commune 
council for appropriate legal intervention. Commune councils are officially entitled to 
make a primary intervention in cases of VAW. Training is also provided to commune 
councillors and police personnel to sensitise them to the issue of VAW.
Men’s and women's groups work both as activists and local pressure groups 
on the issue of VAW. Many local men and women have participated in the program 
activities. They are aware of VAW and gender equality issues. According to the 
evaluation report (Source not cited in order to preserve confidentiality) of the project, 
29% men have stopped DV almost completely and 42% men have stopped partially in 
the course of the project.
9.3 Former perpetrators of DV in this study
The discussion in this chapter is based on the life histories of ten former 
perpetrators of DV from two generational groups, who have participated in the 
aforementioned program: an older generation above 40 (group of seven) and a 
younger generation below 40 (group of three). The former perpetrators of the older 
generation are: Chan Nu (58), a father of seven children, Ra Suong (53), a father of 
three children, Som Nong (51), a father of six children, Thim Eng (late 40s), a father 
of four children. Hong Sar (47), a father of four children. Huy Norm (44), a father of 
four children, and Pisit Kham (mid 40s), a father of four children. The former 
perpetrators of the younger generation are: Vichana Hor (37), a father of three 
children. Monk Sam (32), a father of two children, and Khieng Lim (28), a father of 
two children.
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All, except Thim and Huy, are marginal peasants. Thim is a trader cum broker. 
Huy works in multiple occupations, including farm and non-farm activities. All of 
them are currently maintaining conjugal life. All of them have at least two children. 
All, except Vichana, Mouk and Khieng, have experienced the KR regime. Thim, Som 
and Chan worked in the armed force of the post-KR regime. All of them have 
perpetrated violence, particularly against their wives, for years.
Case Study 8: Pisit Kham
The interview
Mr. Pisit is a participant in the anti-VAW program. He is a self-proclaimed 
perpetrator of DV who has changed into a non-violent individual, having participated 
in the program. He was recruited through the program. The interview lasted for an 
hour.
The interview took place in his home and was semi-public. He was not 
hesitant throughout the interview but spoke openly about his violence towards his 
wife. He also spoke frankly about legal intervention made by the program staff and 
the local men's group against him in the early days of his transformation.
Life course
Pisit is a peasant. He is in his mid-forties, and a father of four children (three 
sons and one daughter). His wife is also a peasant, and his parents were peasants.
He was ten years old in 1975, when the KR regime began. Like other children 
he had a hard and difficult life during the KR regime. He worked as a forced labourer, 
preparing compost, excavating canals, building embankments and preparing land for 
cultivation. The food supply was often too meagre to support a growing child forced 
to work at heavy labour.
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He escaped from the regime’s labour camp in the wake of the Vietnamese 
invasion and was reunited with his family. His father died during the regime. He 
returned to his homeland with his mother and his other siblings after their escape.
Upon return from the ravages of war, Pisit’s family restarted their life. His 
mother headed the family. It was difficult to start again as nothing remained, not even 
agricultural supplies sufficient to make a living. At this stage, his family followed the 
collective farming system under the socialist orthodoxy of the post-KR regime. 
Within a couple of years, his mother became sick and unable to work at farm 
activities. There was no adult male, except teen-aged Pisit, to replace his mother. He 
assumed a fathering role at a young age under the guidance of his mother. Pisit’s 
responsibility for providing for the family long before adulthood and marriage reflects 
the social milieu leading to early construction of masculinities among young boys in 
Cambodian society. His account gives the social construction of his proxy fathering 
role.
After the KR regime, my mother got sick. We did not have anyone else to 
depend on. So, I needed to try to work to support the family. Even I was 
still young, I worked for the family. Every day, I did rice farming, climbed 
palm tree to collect palm extract, and also studied.
Pisit began schooling before the KR regime began. His education was 
interrupted by the KR regime. He resumed his education after the fall of the regime. 
His education was interrupted again when he was in Grade-VIII by the need to accept 
responsibility for providing for the family.
Despite his role of providing for the family, Pisit encountered violence from 
his mother. The violence was associated with his role as provider. He performed the
220
role of providing for the family under strict rules and discipline from his mother, 
which often ended with physical violence. As he says,
My mother beat me. This was because I always stayed around her to help 
her in farm activities and other tasks. There were some works that I could 
not do properly. She was not satisfied with me. So she beat me.
Parental violence towards young children is accepted and normal in 
Cambodian society. It was also normalised in the case of Pisit. He is not resentful to 
his mother for her violent treatment. He perceived the coercive discipline of his 
mother as her legitimate right and it was taken for granted. To this day, Pisit thinks 
that he has succeeded in life (compared to his siblings) because of the strict discipline 
imposed by his mother.
He married aged around twenty, with a girl from his village who had been his 
schoolmate. He had loved her before they married. After marriage, he lived separately 
from his mother.
Subsistence rice farming is his primary occupation. He did not provide 
information about his landholding. His wife also works on the farm with him. He 
engages in non-rice farming activities such as collecting palm extract as a secondary 
occupation. All of his children and his wife currently live with him. The eldest 
daughter is eighteen years old, and the youngest son is eight years old.
Work, workplace and gender regime in work
Pisit’s real working life began at early teen-age through the role of providing
for the family by farming on family land. As discussed in Case Studies 4 and 5,
agricultural practice in Cambodia is peasant and gendered to some extent. But the
gender division of labour in agriculture is not sharp. In his case, Pisit began farming
under the supervision and example of his mother. Collection of palm extract from
221
palm trees was his secondary occupation during that time. It is only men who climb 
palm trees and collect the extract.
Pisit has continued his occupation as a farmer until now. The gender regime in 
his current farming practice is the same as before. He is the lead farmer, his wife is the 
co-farmer. Children also assist their parents during farming season. During his 
lengthy violent period he allowed his farming responsibilities to be adversely affected, 
spending most of his time at personal leisure activities. His wife led the farming 
activities during this period. His children also had to spend more of their time on 
farming activities.
Family, relationship and gender regimes in the family
Pisit was brought up in a female-headed-household. His mother headed the 
family and made all decisions. She managed the family through fear and the use of 
strict rules. Pisit often encountered violence from his mother. According to him, he 
was more prone to be treated with violence by his mother compared to his siblings as 
he worked closer to her than they did. Pisit was also privileged to exercise power and 
command over his younger siblings. He beat them when they did not follow his 
instructions. He obtained his power and authority over the younger siblings through 
his de facto fathering role.
The pattern of gender division of labour in his current family is the same as he 
had experienced in the parental family. Both spouses contributed to the family’s 
economy by working on the family farm. Their children also assisted them on the 
farm.
Pisit has always maintained command over his family. His command over the 
family is patriarchal and is constructed with the notion as he says that kmen are the
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main persons [heads] in the family who are granted a higher degree of power [over 
other family members] as they try to earn money to support the family.’
A pattern of change in the way he commands his family is found in his life 
course. He managed the family by taking the leading economic role for the family’s 
existence in the early years of his marriage. The family relationship was non-violent 
during this period.
Later he managed the family through terror and violence with little economic 
contribution. He enjoyed life by hanging out with his friends, in sports (soccer), 
gambling and drinking. He often pushed his wife and children to work for the family 
without contributing his own labour. This was considered unfair by the family 
members. Therefore, they often disobeyed his commands, and did not respect him. 
Pisit used violence towards his wife and children to regain his command over the 
family and ran the family using violence for more than a decade.
He has been managing the family with a new gender regime for the last three 
years. The new regime is non-violent and practised with an increased economic role 
for the family. He has cut the time taken for his personal pleasure. He invests his 
labour more for the family’s economic production. He listens and discusses matters 
with family members when any issues arise. He deals with family issues gently, but 
not so gently as to be thought of as feminine. He has found the new regime effective 
in managing the family with peace and harmony without diminishing his authority 
over the family members.
Place (rural/urban), peer relationship and wider social life or culture
Pisit’s life experience started in a rural setting with a marginal peasant 
background. He was brought up experiencing social as well as family violence. As
was commonly found among the peasants in Chapter 7, a man in a peasant family
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leads the family by working on the family land. Pisit, being a peasant, also works for 
rice and non-rice farm activities as head of the family.
Peer relations affected Pisit’s construction of masculinity, especially in 
relation to domestic violence. Within a few years of marriage, he ceased to be a hard­
working peasant who provided the main support to his family and became a gambler. 
He refrained from contributing his labour to the family, and became heavily engaged 
in peer affairs -sport, drinking, and gambling. Sometimes he lost money in gambling. 
These habits angered his wife who was already over-burdened with productive and 
reproductive work. Spousal violence began at this point. The following account 
provides a correlation between peer relations and violence in the family:
There was love in the early years of marriage. We forgave each other 
when there was any mistake. But love gradually became more and more 
bitter. Trouble started mostly from my side. I hung out with friends, and 
played football and cards. We also bet money on our card playing. 
Sometimes I lost money. It made me feel bad and unhappy. Then when I 
came back home, my wife blamed me.
Experience of violence
Pisit is both a victim and a perpetrator of violence. He had experienced both 
social violence and family violence as a child and a teenager. He had experienced the 
collective violence of the KR regime and had served as forced labour for the regime. 
He was beaten severely in one episode by the regime’s militia and the violent past has 
left a deep scar in his memories.
He also encountered family violence during the post-war recovery. Pisit’s
mother, who was trapped in the post-war devastation, in extreme poverty, poor health
and lacking the support of an adult member in the family, had no other choice but to
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employ Pisit, the eldest son of the family, to fill the fathering role for the family. She 
used all measures, including violence, to feed the family. She also treated Pisit’s other 
siblings in the same way. The notion of ‘parental discipline’ rationalised her violent 
treatment towards children.
Pisit's experience of violence was passed on to his younger siblings, 
particularly to his immediate younger brother. His younger brother was studying at 
the time and was reluctant to help Pisit and his mother in farming and other tasks after 
school. Instead of helping, he wasted time with his friends and peers after school. Pisit 
often beat his brother because of this behaviour. During this time he turned from a 
victim to a perpetrator. His de facto fathering role in the family was used as a 
justification for his violence towards his siblings.
I used to beat my brother. At that time, I worked for family and studied 
too. I studied in a lower grade than my younger brother. My mother asked 
him to come home straight after school to help me in the farm activities 
and other activities. After school, he hung out with his friends or went to 
play football and didn't come home until evening. Then I beat him because 
he did not help with the work. My mother said nothing because I worked 
hard to support his study and mine.
Both Pisit’s and his mother's violence took place within the notion o f ‘parental 
discipline', exemplified in a proverb, which Pisit termed ‘traditional': i f  you want a 
child to succeed in adulthood, you have to raise him/her under strict discipline. Pisit 
referred to this proverb twice during the interview. The proverb justified parental 
violence. Both Pisit and his mother deeply embody the social meaning of the proverb 
in their parenting.
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Pisit gave confusing accounts about his violence towards his wife. He 
repeatedly mentioned during interview that he had never physically abused his wife. 
Only verbal forms of violence took place. But another account which he made later 
gives the notion that there was also physical violence in the family. He says,
When there were serious conflicts, I went to stay in my relative's house for 
several days. I did so because if I stayed at home with her it could escalate 
the situation further. So, I thought it was better not to stay at home but to 
wait until both sides calmed down and reconciled.
The post-conflict situations strongly suggest that there was physical conflict. 
Furthermore, if there were no physical violence, he would probably not have been 
targeted by the anti-DV programme.
Pisit’s experience of violence, first as a victim and then as a perpetrator, 
reveals the dynamics of the use of violence. The KR regime used violence against 
him to generate a huge labour force for agricultural production, and his mother used 
violence to ensure a labour force for the family's economic production. He used 
violence in his own family to ensure labour force participation for the family's 
economic production, and to maintain command over the family.
Construction of masculinity
Pisit's construction of masculinity has always been organised around specific 
patterns of gender role, position and power in the family relationship. The 
construction of masculinity took place in his turbulent personal and family life, 
including, collective social violence, violence of mother, and engagement in proxy 
fathering.
His construction of early masculinity was organised around ‘supporting the
family' by rice farming and collecting palm extract (which was used to make sugar).
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By providing for the family he was privileged to exercise ‘power and authority’ over 
his younger siblings. At this stage of life he followed the notion that power and 
authority over the family is attainable through the role of providing for its members, 
constructed through his day-to-day relationship with his mother.
Throughout Pisit’s marital life he has maintained this early masculinity by 
positioning himself as the head of the family. His understanding of masculinity in 
marital life is classically spelt out in his account ‘men are the main persons [heads] in 
the family who are granted a higher degree of power [over the family members] as 
they try to earn more money to support the family.’ The three elements: ‘men as the 
heads of the family,’ ‘providing for the family’, and ‘power and authority over the 
family members’, remain central to his masculinity in the violent and post­
transformation periods of his life. But we see a paradigm shift in the way he 
assembles these elements in these two periods of life.
During the violent period of his life, he asserted power and authority over 
other family members without performing the role of providing for the family 
adequately. His attempts at exercising power and authority were, therefore, 
unacceptable and challenged by the family members, particularly his wife. He used 
terror to restore his authority.
In his post-transformation period, he remains authoritative over the family. 
The only difference is that he does not use violence to assert authority as in the past. 
Instead, he is ‘gentle' with his wife and children in dealing with family matters. He 
does not blame or curse his wife or children when an issue or problem arises. He 
invites explanation from family members about the problem.
His transformation into gentleness or non-violence is not totally self-imposed. 
The transformation is also the result of enforcement of relevant laws. The violence
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that he used to hold authority over the family in the past came under legal scrutiny in 
the wake of the implementation of the anti-VAW programme in his community. All 
forms of violence against women, including DV, are being criminalised under the new 
laws. Violence is subject to punishment. Therefore, a change in the old-fashioned 
exercise of authority over the family was needed. Pisit has rearranged his ways of 
maintaining authority over the family to avoid any legal repercussions.
Apart from being “gentle” in relationships, he also reinforces the role of 
‘providing for the family' by doubling his efforts working in rice and non-rice farm 
activities to increase family income. Instead of gambling and personal enjoyment, he 
focuses more on productive work. The enhanced role of providing for the family and 
his gentle treatment of family members reinforce his status as head of the family and 
his consequent authority over the family. As he says,
Yeah, they (family members) respect me more than before because I lead 
the family well. The power of the main person in the family does not mean 
I put pressure on my children and wife or suppress them. It means I 
organise the family better than before. It is different from before. Now, 
everything goes well since I have act well for the family. They are also 
doing well with me.
Pisit’s post-transformation masculinity resembles the version of maleness 
which has increasingly been demanded in the rhetoric of women's groups, gender 
advocates and legal instruments (such as DV law) in the country. He experienced the 
rhetoric from the anti-VAW programme in the commune. The rhetoric expects a man 
to be non-violent, respect women, demonstrate equality in family relationships, and 
contribute to the family’s economic development.
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His ‘gentleness’ does not necessarily mean that he is pro-women. His 
notion of power and authority is still built on a sharp gender-based 
differentiation between men and women. He says,
Khnong leakhanak chareok yeuong chea borosh nen man tuon phlon 
kasoey komlang douch chea neary te (I am gentle in speaking and acting to 
wife and children. I have changed to be gentle and weak in the character of 
man; but not weak like a woman.)
He leads the family with a new perspective without reducing his power or 
changing his notion of gender. There is no doubt about his transformation in terms of 
violence. Though the programme regards him a gender-responsive man, this is far 
from being the case.
Case Study 9: Hong Sar
The Interview
Mr Hong is also a participant in the anti-DV programme, and a self-confessed 
perpetrator of DV who has been non-violent for the last two years. He was recruited 
to this study through the program staff. The interview took place at his home, and was 
a semi-public. One of the members of the men's group attended the interview which 
lasted for one and half hours.
Hong was fluent and enthusiastic during the interview, especially when he 
talked about his change and reasons for his change. But he was less forthcoming when 
talking about his violence within the family. He insisted that there were only conflicts 
and no physical violence in the family. Overall, the interview was a good effort in 
terms of unpacking the root causes of his violence.
Life Course
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Hong comes from a peasant family from an eastern province. He is forty-seven 
years old, and the father of four children. He married in his early twenties following 
the matrilocal system. Both spouses work on the family farm.
Hong has experienced the regimes of Lon Nol, the Khmer Rouge, the post-KR 
socialist regime and the current regime in his lifetime. He was twelve years old in 
1975 when the Khmer Rouge rule began. His experience of the Khmer Rouge regime 
is similar to the experiences of other Cambodians of his time. He was not, however, 
moved out of his parental house. He worked for the regime inside his residential 
village but his parents worked in a mobile team outside the village.
Hong began his education in a village school in the pre-KR era. His education 
was interrupted twice: first by the social disruption during the Lon Nol regime, and 
secondly by the KR regime. He resumed his study in the post-KR era. and completed 
Year Six.
From childhood, Hong maintained friendship with boys. His closest friends at 
school were boys and he deliberately maintained his distance from girls. About this 
gendered pattern of friendship at childhood, he says,
My closest friends were boys because we always played and roamed 
around together. Girls were also good friends. But they were not as close 
as the boys.
His gendered friendship preference was constructed by the social teaching of 
sexual homogeneity in peer relationships. Girls were not allowed to mix with boys in 
school nor in other public spheres. His relationship with his friends was peaceful.
Hong's eldest daughter married ten years ago. The younger children (two sons
and one daughter) work in Phnom Penh. Two sons run mobile food stalls installed on
motorised carts. Hong provided financial support to his sons to buy the motorised
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carts. The daughter works in a garment factory. His wife joined them in Phnom Penh. 
She helps their sons to prepare food for sale. All three children live together in Phnom 
Penh. Unlike the farming tradition of their parents, Hong’s children have developed 
other family enterprises and make up another economic unit within the family.
Hong currently lives in the rural house with his elderly father. His wife and 
children visit him sometimes. He carries out his household and farming activities 
alone.
Work, workplace and gender regimes in the workplace
Hong is a farmer. His farming practice is small-scale, and intended for family 
subsistence. Rice is the main crop but in addition to rice farming, he has been raising 
some poultry and small farm animals at home to provide a cash income.
As is common among small-scale peasants, Hong’s farming practice is labour- 
intensive. Both spouses worked together on the family farm. He did not give an 
account of the specific gender division of labour in his family farming. He mentioned, 
however, that the contribution of both spouses to the family income was equal.
The pattern of gender division of labour shifted when Hong began heavy 
drinking twelve years ago. He did not work on the farm as he had before but spent 
most of his time drinking with friends and then sleeping it off after returning home. 
His wife did most of the tasks related to farming during this time, helped by his 
growing children. There is no doubt that his wife performed as the lead farmer during 
this period. Hong’s role was secondary and he followed the pattern of the absent 
father.
Upon his transformation to normal life for the last two years, the gender 
division of labour in the family farm has further shifted. All of his children have
moved to Phnom Penh to run informal businesses and his wife has joined them. She
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had left him and joined the children in Phnom Penh before he reformed. In fact, her 
move prompted his reform.
Family, relationship and gender regimes in the family
The following account by Hong gives trajectories of gender regimes and 
relationships in his family that have taken place over time. This account is also 
relevant to his course of violence in the family. He says,
We did not know or understand each other when we married. We knew 
each other well and clearly after living many years together. I was 
stubborn and always wanted to win over her when any issue arose. I 
showed my power and did not respect her. This made her angry and she 
started to complain and blamed me. She did not blame or complain about 
me before this. But since she knew that I wanted to control and dominate 
her she started to take revenge. She also tried to show her power in the 
family. She was not scared of me as she was in the beginning. So, I think 
that it was my fault that I tried to control her too much and blamed her 
although she worked as hard as I did.
Hong's family has gone through a series of transitions in gender regimes and 
relationships over time. The trajectory of the gender regime moves through patriarchy, 
contestation of patriarchy, and marginalisation of patriarchy. Gender roles in the 
household economy played a crucial role in maintaining the specific patterns of 
gender regimes.
Hong maintained command and dominance in the family relationships in the 
early few years of his marriage. His dominance over his wife and family was based on 
the notion that he was the natural leader of the family, and that he should always be
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respected by his wife. His notion of patriarchal privilege was that it should be granted 
for being the head of the family.
Hong's dominance came under challenge by his wife after few years of 
marriage. The challenge by his wife coincided with his practice of heavy drinking. 
About the beginning of his drinking Hong says,
My wife used to make trouble with me, like blaming or complaining about 
me. But it was I who used to make more trouble for her. Some days, when 
I came back from work and felt tired, she blamed me for some mistakes 1 
did. It made me feel unhappy and angry with her. Then I went to drink 
with my friends to make myself feel better.
He chose heavy drinking instead of giving up his “winning over her” attitude 
to get rid of the challenge. His heavy drinking exaggerated his changed position in the 
family gender regime. Being drunk, he could not perform his usual role of providing 
for the family, and eroded his authority in family relationships.
Hong's wife played the leading role for the family’s economy for ten years. 
This gave her enhanced power in family affairs, and challenged Hong’s dominance. 
About the changing gender regime, he says,
When I used to drink, all my family members were unhappy with me. I 
could not look at my wife. She was always angry with me because I 
always drank, slept and did not do any work.
At this point, he used violence to restore his lost gender order. He did not give 
further detail of the violence.
In the wake of stricter enforcement of DV law in his commune, a further shift
of gender regime in Hong’s family has taken place. His violence was no longer
tolerated as his wife reported to the commune council via the women’s group. He
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needed to change his ways to avoid arrest or punishment, though he claimed that his 
transformation into non-violence was voluntary. At this stage, he became 
marginalised in his family relationships.
He has not been violent for the past two years. Over the period of his 
transformation, his children and wife have moved to Phnom Penh, where they have 
formed another family unit to generate income. He did not mention whether they 
migrated to Phnom Penh in a group or one followed by others. His wife leaving him 
alone in the rural village is unusual in peasant culture, suggesting that he has been 
discarded by the family.
Place (rural/urban), peer relationship and wider social life or culture
Hong has spent his entire life in a rural socio-cultural setting. Life in a rural 
setting is farm-based. Both male and female members, including children, work on 
the family farm. Men usually lead the family in their work on the family farm.
Making peers within the community is a social way of living for rural people. 
Male peer groups generally gather in local groceries in the evening after a hard day’s 
work. Peer gathering is one of the most common leisure practices for peasants.
Drinking is the most common activity for peers to keep their social life active. 
Drinking alcohol is not stigmatised in Cambodian culture unless it turns to heavy 
drinking. Drinking alcohol is common among men of all classes and occupations. 
Drinking alcohol every day is rising in recent times both in rural and urban areas. 
“Dor mei' (drinking alcohol) is gendered. Women rarely drink with men in the local 
groceries or other social gathering in rural areas. Drinking in peer groups is a men- 
only affair.
Hong’s peers and friends are fellow farmers of the same village. His account
reveals that peer relationships have powerfully influenced his habit of drinking
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alcohol. He learnt about drinking alcohol from his peers. Gradually he turned into a 
heavy drinker under peer pressure. About peer influence he says,
Before I did not know how to drink; but things changed since I started to 
make friends with people who drink. Each time I went to drink, my friends 
asked me to drink more and more. That's why it made me crazy about 
drinking. Even my wife tried to stop me; 1 did not listen to her.
He has reduced spending time with peers since he stopped drinking two years 
ago. He still maintains a relationship with them, but in different way. Currently, he 
does not meet them frequently and does not drink when he meets them. Although he 
does not drink nowadays, he pays for his peers' drinks to keep the relationship active. 
He says,
Sometimes when I drove my motorbike and met my friends, they forced 
me to drink. But I told them that I don't drink. If they insist, I pay for a 
half -litre or a litre of beer for them. Then I continue on my way.
Experience of violence
Hong had experienced both collective social violence and family violence. He 
had a terrible life during the KR regime. In addition to forced labour, he was punished 
on several occasions for not performing tasks as directed by the regime. About the 
terror of the regime he says,
We were small. We did not have fixed work. So they did not care about 
providing rice to us. Sometime, I was careless while herding cows. When 
the Rouge militias saw this, they punished me by starving me for a whole 
day. They did not give me any rice to eat.
Hong had encountered family violence before the Khmer Rouge regime. The
violence came from his father, and his mother was the primary victim. Children,
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including Hong, also experienced the violence of his father. But his father was not 
violent all his life. He stopped being violent after he gave up drinking. Hong did not 
experience any conflict and violence involving his siblings.
Hong is not only a victim of violence, but also a self-confessed perpetrator of 
domestic violence. Most of his violence took place toward his wife over a period of 
ten years. His father had been a model of drinking and violence. Hong has stopped 
being violent for the last two years through his participation in the anti-DV 
programme.
Hong gave ambiguous accounts about his violence during interview. He said 
in one account that there had never any physical violence in the family. Physical 
violence against a wife devalues a man's image in the public within the social rhetoric 
of ‘good men' or ‘real men' in contemporary Cambodia, and this is probably why he 
denies physical violence.
He categorically differentiates between violence and conflict. In his definition, 
violence can only take place in physical forms that result in serious injury, bleeding or 
death. Other forms of physical violence such as pushing, punching, knocking or 
choking are considered ‘veay top bon tech bon touch' or ‘small conflicts’. The fact 
that he was targeted by the anti-DV program and the existence of violence in his 
family for a prolonged period support the inference that he perpetrated at least second- 
degree physical violence (i.e., pushing, punching, knocking or choking) his wife. 
Construction of masculinity
Experience of family violence and collective social violence has implicated 
Hong’s early construction of masculinity in specific ways. Through witnessing the 
violence of his father towards his mother and children in the family, he was exposed 
to a gendered and hierarchical family relationship in childhood.
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My father was a drunk-person and cursed my mother. But later he changed
his mind and stopped drinking alcohol.......  When I used to drink, I also
thought about my father.....
Clearly he has followed the path of his father in this respect. His construction 
of a gendered, hierarchal and violent family relationship was further reinforced by his 
experience of collective social violence during the KR regime.
Hong maintained a violent family relationship for ten years. He gave varying 
accounts about the reasons for his violence. According to his main account (spelt out 
earlier), the violence in his family resulted from his excessive domination of his wife, 
and the drinking of alcohol. A passage in the later part of the interview suggests a 
slightly different picture: that two factors jointly contributed to his violence in the 
family. One is his demand for patriarchal privileges and the other is his absence from 
the family's economy.
I just spent time drinking. It lost time, money and work [rice farming]. 
Sometime, when I came back from drinking, I demanded my wife to serve 
me a meal. The food was ready. I could serve myself. But I wanted her to 
serve me even if she was busy working. The main thing [related to my 
violence] was that my family members were not happy with me. They 
were angry with me at that time. This was because I didn't work and only 
spent money for drink. I made trouble for them after I came back from 
drinking while they were tired from hard work.
Hong's violence in the family took place within his socially constructed
notions of family and family relationships. His notion of family relationships was
built in the same way as Pisit’s which was seen as being in line with men's roles as
the ultimate leaders of the family, holding a legitimate right to command and control
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the family. His wife was either silent or unaware about his dominance in the first few 
years of marriage. She then began challenging his dominance. At this stage, he was 
just disappointed, not violent. He followed the common practice for men's leisure, 
drinking alcohol to suppress his disappointment. In time he became a heavy drinker 
causing him to absent himself from the family's labour force.
This interpretation suggests that his violence took place in real terms when his 
gendered privileges were ignored by the family members. This behaviour by the 
family members was justified as he did not participate in the family's labour force and 
did not provide for the family. His violence did not take place without counter-action 
or reaction (which he describes as ‘anger’) by the family members.
Masculinised leisure and peer relationships were catalysts for his violence in 
the family. Boastful drinking behaviour is currently common among Cambodian men 
and this trend is growing in the country. Ability to drink a good deal of alcohol 
without getting drunk is often associated with men's physical ability. Drinking 
capacity is measured by the litre, not by the glass/peg or bottle, in the local culture. 
Hong also referred to the 'litre' as the unit of alcohol consumption during his 
interview. A man who can drink several litres of beer in one session without being 
drunk is often hailed as a ‘strong man' by his peers.
Hong adopted excessive and irresponsible drinking habits through peer 
pressure. This led him to fail in performing his role in contributing to the family's 
economy. This sparked anger and a challenge to his old-fashioned control and 
dominance by his wife and children. As a result, his violent behaviour was 
aggravated.
Hong's post-transformation masculinity is non-violent, work-oriented and
passive. Unlike in the past, he gives his full attention to farming. In addition to rice
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farming, he engages in non-rice farm activities to earn extra income. He also performs 
all household chores. He lives with his elderly father in the home. His wife and 
children live away from him to make extra income. As his wife lives away from him, 
it is difficult to explore his power relationship with her. However, he still holds a 
subversive notion regarding violence. He thinks both spouses are responsible in 
creating violence. He referred to the proverb that ‘one cannot clap with one hand.’ For 
his own case of violence, he thinks that his wife caused his violence by being violent 
too. But he also felt he was more responsible for the violence than his wife.
9.4 Patterns of masculinity and relations to DV
9.4.1 Patterns of masculinity among the former perpetrators
Pisit and Hong are contemporaries. Both of them experienced collective social 
and parental violence. Other former perpetrators of DV of the older generation also 
experienced both collective social violence and parental violence (except Chan and 
Huy) in early life. The former perpetrators of DV of the younger generation were 
brought up in relatively good parental relationships. Although the younger group did 
not experience collective social violence like the older group, the aftermath of the 
civil war significantly affected their upbringing. For example, Khieng lived in a 
refugee camp with his parents as a child. The construction of early masculinities took 
place in more turbulent social and family conditions among the older group as 
compared to the younger group.
Irrespective of their different experiences of social and family life, and age
difference, the former perpetrators of both groups demonstrate common patterns of
masculinity. They constructed early masculinities within the notion that ‘men are the
main persons in the families’ and ‘have more power in the family’ as they ‘provide
the main support' to the family. Three key elements: position (head of the family),
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power (control over the family) and economic role (breadwinning) constituted their 
early masculinities. The principles on which their early masculinities were constructed 
were mediated through their life experiences, by serving as proxy fathers at a young 
age (as done by Pisit), or participating in the family’s labour force from childhood, or 
seeing their fathers as the role model. Pisit and Khieng term the notion Traditional,' 
and ‘natural' respectively. Pisit’s idea of traditional refers to the gender order of the 
family in the post-colonial era.
The notion of patriarchy in family headship, hierarchal family power 
relationships and the gender-specific role of providing for the family remained central 
in the construction of masculinities throughout their lives.
The former perpetrators of DV of the older generation began violence almost 
at the same time. Pisit and Hong began violence in the early 1990s although they 
married in different years (1991 and early in the 1980s respectively). Thim and Huy 
began being violent in 1993. They married in 1991 and 1992 respectively. Ra, Chan 
and Som began their violence in 1992 after passing many years of conjugal life (they 
married in 1978, 1988 and 1972 respectively). Among the former perpetrators of DV 
of the younger generation, Khieng, Vichana and Mouk began their violence in 2005, 
2006 and 2001 respectively. It seems that the onset of violence particularly among the 
older generation relates to a period -  the early 1990s, the time when Cambodian 
families were going back to individual family living from Krom Samaki (cooperative 
group farming), the farming policy the post-KR regime adopted.
During their violent period, the former perpetrators of DV organised
masculinities with heavy drinking, spending lots of time with peers, and partial
absenteeism from labour force participation. The practices of heavy drinking, and
spending too much time with peers were preceded by grumbling and complaints by
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their wives. The grumbling or complaints by the wives were related to income and 
living conditions for the family, except in the cases of Ra, Vichana and Huy. The 
reasons for grumbling by the wives of Ra, Vichana and Huy are discussed later.
According to the men's accounts, the complaints by their wives caused them 
stress. They followed masculinised leisure habits (i.e., heavy drinking, gambling and 
spending time with peers) to rid themselves of the stress. In effect, the masculinised 
leisure reduced their economic role for the family as they were often drunk during 
working hours and thus remained absent from the family’s labour force. As they were 
partially or fully absent from the family’s economic role, their families, particularly 
the wives, had to cope with the situation by working longer hours. As the wives were 
desperate with their productive and reproductive roles, they could not pay as much 
attention to their husbands as they had in the past. The men considered less attention 
by their wives as versions of ‘ignorance', ‘disrespect' and ‘carelessness'. At this 
point, their violence was perpetrated in real terms to restore their power.
Som, a former perpetrator of DV of the older generation, was interviewed in 
the presence of his wife. When asked about a typical day of his violence, his wife 
replied along with him. Here accounts of both spouses are provided which best reveal 
the dynamics of his violence. The accounts are also representative of other former 
perpetrators in this study.
About a typical day of his violence, Som's wife says,
One day, I asked him to take leave from his work (he worked as a village 
chief at that time) for some time and go fishing [this is his current 
occupation]. At that time, we had nothing to eat at home. Then he became 
angry with me and replied that I grumbled a lot about that issue (lack of
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food). He then went out to drink. He came back home in the evening and 
began beating me.
Here is Som’s account about reason of his violence,
One day I came back from work. I heard her grumbling a lot at me. I then 
became very angry with her (did not say about violence). I just came back 
from work. I was very tired. She could blame me if I were not in work. But 
actually, I worked hard whole day. She still said something at me again 
and again. So, I was very angry.
Unlike other former perpetrators, Vichana, Ra, and Huy received grumbling 
from their wives on non-livelihood issues. Vichana. who married twice, encountered 
arguments from his second wife when he brought a daughter from his first wife to live 
with him. The children from the two wives often quarrelled and could not get on 
together. This led to conflict between Vichana and his second wife. The story of Ra's 
violence is similar. Ra encountered serious neglect from his wife as soon as she 
noticed him with another woman, whom he has been living with since 1993 without 
divorcing his legal wife. Huy's trajectory of violence is opposite to the case of Ra. 
Huy suspected his wife, who runs a vegetable shop in the local market of having a 
relationship outside marriage. He always controlled her outward mobility, especially 
when he could not accompany her. He used serious forms of violence to control her 
mobility. At one point, she reported him to the commune council. He gave an 
undertaking to the authorities, in order to avoid police arrest.
In their post-transformation period, the former perpetrators have reorganised
masculinities around an enhanced role of providing for the family, controlled their
drinking and peer affairs, and leading their families non-violently. In the course of
participating in the program, they have learned the programme’s message that it is
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wrong for a ‘real man" to lead his family with violence and without playing the 
economic support role for his family adequately.
In the post-transformation period, most of the former perpetrators have 
restarted their economic role in full-swing to provide the main support to the family. 
They have slashed time and expenses for personal leisure. They are more focused on 
economic production. They have been leading their families with Pisit’s typical model 
of headship of Khnong leakhanak chareok yeuong chea borosh nen man tuon phlon 
kasoey komlang douch chea neary te (I am gentle in speaking and acting with my wife 
and children. I have changed to gentle and weak in the character of a man, not weak 
physically like a woman) which combines both feminine and masculine aspects 
without compromising the power over the family members. The reorganised model of 
family headship has gained acceptance in the nexus of anti-VAW activism.
The life histories of the former perpetrators suggest that they have been 
enjoying more power over the family, not less, in the post-transformation period. This 
power over the family is enjoyed in the form of respect, honour and services provided 
by the family members, particularly the wives. Their enhanced economic role for the 
family in the post-transformation period is the key to gaining increased power. Thim, 
who currently works as a trader and broker, is now the sole provider for the family 
and describes his new status in the family as.
If compared with the past, she [his wife] respects and take care of me more 
now. For example, nowadays she wakes up in the early morning to cook 
soup rice, and prepares breakfast for me. In the past, when I was drunk, 
she didn't give care for me much. She also looked down on me. When I 
said something to her, she replied badly with a loud voice. But now she 
does not reply as she used to.
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9.4.2 Men, masculinities and domestic violence: interrelation
The violence perpetrated by the former perpetrators of this study is multi­
faceted and dynamic. Patriarchal notions of family headship, hierarchal power 
relationships and gender specific roles are central to their violence. As is common 
with peasant masculinities, the former perpetrators of DV, who come from peasant 
backgrounds, constructed masculinities within the notion that men are the heads of the 
families. They also hold the notion that being the heads of families, men are entitled 
to maintain power in the family. The notion of men's entitlement to power in the 
family relationship is taken for granted because of their role in providing the main 
support to the family. The construction of masculinities by the former perpetrators of 
DV takes place within the overall gender order installed in Cambodian society by the 
French colonial rule, as discussed in Chapter 4.
The periods of violence by the former perpetrators suggests that domestic 
violence, particularly in countries like Cambodia where women in most of the 
families were economically dependent on their husbands, takes place in the dynamics 
of patriarchy, power relations and gender role for the family. A critical look at the 
grumbling and complaints by the wives suggests that they shared the notion that men 
should provide the main support for the family. Men are granted power (in the form of 
respect, honour and acknowledgement) by family members, particularly the wives, in 
exchange for their role of providing the main support to the family. When it is 
mutually accepted, their power over the family is non-violent. But making this 
happen non-violently depends on the men fulfilling the economic role to the extent of 
family’s needs. And that is not guaranteed, as these stories show; other masculine 
practices, such as peer group socialising, can put it at risk.
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PART IV
THEMATIC CHAPTERS
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CHAPTER 10
MEN’S ROLE IN PROVIDING FOR THE FAMILY AND THEIR 
RESPONSES TO THEIR WIVES’ OUTSIDE PAID WORK
10.1 Introduction
There have been a number of recurring issues in the life histories of the men 
interviewed in this study. These issues are related to family providing and family 
relationships. This chapter analyses the issues related to family providing with two 
foci: men's notion of the role in providing for the family, and their responses to their 
wives' outside paid work. Family relationship issues are analysed in Chapter 11 with 
two foci: power relationships between spouses and the reconfiguration of 
masculinities, and the fathering role of men.
The issues related to family providing are important in the study of 
masculinities, particularly in the Cambodian context in relation to intra-family gender 
relationships, particularly where men accrue power over the family and head the 
family based on the notion that men should provide the family's main income. As 
labour market and socio-economic conditions are changing in Cambodia, it is the 
ideal context to explore to what extent the Cambodian men across different 
occupations retain the notion that men provide the main income to the family. The 
changing labour market can be disadvantageous for some men in terms of earning
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enough money to lead the family well. How do they respond to their wives' outside 
paid work knowing that the income of their wives can challenge their power and 
status in the family?
10.2 Men’s notion of providing for the family
Men's role in providing the main income for the family, and their consequent 
status as head of the family are two key and interrelated features of Khmer 
masculinities. All men interviewed in this study hold the notion that they are heads of 
the families. They justify their status as head of the family because of their role in 
providing the family's main income. These specific patterns of men's notions of 
family headship and gender role for the family have been installed in Cambodian 
society through the French colonial administration from 1898 to 1954.
The intra-family gender relationship is played within the notion of family 
gender role and position. There is a kind of relationship between men’s power over 
the family and their role in providing the main income to the family. Their headship is 
mutually accepted by their family members, particularly by their wives as long as they 
provide adequate support to the family. Domestic violence, particularly violence by 
men against their wives, takes place within the dynamics of this gender pattern. The 
relationship between domestic violence, family headship and men's role of providing 
for the family is discussed in Chapter 9 and Chapter 13.
The life histories of men in this study demonstrate that men’s notion of being 
the head of the family is default in their construction of masculinities, but the notion 
of their gender role in providing the main income to the family is not. This is because 
some of the men who failed to provide the main income for the family still hold the 
notion of that they are the head of the family. Men whose wife’s economic
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contribution to family's economy exceeds their husband’s share also believe this. The 
changing labour market, their personal capabilities in terms of finding well-paying 
work and the growing economic needs of the family are important whether their 
support to the family is regarded as the main one or not.
10.3 Wives’ outside paid work and its significance to the family economy
The wives of the majority of the men interviewed in this study were engaged 
in paid or subsistence work at the time of interview. They worked in various sectors 
including garment manufacturing factories, construction companies, government 
offices, banks, small-scale self-run businesses and family farms. The wives of men in 
the rural setting (peasants and former perpetrators of DV) generally work in the 
family farm along with their husbands. Historically, men and women in Cambodian 
peasant families work together on family farms for subsistence. But outside paid 
work, either waged labour or a salaried job or a self-managed business are relatively 
new for Cambodian women. Rapid urbanisation and the growth of industrial sector in 
the country are creating outside paid work for women. Outside paid work in this 
chapter refers to waged or salaried jobs and self-managed businesses run by the wives 
of the urban men, both workers and managers.
Though the men in this study think that they are responsible for providing the 
main income to the family, a notion originating with colonial rule, in practice both 
spouses support the family jointly. By working in the paid or subsistence work, the 
wives contribute to the family’s economy. The proportion of economic contribution 
these wives make to their family's economy is, in many cases no less than that of their 
husbands.
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Apart from being engaged in paid work, these wives are also overwhelmed 
with household chores. They are over-shouldered with productive and reproductive 
roles. Men are often exempted from household chores either on the cultural 
interpretation that household chores are the women’s domain or because of their role 
in providing for the family, or both. Where men's role in household chores exists, it is 
usually limited to non-repetitive tasks and spending leisure with children.
10.4 Patterns of men’s response to their wife’s outside paid work
The life histories of men show that their responses to their wives' outside paid 
work are diverse and dynamic. A man’s pattern of response is influenced by what he 
earns from his work, his work culture and the gender regimes in his workplace. In 
some cases, the responses by the men to their wives’ outside paid work adapt in 
response to the changing labour market vis-à-vis their personal capabilities. Based on 
the patterns of responses, the men can be divided into three groups.
The first group: career supporters
The men of this group include Sok, Phyrum, Mony, Sopheak and Chhrem. The 
men of this group not only accept the economic contribution of their wives to the 
family, but also offer support that enable their wives to retain an outside career.
Sok is a public sector manager. His wife is an engineer who works in two 
places in Phnom Penh, including a job in public sector. Her daily schedule is hectic. 
Sok gives her lifts to and from home and office. If Sok cannot pick her up from her 
office at the end of the day, she needs to come to his office and they go from there 
together. Sok's pattern of support to his wife is also common among two other public 
sector managers. Phyrum and Mony, whose wives also work in the public sector.
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Sopheak, a public sector manager who currently works in an international 
NGO supports his wife by sharing in household chores. His wife, who works in a 
bank, does not have much time to do all the household chores. Sopheak washes dishes 
and clothes to support his wife. This support is to some extent monotonous and 
includes “women’s” work.
Chhrem, the manager of an international NGO, helps his wife by giving her a 
lift between home and work, and looking after their growing children after hours. 
Chhrem’s wife works in an NGO. Her office schedule, particularly the time for 
leaving the office, is not fixed. She needs to spend longer hours at the office during 
some events. Chhrem gives her a lift every day though her schedule is not fixed. He 
understands the situation.
Transport by their husbands to and from the office is crucial for these wives 
as there is no public transport in Phnom Penh. The only available public transport is 
motodup and tuk-tuk, but these means of transport are unsafe.
The second group: investors
The men of this group are Han, Prom and Saroeun. The wives of this group of 
men mainly run self-managed businesses. The men of this group invest either capital 
or labour in their wife's business.
Han, a motodup in Phnom Penh gives lifts to his wife every night to and from
home and the markets with a load of vegetables. His wife, who runs a retail vegetable
grocery in a residential suburb, needs to buy vegetables from the wholesale market
located in the downtown area late at night. Instead of hiring another motodup or tuk-
tuk, Han helps his wife to transport the vegetables from the wholesale market to her
retail shop. He provides this transport to his wife before he resumes his own work. By
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giving a lift to his wife, he helps to save money that she would otherwise spend on 
transportation of the vegetables. On the other hand, by running the business, his wife 
also contributes to the family’s economy. Han’s support maximises the profit of her 
retail business.
Prom, a manager of an IT company gives his salary to his wife for her 
business which is importing ready-made clothes from Hong Kong to sell to retailers in 
Phnom Penh. The more clothes she can import, the more profit she can make. Prom 
invests his salary in his wife's business with the view that it eventually increases her 
income and her economic contribution to the family. But she does not own the profit 
alone, as Prom owns a share on the profit, though this is not formally recorded.
Saroeun, a small-scale construction entrepreneur in Phnom Penh, helps his 
wife in running her mobile food stall. His wife sells homemade traditional food 
(noodles and pies) in a mobile stall to factory workers in the neighbourhood. His wife 
gets up at late night to prepare food so that she can bring it to the clients before they 
begin their work. Saroeun gets up with his wife and helps her in preparing food. After 
his wife prepares the food, Saroeun starts his own work. Saroeun constructs low-cost 
residential houses for the middle-class urban families. He learned the skills of house 
construction during his service in the engineering corps of the PRK army. His 
construction enterprise is mainly manual and uses conventional skills and techniques. 
In the early years he received plenty of work. Nowadays, he has more free time as the 
work has been reduced over time.
Apart from helping his wife in running her business, Saroeun also shares in 
household chores. He cooks food for the family, especially when his wife is busy 
selling food.
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The third group: exclusive breadwinners
Men of this group include Bunthi, Sophea, Liang, Syheap and Thim. Unlike 
the men of the other two groups, men of this group do not support their wives having 
paid work. Instead, they withdraw their wives from outside paid work and self- 
managed businesses.
Bunthi, a business entrepreneur, has been maintaining his family with 
breadwinner/housewife model since 2009. His family was managed with the joint- 
breadwinner model until 2009. His wife contributed to the family’s economy with her 
income from a stationery shop. Bunthi opened an export-oriented business in 
partnership in 2009. At the same time he has been working as paid staff in a foreign- 
owned company. With his two jobs. Bunthi earns good money, particularly from his 
export business. He withdrew his wife from her business in 2009 and she now works 
full-time in the household sphere.
Sophea, an entrepreneur of a real-estate company maintained his wife in the 
joint-breadwinner model until 2007. His wife, who worked as an IT specialist in an 
NGO provided a share in the family’s budget. He began his business in 2003/4 
informally and formalised it in 2007 in financial partnership with Japanese and 
Korean investors. The property market in Cambodia boomed until 2009 and he made 
a fortune. He bought a house, an expensive car (for the family) and other fixed assets 
from the money he earned from the property market. At this time, he also withdrew 
his wife from her specialist work. She is now a full-time mother and housewife. She 
did not leave her employment voluntarily, but followed her husband's decision.
Liang, a regional manager of a transnational financial corporation, has never 
allowed his wife to take on outside paid work. He has always worked in the corporate
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and competitive work environment. He is most successful in terms of his professional 
career among the local Cambodians of his generation. His current position is both 
prestigious and highly salaried and he has always been focused on making ever more 
progress in his career. He does not mind with the breadwinner/housewife family 
model. Instead, he feels ‘good' with this arrangement as he can ‘spend longer hours at 
work.’
Syheap, a farmer, has remodelled his family from joint-breadwinner into 
breadwinner/housewife. This is unusual as almost all peasants maintain their families 
using the joint-breadwinner model. He is also exceptional among his group of farmers 
because he has a high-school education and maintains social networking with his 
peers who work in business sectors in the cities.
His wife ran a grocery shop and also helped him in doing farm activities. But 
over the time, the gender division of labour in his family has been reversed. She does 
not run the grocery any more. Nor does she share in farm activities as she did in the 
past. She is now a full-time housewife who gives ‘good' care to her children. The 
withdrawal of Syheap's wife from running her business coincides with his 
multiplication of income. Over the time, he has diversified his occupations. He 
currently runs an automobile workshop along with his regular farming activities. He 
has made the time to run his workshop by mechanising his agricultural practices.
Thim, a former perpetrator of domestic violence was abstained from the role 
of providing for his family during the period of his violence. His wife provided for the 
family with her wages as an agricultural labourer. She served both as a provider and 
home-maker for the family. The gender role in the family has now been reversed in 
Thim's post-transformation period. Thim is now the sole breadwinner for the family.
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Although he owns a few pieces of land, he does not know how to farm. He engages 
himself in trade and brokerage. He buys and sells commodities such as land, cattle 
and jewelleries in the local market. Sometimes he also works as a commodity broker 
who executes orders to buy or sell commodities such as land and cattle on behalf of 
clients and charges them a commission. He earns a good deal of money as a trader and 
broker nowadays. He has withdrawn his wife from waged labour as he says,
In the past, my wife worked as a waged labourer. But I don't allow her to 
work outside the home for the last three years. I let her stay at home and 
only take care of the home and children.
10.5 Men’s reasoning about specific patterns of response to their wife’s outside 
paid work
The patterns of support by the first group of men enable their wives to work in 
paid work outside the home. This support, particularly provided by Sopheak and 
Chhrem, reduces the burden of productive roles of women and challenges the cultural 
notion of reproductive work being appropriate for females.
The support of this group of men who mainly come from the public sector 
(except Chhrem) for their wife's paid work is influenced by their self-awareness of 
gender equality raised from the gender regimes of their work places -a  phenomenon 
of men's support to their wives’ paid work is also suggested in the studies of Nkwake 
(2009) and Slegh et al. (2013) discussed in the literature review chapter -  and 
economic needs for the family. As part of the Royal Government of Cambodia's 
(RGC) policy for gender mainstreaming in different sectors, all the managers of this 
study work under gender equality policy. All of their line departments are actively 
involved to address and promote gender equality in their line departments. Because
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they work in gender-responsive institutions, they are exposed to gender equality 
issues through work and work-related forums. Some of them, Phyrum and Mony for 
example, are directly involved in promoting gender equality in their line departments. 
All of them have participated in gender training and forums both within and outside 
Cambodia. They have become more aware of gender equality situations and practices 
through participating in gender training and forums in the international community. 
This can impact on their knowledge and practice of gender practice, both at work and 
in their families.
The economic needs for the families also underpin the support provided by the 
public sector managers to their wives. The managers" salaries are not adequate to 
support their families well in social class competition. Hundreds of public sector 
personnel in Cambodia, especially those who have specialist skills but hold non- 
managerial positions, work in the emerging sectors (such as UN agencies, NGOs, 
private companies, banks, etc.) to earn extra income, as well as in their government 
jobs. As they hold senior positions with important portfolios, the public sector 
managers in this study, (with the exception of Sopheak) cannot take another job 
outside their government workplace. They prefer their wives to take on outside work 
instead. They provide as much support as possible to their wives in this regard. The 
economic reason for letting their wives do outside work is echoed in Sok's account. 
Sok’s wife does two jobs. He says, ‘Oh, you know, it is difficult to support the family 
with my salary. That’s why my wife needs to do two jobs. I also think about her 
responsibilities for family and work. She tries hard to do her work every day. 
Sometimes, she is very tired.’ He is sympathetic to his wife.
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As he possesses specialist skills (being a medical doctor), and holds a junior 
but still managerial position, Sopheak has an advantage in finding a job with good pay 
in private sector. In fact, he has been working in the private sector since 2008. He 
earns a good salary (compared to his salary in the public sector). Why does he support 
his wife doing outside paid work? What is his motivation? Sopheak's reason for 
supporting his wife's employment is also economic but the reason for his needing 
more income is different.
Sopheak's economic need is based on his social class. Although he was 
brought up in extreme poverty, he feels the need to have a contemporary villa house 
in order to fit in with the class of his wife’s ruling-class family. He needed money to 
upgrade his impoverished wooden house to a modern villa-house. This is his core 
motivation. Because of this he left the public sector job to take up a position in the 
NGO sector to earn a higher income. He supports his wife by sharing in household 
chores so that she can continue her outside paid job smoothly.
Chhrem's motivation to support his wife is not economic. His motivation is 
rooted from his awareness of gender equality which he obtained through his first job 
where he worked for more than three years in a gender-specialised organisation with 
men and boys, to support women’s empowerment and gender equality. His 
involvement in this gender project was deep and authentic. Gender equality is also a 
crosscutting theme in his current work place.
The patterns of support by the second group of men to their wives’ businesses 
are need-based and relate to their personal capabilities in relation to the changing 
labour market. The reasons for their support are not embedded in their self-awareness 
of gender equality or women's empowerment.
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Han’s occupation (motodup) is a gendered enterprise. Though there is no 
formal gender rule in this informal urban sector, motodup drivers are invariably men -  
mostly working class men. The motodups need to show toughness and energy to work 
in this sector. On the other hand, the income that he earns from motodup is irregular. 
On some days he cannot earn income to feed his family. He does not possess 
marketable skills that would allow him to engage in other occupations from which he 
might earn a higher income. The only alternative for him is to let his wife run her 
business. He helps her to increase her profit by providing transport for her vegetables, 
saving money that she would otherwise need to spend to move her stocks of 
vegetables to market.
Like other technologies, IT is also gender blind. As usual, Prom’s workplace 
does not have any gender policy and he is not familiar with gender concerns. Why 
does he support his wife’s business? His reasoning for supporting his wife's business 
is explicitly related to his personal capabilities in the changing labour market in the IT 
sector. Here is his story.
Prom is an IT technician through experience. He has no formal degree in IT 
and began his career in this sector as an office assistant. Over the period, he 
accumulated expertise in IT by working in the field. He attended some IT related 
trainings and entered this sector in the post-war period when the country lacked 
skilled human resources. Over the time, the situation changed. In contemporary 
Cambodia, there are surplus numbers of IT graduates and the labour market in this 
sector is competitive. In his current work, Prom failed to negotiate with his employer 
to increase his salary. In the changing labour market, his skill is average, not specialist 
and he is facing challenges to remain in IT. On the other hand he needs to earn more
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and more to meet the increasing cost of living and ensure financial security for his 
children. He cannot achieve this with his skill which is in less demand in the new 
labour market. But the economic liberalisation of the country has been a blessing for 
his wife’s business. He invests his salary in his wife’s business in an economic 
partnership to overcome the economic need that he cannot address with the earnings 
from his own job. He says,
I think about the future, because 1 have two children. If I work alone, I can 
support day-to-day living for the family. But we cannot accumulate 
anything (valuable properties like houses, savings, etc.) for children. We 
need to make a plan for our children. That's why my wife also runs her 
business. I give my salary to her to help her to build her business. She is 
successful in her business.
Saroeun’s support to his wife's food business is similar to Han’s and Prom's 
in nature. In the changing economy of the country, the local construction enterprises, 
that use conventional skills and manual labour, are being replaced by large-scale 
construction companies that use improved technologies and equipment. Sarouen is 
also a victim of the modernisation of construction work and enterprises. He does not 
get many work orders nowadays. His income is irregular and shrinking. Therefore, he 
pays more attention to his wife's business. He does not hesitate to replace his wife in 
doing household chores like cooking food when his wife is busy vending food.
The supports of Han, Prom and Sarouen for their wives' businesses are 
attempts to maximise the family income, and are also responsive to the changing 
labour market. As they find their personal capabilities less competent to address their 
families’ economic needs, they discover the advantage in giving support to their
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wives in running their businesses more profitably. While they find their income from 
their own jobs is demeaning, they overcome this by making partnerships with their 
wives, either investing their salary or their labour in their wives' businesses.
The men of the third group who have withdrawn their wives from outside paid 
work, or do not allow them to enter into paid work, come mainly from the business 
sector. Syheap and Thim are the exceptions as they come from the rural setting 
although their occupations are pro-business.
The business sector is totally gender blind. They work in an environment 
where they have to spend an enormous amount of time on their businesses. Bunthi’s 
business involves many trips to the country. He stays away most days of the week. 
Sophea's business requires his undivided attention. He does observe a work-schedule. 
As his business is client-based on individuals, his schedule includes every day of the 
week.
Liang who works in a transnational corporate world, works in a competitive 
environment. He needs to devote himself fully to his work. He does not want to be an 
average manager. He has been spending enormous time and effort on his career from 
the very beginning. His workplace also functions with a gendered division of labour 
where men hold the managerial and CEO positions, while women hold a good 
proportion of customer service related positions and work in the front desk. A good 
proportion of women are put at the front desk ,with the gendered notion that women 
are better than men in customer relations. Syheap and Thim also spend an enormous 
amount of time on their businesses and again their schedule of work is not fixed.
As the men of this group need to spend an enormous amount of time for their 
occupations, they intentionally withdraw their wives from outside paid work. This
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withdrawal is made to ensure that they do their domestic jobs smoothly. The men of 
this group withdraw their wives from outside paid work as they believe that their own 
income is adequate to run the family well. All the men of this group have enhanced 
their income by engaging in multiple occupations and improving professional skill. 
Bunthi runs his export-oriented business along with a paid job in a foreign company 
and works long-hours every day. Syheap runs an automobile workshop but keeps up 
his farming activities. He also worked recently with a local agriculture-specialised 
NGO. He left the job as he cannot manage time to work in three occupations. Thim is 
currently engaged in trading and brokerage to increase his income. Unlike other men 
of this group, Liang earns a high salary from his single job. He has put tireless efforts 
into his education, training and work in the past, to make himself competent in his 
current position.
Unlike others, the men of this group reconstruct patriarchy in the family, not 
necessarily maximising profit, but maximising their power and authority in the 
family. They reinforce power and authority over the family at the cost of their hard 
work.
10.6 Conclusion
The men of groups one and two respond to their wives’ outside paid work to 
ensure that the family is being managed well -a  phenomenon which gives social 
credit to the men as they are perceived to lead their families. The notion o f ‘managing 
families well' is comparable to the notion o f ‘providing a higher standard of living for 
the families’ -  an economic motive for labor force participation of married women 
from better-off families argued in the study of Eggbeen and Hawkins (1990). The 
economic needs for labor force participation of these two groups of men, particularly
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the managers are not basic or survival of their families. Rather, the needs are for 
keeping their families in upper class in the competitive and ever-progressive 
Cambodian society. The case of Sopheak is the classic example of how the economic 
motive for the wives’ labor force participation of these two groups of men is affected 
by social-class factor, and why men render their supports to let their wives maintain 
their paid work.
Though they think that they are responsible for providing the main income to 
the family, the men of these two groups allow their wives to engage in outside work. 
When needed, they support the outside work of their wives to ensure an adequate flow 
of income to the family. At this point, men's notions of providing the main income to 
the family assimilates with the notion of managing the family well. But the ways men 
of these two groups support their wives are different: men of the first group extend 
their support to their wives in a more gender-responsive manner, while men of the 
second group extend their support in a self-interested partnership.
There are, however, some men, such as those in the third group, who withdraw 
their wives from outside paid work or do not allow their wives to enter outside paid 
work. The men of this group follow this pattern of response when they think their 
single income is adequate to run the family well. They reconstruct patriarchy in the 
family, not maximising profit, but maximising their power and authority over the 
family. This reconstructed patriarchy takes a heavy toll in terms of long, hard working 
hours and occupational stress.
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CHAPTER 11
MEN’S RELATIONSHIPS IN THE FAMILY, AND 
RECONFIGURATION OF MASCULINITIES
11.1 Introduction
Men's relationships in the family are diverse and dynamic. The life histories 
of the men interviewed in this study show that their position in intra-family gender 
relations is subject to change, and this change is driven by a wide range of factors. 
The change can weaken or reinforce their status. Within this change of status and 
power, men always reconfigure their masculinities.
In this chapter, men's relationships in the family are analysed with two foci: 
power relationships between spouses vis-à-vis reconfiguration of masculinities, and 
men’s fathering role.
11.2 Power relations between spouses
The general consensus in Cambodia is that spousal relations should be 
patriarchal which means that a husband dominates his wife within the family. 
Although this pattern of spousal power relationship is most common, the extent of 
power a spouse exerts either as a husband or a wife is not static. The power held by a 
spouse can be contested and recontested from time to time.
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Spousal power relations have social, economic and political dimensions. The 
degree of power a spouse holds in a particular period of conjugal life is determined by 
(i) cultural interpretation of spousal entitlements in the family, (ii) gender division of 
labour (i.e., who does productive work and who does other work?), (iii) resources, 
including the personal capabilities of a spouse, and how best these resources or 
capabilities are being used in the labour market, and (iv) the gender regime in the 
workplace and awareness of gender equality.
A spouse's power in the family is usually translated in the form of decision­
making in family affairs. Therefore, spousal power relations in this section are 
weighed in terms of a husband or wife's status in the family’s decision-making 
process.
The life histories in Chapters 6-9 show that the men began their family lives as 
head of the family. This means they began family life with a higher degree of power 
and authority over the family than their wives. Over the course of their conjugal lives, 
they have experienced ups and downs in their status within the family.
The men of the first and second groups in Chapter 10 are complicit to their 
wives in power relationships in contemporary life. They involve their wives in major 
family decisions, are supportive of their wives' outside paid work, share in household 
chores, at least casually, and are flexible to their wives wishes in overall issues. Men 
of these two groups, except Chhrem, are in between the first group and the third group 
of men of Bolake’s (1997) study in terms of sharing household chores and ceding 
power to their spouses. Chhrem's gender practice, which is more egalitarian, is 
comparable to Bolake’s third group of men. The involvement of the men of these two 
groups in the emancipation of their wives does not go all the way. The current practice
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noted above comes in the course of conjugal life. Their willingness to emancipate their 
wives is influenced by a wide range of factors, as shown in the following section.
Sopheak ruled his family and controlled his wife with the notion of Chhbap 
Srey in the early years of their conjugal life (Chhbap Srey is a traditional code of 
conduct for women in Cambodia by which a woman must serve meals to her husband 
punctually, listen to and respect her husband, and should not argue or fight with him). 
He made every effort, including violence, to ensure that his wife complied with 
Chhbap Srey.
Sopheak’s early masculinity was organised around his ‘strong personality' 
having ‘grown up on his own' and his experience of collective social violence, family 
hardship and the school system. He endured a tough life with his mother in the post­
war era that was brought about by his father’s abandonment of the family. He 
assisted his mother in Phnom Penh by doing all sorts of work (including vending 
food, catching fish and collecting scrap materials to sell) in order to survive in the 
aftermath of war. He also went to school where his performance was excellent. He 
was chosen as a student leader at secondary school and this student leadership was 
endorsed by the post-KR state's socialist political orthodoxy, to create a pool of future 
socialist comrades. He was taught to be rigid and tough by the school and visited a 
number of socialist countries as a student leader in his teens. Toughness and 
roughness, the key characteristics of socialist comrades, were deeply embedded in his 
construction of masculinity. In his adult life post-education, Sopheak maintained his 
personality of toughness and roughness and claimed that he had 'never been 
influenced by others.’
Now, however, we see a paradigm shift in the way Sopheak relates to his wife.
He has moved far away from the notion of Chhbap Srey and is flexible in relation to
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his wife. He supports his wife sometimes by doing household chores that he 
previously thought of as exclusively female work. His wife’s opinions are also taken 
into account in family decision-making processes. About the changing situation he
says,
I help her (wife) a lot in cleaning, cooking and then... I also encourage her 
to make decisions. I give her lots of opportunities.
He has been considerably influenced by his wife over time. He has given up 
the old view of masculine personality and made concessions to the changing situation. 
For example, his switch to the NGO sector was influenced by his wife, with the 
motivation to earn the higher income needed to upgrade his impoverished wooden 
house into a modern villa. Even the idea of building a modern villa comes from his 
wife. Formerly he lived in a flat he owned. He sold the flat and bought the piece of 
land where he currently lives. He bought it in order to build a villa, as his wife prefers 
a villa to a flat. He has not built it yet because of lack of money. He and his wife are 
working together to earn money to build the villa.
Sopheak’s complicity to his wife and the reconstruction of masculinities are in 
response to his wife’s contribution to the family economy from her outside paid work, 
the inappropriateness of his earlier version of ‘strong' personhood in the changing 
social context, and his exposure to and participation in training and work which aim to 
promote gender equality and end VAW.
Neither Mony nor Phyrum nor Sok constructed early masculinities in the way
Sopheak did. But the notion of men as the head of the family was basic in their
construction of masculinities too. They began their family lives within this notion.
They still hold the same notion even if their wives contribute significant income to the
family’s economy. They do not maintain complicity to their wives in the ways
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Sopheak does. Phyrum does not share in household chores. Instead, he lets his wife 
makes more family decisions than he does. Both spouses do paid work on the 
weekend. But the purpose of doing this work is gendered. Phyrum works at the 
weekend to complete extra assignments to please his boss and the senior management 
of the ministry in the hope of future promotion. But his wife works to earn extra 
income. His wife is overburdened with household work and the week-long domestic 
role. But she is privileged by exercising more decision-making power in the family. 
This situation is mutually respected by both spouses.
Extra paid work gives Sok’s wife more power in the intra-family bargain. 
Sok's account in relation to decision making in the family reveals his complicit 
relationship to his wife. When asked how he addresses the situation when any 
disagreement in relation to family affairs arises with his wife, he says, ‘When any 
disagreement arises, I don't respond immediately. I take time, and weigh whether I am 
in a position to bargain. When she becomes angry with me, I keep silent and do not 
talk much. Sometimes I leave the scene. I have to think who is wrong.' He was 
uncompromising with his wife during the early years of their conjugal life and used to 
have conflicts and argue with his wife. He has learnt his new skill over time and his 
attitude of compromise and allowing his wife more decision-making is surely the 
result of his wife’s economic contribution to the family, as well as his awareness of 
gender equality through his work.
Mony's pattern of relations with his wife falls between those of Sok and 
Phyrum. He does not give up his power significantly like Sok and Phyrum. He 
compensates for his wife's contribution to the family budget by doing some family 
tasks such as dropping children at school, and sometimes taking care of the young 
children.
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Chhrem’s relationship with his wife is rather egalitarian and this results to 
some extent from his gender awareness. Both spouses have an equal stake in decisions 
relating to the family. When asked to give a typical example of how they cooperate on 
family decisions decision, Chhrem gave an example on expenditure -  often the main 
issue on which spouses disagree. He said that when there is any occasion such as 
Khmer New Year, they would give same amount of money to both sets of parents.
The relationships with their wives exercised by Han, Prom and Saroeun are 
blunt and explicit. The patterns of spousal relationships they maintain is some extent 
similar to the ‘mutual-respect' model relationship men of Pineda's (2000) study 
maintain with their wives. However, unlike men of Pineda's study, neither Han nor 
Prom nor Saroeun employs them as the full-time worker in their wives' business. All 
of them have their own job. As their wives' businesses are more prospective, they 
invest some time and capital to them. They accept higher authority of their wives in 
family relationship. It seems that the higher contribution of their wives to family 
finances is precarious for them in intra-family gender relations.
The wives’ businesses, which usually run seven days a week from morning to 
evening, requires these men to do more (compared to their wives) in household chores. 
Their wives also draw more power in the family’s decision-making process.
When asked how he spends his time. Prom replies the following:
Actually, right now, I take my sons to school (public school) in early 
morning. After dropping them at school, I come back home to take my 
wife to market (business place). And after that I go to my office. At 12 
noon, I come home to have lunch (bought from outside). In the evening, I 
take my sons to the English learning school. On Saturday, they do not have 
school. So I work only half day. In the evening of Saturday, I sit with them
267
to play games or watch a movie. On Sunday, I bring them to places like 
the market, travel or swimming pool, wherever they want to go. 
Nowadays, my wife is not free most of the time. She is very busy with her 
business. Only I give children care.
Taking care of the young children is the bulk of Prom’s household chores. He 
performs that task alone, as well as his paid work. His engagement in the upbringing 
of children and performance of household chores is simply because there is ‘no other 
choice' as a result of his wife's increased economic role for the family. He did not 
give an exact account regarding his wife's role in decision-making. But given the 
nature of Prom's position in the family's gender division of labour, it is highly likely 
that his wife plays a major role in the family’s decision-making.
Saroeun does not have young children who need care. But he invests a lot of 
his labour in his wife's business. Apart from assisting his wife in running the business, 
he also shares in household chores like cooking food. He has to do household chores 
as his wife is away from home for long hours attending to her business. Though he 
claims to be the head of the family, his wife is the de facto head of the family. The 
following account by Saroeun gives the sense that his wife is privileged with power in 
the family relationships.
We get angry sometimes. But I try to control my feeling because we all are 
tired. My wife works harder than me.
His wife draws power and authority over the family through her income which 
is regular and higher than Saroeun’s income.
Among the peasants, we see a shifting pattern of gender relations between the
spouses in the life history of Vuthy (Case 4). In current practice, he maintains
complicity to his wife, who now provides the main income to the family earned from
268
paid work in an agro-processing factory. In the past, Vuthy had more influence in the 
family through feeding them throughout the year with the rice harvest from the family 
farm. But the changing climatic condition made rice farming a more precarious 
occupation. On the other hand, his wife’s new job has become a blessing for the 
family as she compensates for the family’s economic need. But her job in the non- 
traditional sector brings tensions to Vuthy’s notion about femininities. He finds his 
wife has a different attitude when she blames him for substandard household 
arrangement. He suffers emotionally when he thinks about his wife's outside work 
with her male colleagues. Vuthy does not have any other choice but to adapt to the 
changing situation as he lacks the skills to replace his wife.
He negotiates the situation by taking care of household chores and considering 
himself responsible for the situation. He does not confront his wife when she 
expresses her discomfort with poor household amenities and family meals during her 
visits home. He normalises the odd and awkward situation by humorously reminding 
her about their poor living standards in the past.
Vuthy’s power position in the spousal relationship is not representative of 
other peasants. The roles and relations of spouses among peasants are usually 
reciprocal. Wives of all peasants, except Syheap (Case 5) who constructs a quasi­
business masculinity have a substantial stake in the family’s decision-making 
processes which they draw from owning the family’s farm land, and their labour 
participation in farming. A peasant can obtain a patriarchal dividend in family 
relationships only in exchange for providing for his family in a sufficient and timely 
manner.
The men in the third group in Chapter 10 maintain patriarchy in spousal
relationships by changing the family model for the wife from joint-breadwinner to
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breadwinner/housewife. They have all withdrawn their wives from outside paid work 
and business as discussed in Chapter 10. They reinforce their power in contemporary 
family relationships by reconstructing a patriarchy that maximises their power and 
authority. In this model of the family, their wives have little power.
In contemporary life, Syheap, for example, regulates the mobility of his wife 
and her labour force participation. Liang's wife has never been in the paid labour 
force. He feels happy with this arrangement as he does not need to involve himself in 
family matters. The domestic labour carried out by his wife enables him to pursue his 
professional work smoothly. He exerts his power in the family without being 
questioned by his wife as a huge intellectual gap exists between him and his wife. He 
is considered an altruistic man by the family members.
Bunthi enjoys sexual privileges (having extra-marital relationships) since he 
has entered the business sector. He reconstructs his masculinity around sexual 
privilege and this brings his wife into a confrontational situation. His current practice 
of marital infidelity is unacceptable to his wife but she is in a weak position in this 
confrontation as she is fully dependent on him. This is a typical example 
demonstrating how patriarchal power of the men of the third group has been 
maximised.
Unlike Bunthi, Sophea does not construct masculinity around extra-marital 
relationships. Rather he organised his masculinity around having his own house, 
owning a car, running a business, and having a family with children. His power 
relationship in the family is very patriarchal and hierarchal. When asked who makes 
decision in the family he says the following:
Me. It is my family. So, I make decisions. When I am at home everybody 
must respect me. I never had any problem or conflict. This is because
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when I am at home, family members are scared of me. Yeah. Even when I 
watch TV, they do not join me. Because we have to show them (children) 
what is good and what is bad.
Thim also reconstructs patriarchy in his family in the post-transformation 
period. He maintains power over his family by terror during long violent periods. His 
wife provides the main income for the family. In the post-transformation time, he no 
longer maintains power by terror, as this is not tolerated any more in his commune. 
Rather he maintains power by reversing his role of not providing for the family. He 
has withdrawn from this over the period of his transformation and has diversified his 
income from multiple occupations. By providing enough support for the family, he 
reinforces his patriarchy in the family.
No other former perpetrators of violence withdrew their wives from outside 
paid work (farm work) like Thim. But Thim’s pattern of restoration of patriarchy in 
the family by maximisation of his income is similar to that of some of the former 
perpetrators such as Pisit, Khieng and Som. Their power over the family is enjoyed in 
the form of respect, honour and services provided by the family members, particularly 
the wives. Their enhanced economic role for the family in the post-transformation 
period is the key to gaining increased power over the family 
11.3 Men as fathers: altruism, contradiction and virtual paternal care
Fatherhood is an important site of making and remaking masculinities. How 
do Cambodian men perform as fathers? There was an attempt in the interviews to 
understand their current practices in relation to their children.
All men interviewed in this study, except Sokheng and Ishara, two urban
workers, have at least one child. Some men of older age groups have grandchildren.
All men of the old-age groups and some men of the younger age groups went through
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social violence during the Khmer Rouge. They served as forced labour during the 
regime and were separated from their parents. Many of them lost their parents during 
the regime. Many of them spent a significant period of their life without parental care. 
Apart from social violence, many of the men also experienced family violence in 
childhood.
The life histories of men from different occupations also reveal that many of 
them played a fathering role long before they made their own families. They took up 
the responsibility to provide for their families (younger siblings and mothers) by 
doing various waged and subsistence jobs. Their early construction of masculinities 
was organised around ‘proxy fathering.’ Their construction of proxy fathering reflects 
the classical gender role expectation in Cambodian society where the eldest son/s 
should provide support to younger siblings and elderly parents even in their teens.
11.3.1 Men’s emotional attaehment to their children
The life histories of men interviewed in this study suggest a generational 
difference in terms of their emotional attachment to their children. The men of 
younger age groups, particularly those who live in urban locations (managers and 
urban workers), are more interactive to their young children. More specifically, men 
of this group are more emotionally attached to their children. Conversely, men of the 
older generational groups are less interactive with their children. Children of men of 
this group maintain a distant relationship with their fathers.
Bunthi, the business entrepreneur finds his family as a site of ‘entertainment' 
because of his children. Despite his hectic day with double jobs, Bunthi manages time 
over the weekend to take his children to libraries. He also takes his children to the 
provinces during his field trips. He preserves records of major activities of his
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children, such as drawing, etc., to let them know something of their childhood when 
they reach adulthood.
Within his tight and scheduled time for his family, Liang lies down in the bed 
of his daughter for ‘twenty minutes’ every morning to wake her up, and catches up 
with his children and their peers on different occasions in attempts to build up 
rapports with them. He brings his son along with him to play soccer on the weekend. 
He has a plan to enrol his son with a qualified soccer coach. Liang's fathering is 
exactly what Wall and Marinho (2007) categorise as ‘time-condensed fatherhood' 
who limits his fathering role only to quality time with children. The managers in the 
group tend to give more attention to their children's school performance and home 
work. They rarely engage with their children through giving them routine care.
Prom cuts his office hours on Saturday to spend time with children. He works 
a half-day on Saturday and then spends the rest of the day with his sons, playing 
computer games and watching movies. On Sunday, he takes them to swimming pools 
and other popular entertainment sites in the city.
The ways men build emotional attachment with their children have some 
gendered dimensions. They feel it easier to interact with children who are already past 
early childhood. Similarly, they generally engage with their children through outdoor 
and leisure activities. But the way Liang interacts with his daughter (e.g., lying down 
on the bed to wake her up) is domestic and feminine in nature.
These fathers have developed emotional attachments to their children in
reaction to their own life experience as children. They do not want their children to go
through the hard and tough life they endured in their childhood. Men’s emotional
attachment with children also expresses the dynamic of construction of masculinities
in relation to violence. Though they encountered violence from their parents, they
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have constructed a fatherhood focussed on their children’s wellbeing. They have 
never beaten their children. Bunthi who had a violent and scary childhood is very 
much emotionally attached to his children. He cried when he was talking about his 
fathering role during the interview. As a typical example of his concern for children 
he said that he was very worried for his second child when he left him alone in school 
for the first time.
11.3.2 Men’s striving for a better and secure future for their children
Ensuring a better and secure future for children is considered a major aspect of 
fathering by the men of this study. They have chosen education as the best area of 
investment for a better future for their children. By education, the men mean an 
education with proficiency in the English language through which their children can 
obtain salaried jobs in the future.
Two reasons shape these men's views of education, particularly education in 
English to give their children a better future. The first reason is based on the 
contemporary labour market in Cambodia. University graduates with proficiency in 
English are the most privileged in the current job market, particularly in business and 
non-governmental organisation (NGO) sectors. Cambodians who have a university 
degree and proficiency in English can find a job in the private sector which provides 
salaries much higher than in the government sector.
The second reason is their realisation of the importance and enduring value of
education during their life course in war and the post-war era. Wealth had no value
during the war and the post-war period. During the war. people ran away from their
homes leaving all their valuables in order to survive. In post-war times, valuables had
little worth as there was no market for them. Many Cambodians still feel the effects of
the war and do not want to invest their money in physical properties. However,
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education was important and useful in the post-war era. Educated people who 
survived the war were offered important positions in government and non-government 
services in the post-war era. Even now, educated people have better chances to 
exploit opportunities.
As education, particularly education that provides proficiency in English, is 
chosen as the best way of investing in children’s future, men's income level certainly 
determines what kind of education they can provide to their children's education. Men 
in this study who come from different occupations with varying incomes are sending 
their children to the most-expensive English medium schools that follow British 
curriculum system and also to cheap English language learning schools that are 
mushrooming in the cities. For example, Liang, who earns a huge salary from his 
managerial job in the transnational financial corporation, sends his daughter to a 
British Standard English medium school and two sons to an American Standard 
English medium school in Phnom Penh. Yin, a 30-year old semi skilled worker in a 
construction company earns around 100 AUD per month from his work. His wife also 
works in the same company and earns 65 AUD per month. Yin has two sons of school 
age. With his family, he cannot send his sons to the school of Liang’s children. With 
his limited income, Yin sends them to a cheap English learning school where local 
Cambodians teach in the class. He is happy with this arrangement as he thinks that his 
sons are getting a good foundation in English. Though he comes from a rural setting 
and is a manual worker, Yin is determined to give his children a higher education so 
that they can be established in society. He works long hours (twelve hours on average 
per day) to ensure the education of his children.
Not all men are in the same situation to realise the future of their children.
Some men, who lack marketable skills, and/or have lost income in the changing
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socio-political context, encounter uncertainties in realising the future of their children. 
Chantu, a 27-year old marginal peasant, is the father of two daughters. He wants to 
give them at least high school education so that they can find salaried jobs when they 
leave school. He owns one hectare of land which he was given by his parents and 
parents-in-law. His parents and in-laws began using the land after the fall of Khmer 
Rouge. As is common, they do not have a certificate of ownership. Under the 
government's industrialisation policy and plan, one transnational agro-based industry 
is acquiring farming land (the government thinks the land belongs to government as 
the farmers do not hold land title) without compensation. One half hectare of Chantu’s 
land is being taken. In this situation he is uncertain how to provide high school 
education for his children as the loss of arable land has reduced his income. On the 
other hand, he does not have any skill, except farming and labouring to earn an 
income that he can spend on his children.
In addition to education, the peasants also strive to leave pieces of land, 
improved houses, and cattle for a better future for their children. The pattern of 
organising family inheritance around properties for children by peasants is realistic in 
terms of the limited chance of education available to the children. Schools, 
particularly the high schools in rural Cambodia, are sparsely located. The nearest high 
school for many communes is at least ten km away. Children in rural areas need to 
travel long distances for schooling. On the other hand, universities are primarily 
located in Phnom Penh. With their subsistence income, the peasant families can 
hardly afford university education for their children in the cities.
Pou is a 30-year old farmer. He had left school before he completed his Year-2
to support his family by working on the family farm. He is the father of two children.
He owns one hectare of land. Apart from farming, he also works in other non-rice
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farm activities during off-rice reason to add extra income to the family’s economy. 
When asked about how he organises himself as a father he says,
I wish to earn much money to buy some assets, which I can pass on to my 
sons so that they can establish their own family easier. I have been trying 
hard to earn money just for that purpose. I want my children to obtain 
higher education as other boys in the village. I don't want them to be 
illiterate like me.
Their construction of masculinities in relation to their children's future takes 
place within the peasant economy. In a peasant economy, particularly in a subsistence 
one, land and cattle are important for better living and better living for a farmer means 
enough harvest to feed the family throughout the year and a surplus paddy which they 
can sell to obtain other commodities for the family.
11.3.3 Paving children’s future in their own experience
The interviews with the men in this study also suggest that there is a tendency 
among them to plan the future of their children in light of their own life experiences. 
The futures of their children are being shaped by their fathers’ experiences of success 
and failure, and exposure to the wider culture and society. What could be the best path 
for a future career for their children is deeply embedded in their own life experiences.
This pattern of the father’s guidance or rule is rooted in their perception that 
they are altruistic fathers. The men generally think that they are doing the best for the 
future of their children by sacrificing their own pleasure, working harder and longer, 
and so on.
For example, Liang who has always worked in transnational and multi-lateral
organisations throughout his professional career, has studied in a top ranked
university in the world and has worked (though for a brief period) in an industrialised
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country, wants his children to be “globally competent' so that they can build their 
careers in the global job market. He sees the careers of his children as extending 
beyond the local market. Because of this he sends his children to an expensive 
English medium school. Having worked, lived and studied in a globalised world, he 
plans the life of his children to make them global citizens. Liang's patterns and 
ambitions are exceptional among the men of this study, but some others have moved 
in the same direction.
For instance, Barom who brings extensive work experience in the public 
sector extended his bureaucratic support to his children to enter the public sector. 
Three of his children work in the public sector and the eldest one already holds a 
managerial (junior level) position in a government department. He also managed 
scholarships for two of his children to pursue their post-graduate degrees in English 
speaking countries.
Prom, a manager in the IT sector provides laptop and internet facilities to his 
young children who can hardly make best use of the technologies. He is, however, 
making his children aware of technologies in their childhood, as he wants his children 
to become IT experts in the future. He says,
I am not worried about computer skills for my sons. They have already learnt 
browsing, typing and other things. They try to follow me. I have given them 
laptop and Internet connection at home.
Sok, the public sector manager, “builds dreams’ for his children in the light of
his own professional experience. He sends his children to English learning school
along with an elite government school. Having been educated overseas, he plans to
send his children to overseas universities for post-graduate study. He knows that an
overseas degree, particularly from universities of English speaking countries, can best
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place his children in the local job market. During the interview, he said he is 
“arranging things’ to realise his children’s dreams. He did not give further details 
about the arrangement. By “arranging things’, he probably meant managing 
scholarships (which are channelled through his department/ministry) for his children 
to undertake overseas study.
Thim, a former perpetrator of DV who currently runs trade and brokerage in 
the local area, wishes to teach trading skills to his sons. He wishes them to become 
merchants and traders in the future. He is accumulating capital and valuables (gold) 
for the future of his children. His sons currently work as labourers in Phnom Penh. 
11.3.4 Virtual fathering
Either though being overworked with their jobs/businesses or because of 
living far away from their families, some men in this study use mobile phone 
technology to stay in communication with their children. The new technology enables 
fathers to interact with their children when they cannot do so face-to-face. The life 
histories of men show that they use mobile phone to communicate on a range of 
matters with their children, which range from overseeing school performance and 
homework to personal and sometimes emotional conversation. The pattern of virtual 
fathering is mainly found among the managers and urban workers who leave their 
families in the rural provinces.
Sok's department runs multi-million dollar construction projects. He has to 
stay most nights of the week in the provinces to oversee the construction work. While 
he stays in the province he looks after the studies of his children over the phone. He 
says, “You know, I have no time. But I have to find something to do for my children. 
When 1 stay in the provinces, she (eldest daughter) keeps calling me and I also keep
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calling. I ask (during telephone conversation) whether her homework is finished or 
not and whether it is completed before she goes to school. I always check.'
11.4 Conclusion
Despite the consensus that the spousal relationships should be patriarchal, in 
reality, men maintain relationships with varying degree of power: some men increase 
their control in course of time and other men cede their control and authority over the 
family. Like women, men’s fail-back position in intra-family power relationship is 
subject to contest. Women’s agency, particularly their outside paid work, and men’s 
varying ability to provide for the family in the changing socio-economic context, in 
particular mediate the degree of power they hold in family relationships in a particular 
time. In addition, men's awareness of gender equality, which is mainly raised through 
the gender regime in the workplace, also affects whether they increase or cede power 
in family relationships.
The fathering skills of men. particularly of younger age groups -  characterised 
by emotional attachment to children and strive for a better and secure future for their 
children - are developed within their own life experiences of hard and tough life and 
enduring violence as a child. Though they strive best for a better life for their children, 
most of them are unaware about the significance of a non-violent family relationships, 
to children's overall development and wellbeing.
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CHAPTER 12
MEN, MILITARISATION AND CIVIL WAR: A PATTERN OF 
POST-CONFLICT TRANSITION IN MASCULINITY AMONG
CAMBODIAN MEN
12.1 Introduction
Cambodia experienced political conflict, increased militarisation and civil war 
during the regimes of Lon Nol. the DK and PRK, which lasted from the early 1970s to 
early 1990s. These violent events were gendered. Men mostly carried out the violence 
and men were overwhelmingly the victims of the violence. A total of fourteen men in 
this study were actively involved in the civil war and conflict in the country's recent 
history. Among them, Rathanak Kong, Chundureth Lam, Sophoan Chea and Chan Nu 
served in the DK’s militias. Sokha Yim, Samay Leng, Vuthy Tep, Saroeun Chea, 
Souen Kong, Souv Leng, Sytha Hem, Ra Ket, Thim Eng, and Som Nong served in the 
KPRAF, the paramilitary armed force of PRK regime.
As we saw in Chapter 3, the former militias and soldiers in other geo-political 
contexts (South Africa and Timor Leste) organised their masculinity around violence 
and conflict in their post-war period. Conflict and war left them without skills or 
education, which marginalised them in the new post-war socio-political order. They 
followed similar paths to those they had followed in war time, to survive in the new 
order.
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Cambodia’s experience of war and social disruption is extreme and daunting. 
The devastation and disruption of civil war that the Cambodian people have 
experienced is no less than any of the conflicts in Africa or Timor Leste. In 
Cambodia, too, the country gradually moved to peace and hopes of prosperity in the 
post-war period and this involved a new gender order. Life histories of the former KR 
militias and KPRAF’s armed men in this study show that they have mostly 
constructed peaceful and responsive masculinities in the post-war era.
12.2 Socio-political contexts of involvement of Cambodian men in conflict and 
civil war
The involvement of Cambodian men in conflict and civil war was originally 
affected by the politics of Cold War in the region, more specifically by the Second 
Indo-China War.
The political stability and social development in post-colonial Cambodia, led 
by Prince Norodom Sihanouk as the Prime Minister, came to an end in the late 1960s 
when the north-eastern provinces occasionally encountered US military incursions. 
The US carried out a military campaign to counter the north-Vietnamese communist 
groups who hid in the border provinces of Cambodia. At this time, the US military 
campaign disrupted normal life and created a significant death toll, mainly in the 
north-eastern provinces. But the military coup of General Lon Nol in March 1970, 
when he ousted Sihanouk, brought Cambodia into a large-scale military campaign of 
the USA. The USA expanded its military campaign all the way to Phnom Penh to 
eliminate the Vietnamese communist groups and their Cambodian fellows. In this 
effort, the USA dropped 539,000 tonnes of bombs on Cambodia between 1969 and 
1973 causing the death of 600,000 to 700,000 Cambodians. Many of the participants
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of this study who experienced this time, have described the difficulties they suffered 
from the Second Indo-China War.
A heavy death toll and social disruption caused by the US military campaign 
paved the way for the Khmer Rouge (KR). The socialist propaganda of the KR gained 
popularity among the peasants. Cambodia's casualties from the US military 
campaign, and the removal of Sihanouk as the head of state by Lon Nol, assisted the 
KR to recruit thousands of militia conscripts, mainly peasants, who overthrew Lon 
Nol's regime and formed Democratic Kampuchea (DK) in early 1975.
The DK regime attempted to transform Cambodia into a completely agrarian 
society. This attempt brought tremendous social upheaval. Cities and towns were 
evacuated and everyone was forced to participate in the agricultural labour force. The 
DK treated peasants as a progressive class and the urban population and professionals 
as class enemies. The peasants held command and power over feudal, professional 
and former civil servants in the implementation of the gigantic social experiment of 
transforming Cambodia into an agrarian society.
The peasants who became the militias of the KR took extreme measures, 
including killing, torture and forced labour, to transform the society to an agrarian 
one. At least 1.5 million Cambodians died during the DK regime. Most of the 
survivors of the DK regime encountered hard labour, and physical torture. In this 
time, the rule of KR militias was totalitarian. The invasion by the Vietnamese army in 
early 1979 and subsequent formation of the PRK regime and the paramilitary armed 
force, the KPRAF, further militarised Khmer masculinities. Many of the survivors of 
the DK regime joined the armed forces of the PRK regime. The members of KPRAF 
and KR militias fought against each other, particularly in the provinces on the frontier
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with Thailand. This again brought Cambodian men into violent confrontation with 
each other.
The violent confrontation between KPRAF members and KR militias 
continued until 1993 when the country held its first democratic election under the 
supervision of the United Nations. After more than twenty years of violence, 
Cambodia once again moved towards peace and political stability.
12.3 War, organised violence and masculinities in conflict situations
The life histories of the men in this study show how they organised their 
masculinities in a conflict situation, and how the organisation of masculinities was 
shaped by the organised violence.
The recruitment of Rathanak, Sophoan, Chandareth and Chan to the KR was 
motivated by socialist propaganda of class-politics, and personal loyalty to Prince 
Sihanouk. Sophoan and Chandareth affiliated themselves with the Khmer Rouge as 
activists, years before the revolution. Therefore, the militancy of Sophoan and 
Chandareth during war time was shaped by their political orthodoxy. Rathanak and 
Chan actually joined the Maki (Sihanouk's rebel group) in a bid to restore Sihanouk to 
power. But later when Maki was absorbed by the KR, they became KR militiamen.
Sophoan, Chandareth and Chan joined the KR in the early 1970s when they 
were 21, 24 and 17 years old respectively. Rathanak's entry to the revolution at a 
comparatively young age suggests that he may have been blindly influenced by 
socialist class politics. Rathanak joined the Maki group in early 1975 at the age of 
fifteen. He fought against Lon Nol’s army first and then against the Vietnamese army. 
He carried a gun and suffered a serious leg injury during the fight against the 
Vietnamese army. His wound sent him to the regime's rehabilitation centre. After
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partial recovery from his injury he worked in the logistic section, but was forced to 
escape to the forest when his group was finally defeated by the Vietnamese army.
Sophoan joined the KR in 1970 at the age of 21. He took up arms against Lon 
Nol’s regime long before the regime was ousted. After the fall of the Lon Nol regime 
in 1975, Sophoan was expelled from the regular armed forces by the KR leadership, 
and transferred to the transport section. He did not talk about the reason for his 
expulsion. He drove an armed truck from 1975 to 1979 but had to hide in the forest 
after the fall of the KR. He returned to his parents after staying in the forest for a few 
months.
The trajectory of Chandareth to KR militias is different from those of 
Rathanak and Sophoan. Chandareth was married and had fathered a child when he 
joined the army. He was also a monk before he joined the KR immediately after Lon 
Nol's coup. He worked in the engineering corps when he was first recruited.
Chan also joined the Maki group in 1973 at the age of seventeen as a loyal 
follower of Sihanouk. He fought against the army of Lon Nol, but later came to know 
how the Maki group was being politically black-mailed by the KR. By this time, he 
was mobilised to the commune to deal with the Khmer Sor (white Khmer, urban 
evacuees, professionals and the masses who were treated as class enemies by the KR). 
He served in the KR regime until 1979.
All these former KR militias organised masculinities with both fear and 
courage during this time of conflict. They were routinely involved in fighting. They 
feared their leaders more than they feared their opponents (Lon Nobs army, 
Vietnamese army and PRK's armed force). Though they were militia, they were under 
the strict control of their leaders. Any wrongdoing could result in execution. All of
them served as the grassroots militias, but none of them held a leadership position.
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The KR regime used terror to deal with both the mass labour force and their own 
militia. The rules of the regime were strict, and were based on the whims of individual 
leaders. The militia had to comply with the instructions and orders of their individual 
leaders. About the fear of his own leadership, Sophoan says,
When I drove a truck, I could not let the truck break down. I had to rotate 
with another man to drive the truck. They (leaders) warned me that if I 
caused the truck to break down, I would be killed. However, I always took 
care of the truck well and I did not have any problem about that.
They were fearless in dealing their political opponents such as Khmer Sor, 
Lon Nol’s army, the Vietnamese army and the PRK's armed force. Sophoan, 
Rathanak and Chan consciously avoided talking about their time with the Khmer Sor 
as the role of KR militias in the killing and torture of huge numbers of the people is 
notorious. Unlike Sophoan, Rathanak and Chan, Chandareth spoke about his 
engagement with the Khmer Sor, but he used political terms to define his engagement. 
As he says,
In 1977, I was sent to another commune to fight against the Khmer Sor 
(white Khmer) who were the class enemy of Pol Pot. I was in the mobile 
armed force of Pol Pot and moved from one place to another place.
Chandareth too did not give a detailed account of his actions against the 
Khmer Sor. However, the cruelty and gruesome treatment of masses of civilians by 
the Khmer Rouge militias are well documented in both academic and non-academic 
work. Sophoan, Rathanak and Chan spoke only about their fight against Lon Nof s 
army and the Vietnamese army.
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The militias were mobilised and moved from zone to zone in different parts of 
the country, as decided by the national leaders. The war strategies varied from region 
to region and were adapted in ways thought most appropriate to defeat the enemies.
About the construction of warfare masculinities, Rathanak says,
When we were caught in the battlefield, we had to fight seriously to win.
There was no other alternative. We fought seriously. We felt happy when 
we defeated our opponents. We always had to reorganise our strategies 
and resources to fight back against our opponents.
The recruitment of men into the KPRAF of the PRK regime was mostly 
voluntary. Their voluntary zeal was driven by the systematic exploitation and torture 
by the DK regime, and by patriotism. Many of the men said frankly that they joined 
up to take revenge against the KR regime. Sokha, who was tortured by the KR says, 
After the Pol Pot regime collapsed. I came to settle down in my village.
The new regime was recruiting men into the armed forces. I was sixteen 
years old at that time. 1 resumed my study at that time but gave up my 
study and joined the army because I wanted to take revenge on those Pol 
Pot soldiers who had beaten me and treated me badly during their regime.
I did not look for my parents because all I wanted was to be a soldier.
Vuthy, Saroeun, Souen, Ra and Som joined the army with a sense of 
obligation to protect and safeguard the country and their fellows from further 
devastation. Vuthy describes his reason for joining the army as;
I joined in army in 1986 and worked until 1992. I volunteered to be in the 
army. That was an obligation; my country needed people for its security.
Saroeun joined the KPRAF with the notion of "duty for the country' for which 
he was ready to give his ‘life to protect the country.’
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Given their voluntarism, sense of revenge and desire to protect the country, 
men who worked in the armed force of PRK organised their masculinities around 
warfare in wartime. They took every risk to defeat the opponent, perform their tasks 
of rebuilding road and infrastructure. They reorganised strategies and resources to 
fight back the enemy. They fought knowing the fact that they could be injured and die 
any time. Members of the KPRAF fought against KR militias on a regular basis. They 
fought on the frontier with Thailand and many of them witnessed casualties of their 
co-fighters and KR militias in battle.
12.4 Departure from militancy and construction of post-conflict masculinities
The careers of most men the KR militias ended with the fall of the DK regime. 
But most of the KPRAF’s paramilitary men left military life by their own choice. The 
departure from war was a timely need which they felt within a new notion of 
‘maleness' in post-war Cambodia. The new notion of maleness developed a social 
rhetoric that emphasised a man's role in family prosperity, the accumulation of wealth 
and good education for children. In this post-conflict time, they constructed peaceful 
and responsive masculinities with a focus on the family. The brief life histories of 
Rathanak Kong, Souen Kong and Saroeun Chea describe how they discursively 
constructed peaceful and responsive masculinities in the post-war period.
Rathanak Kong
Rathanak comes from a central province. He joined the KR militia at the age
of fifteen. He first fought against Lon Nol's army, then worked with the Khmer Sor at
the commune level, and then fought against the Vietnamese army. He suffered a leg
wound during a fight with the Vietnamese army. In another fight with Vietnamese, his
group was defeated and they retreated to the mountains for survival. After the escape,
Rathanak made his way to his home province. His parents arranged a wedding for him
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immediately after his return from the battle field in early 1980. The marriage was 
unsuccessful and he left his wife in 1982 returning to the paternal commune. He 
married again in 1983 in his parental commune. He currently lives with this wife and 
five children (one son and four daughters). He has one daughter from his first wife but 
does not communicate with her.
When he lived with first wife, who was a school teacher, Rathanak worked at 
farming and ran a small business. His current occupation is farming and he holds 
three hectares of land including one hectare that he bought. He can produce surplus 
rice from this land and he has bought a motorbike and owns a power tractor. He also 
owns several cattle. Both he and his current wife work on the farm. Apart from 
farming, both spouses also collect firewood from the local forest for sale.
Of their children, the first daughter completed Year 6 and currently works in a 
garment factory in Phnom Penh. The second daughter has also completed Year 6 and 
helps Rathanak on the farm. The third daughter has completed Year 10 and works as a 
secretary in the local council. The fourth child is a son who is currently in Year 11. 
The youngest child is a daughter who is in Year 6.
Though his first marriage was unsuccessful, having a family was crucial for 
Rathanak's transit to civilian life. Over time, he has turned himself into a family- 
oriented man. His focus is the family and the family’s prosperity. He has organised 
himself as a father who thinks for his children’s future. He could not provide higher 
education to his children yet. But he wishes he could. As he says,
I feel sorry for them (the children who dropped out). My wife and I have 
only a little education. I wish them (the youngest two children) to study 
higher so that they can get work in an NGO or some good places to earn 
good income to support their family.
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Souen Kong
Souen comes from an eastern province. He was seventeen when the KR began 
operating in his area. He worked in Kong Chalat in the first year of the KR regime. 
After serving one year in Kong Chalat, Souen was appointed as a teacher in the 
education program of the KR with a reference from a relative of his father working in 
the ministry of DK's regime. He taught until the fall of the regime.
In 1979 when the Vietnamese Army invaded Cambodia, Souen, along with 
other family members, fled to the forest and spent seven months there but they were 
again caught by the KR solders. While Souen’s family was heading to the north­
western zone under the control of the KR, the Vietnamese army attacked the KR 
force. The Khmer Rouge was defeated in the battle and Souen's family was freed. 
Souen's family then returned to their home province.
Souen served in the PRK's paramilitary police force from 1980 to 1986. He 
married in 1984 while he was serving in the military. He fathered two children in the 
first two years of marriage. He found that his meagre income was not enough to 
support his family and decided to leave his job and engage in cross-border black- 
market trade. He had learned trading skills from his father and supplied consumer 
goods from Thailand to his home province. This was illegal but unofficially 
sanctioned. The black-market trade required special trading skills. He had to manage 
the police for easy and safe shipment of goods and the whole process of black­
marketing was risky. Law enforcement became stricter and trading became harder day 
by day. Finally, he stopped the trade in 1992 to avoid arrest.
By the end of 1992, he joined the armed force of the current regime. His 
appointment in the armed force of the new regime was a part of government’s policy
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to integrate former militias into normal life. He was posted to Phnom Penh, and 
moved there, leaving his wife and children back in the village.
Souen bought a piece of land in Phnom Penh in 1992 with money he earned 
from the cross-border trade. He has built a house on this land, and currently lives in it 
with his children. He brought his children from the rural province to Phnom Penh for 
the sake of higher education. Two of his children have already completed university 
degrees.
His job with the armed forces was changed to casual employment in 1995. He 
bought a tuk-tuk several years ago to earn extra income to support the education of his 
children. Currently, his earnings from the tuk-tuk are his main income.
Although he serves in the army on a casual basis, Souen does not reveal this 
identity to his clients. He prefers his identity as a tuk-tuk driver. This is an unusual 
sacrifice of social prestige. It shows the importance of altruistic fatherhood in his new 
life: preserving the tuk- tuk income is vital. But it means he lives a divided life, 
involved at the same time in two conflicting patterns of masculinity.
Saroeun Chea
Bom in a city family, Saroeun was brought up in three families: with his 
parents until he was ten, with his grandparents between the ages of ten and fifteen, 
and then as an adopted son with a woman for one year at the age of nineteen. 
Saroeun's father was a soldier of the Lon Nol government in Phnom Penh who died in 
a clash with communist rebels in 1973. Saroeun was living with his parents in Phnom 
Penh at the time and his mother also died in the same incident. He then joined his 
grandparents in the province.
While Saroeun was living with his grandparents, the KR revolution broke out
throughout the country. KR operations penetrated to his area in the same year. He was
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fifteen at this time. Saroeun was separated from his grandparents and sent to a 
children’s group by the regime. He performed tasks allocated to children's groups. He 
turned eighteen by the end of 1978. Then he was sent to Kong Chalat.
Saroeun was sentenced to death once while working in the children's group 
for not complying with the strict rules. He survived through the mercy of one of the 
soldiers. In early 1979, along with many others, he was taken by the KR as a prisoner 
to the north-western provinces. On the way there was a battle between the Vietnamese 
army and KR soldiers. He was caught in the cross-fire and luckily survived again.
The KR soldiers lost the fight, and the Vietnamese army took him and sent 
him to Phnom Penh. He met a woman on the way to Phnom Penh who had lost all of 
her family and she adopted him as a son. Upon his return to Phnom Penh, Saroeun 
lived with her in an abandoned house and they began life from the ruin. He collected 
materials from destroyed houses and exchanged them for rice. He lived with his 
mother for one year, then had to leave her because she married again. In the 
meantime, he joined his grandfather.
Saroeun served in the PRK's armed force from 1982 to 1986. He joined the 
armed force voluntarily. He married in May 1985 while he was in service with the 
KPRAF. Being a residential member of the armed forces, he had to live in the military 
barracks. His wife visited him in barracks on different occasions. During her visit, 
Saroeun's wife expressed emotion and serious concern for his wellbeing and safety. 
Her appealing femininity touched Saroeun's heart, and he became more and more 
dedicated to his wife.
Saroeun was not allowed by the command to take leave to visit his wife in the
rural village. His sense o f ‘duty for country’ faded when he was refused permission to
be with his wife when she delivered his first son. His family condition was also
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worsening because of lack of income. Feeling that he was doing nothing for his wife 
and newborn, Saroeun finally left KPRAF although there was a risk of arrest for 
desertion. He describes the moment of his exit from the armed forces as,
There was no-one to look after her (his wife), and her living condition 
was so bad. So, I decided to stop serving because I saw my family in 
hardship. I did not care about arrest or any other trouble which could 
happen due to stopping from job. I did lots for the country. I took my 
life to protect my country. But my family was in trouble and the 
government did not care about this. They did not support my family and 
my living condition.
He joined his family and began a new life. He migrated to Phnom Penh along 
with his family. He first worked as a labourer in a privately owned construction firm. 
Later he opened a construction firm and auto-repairing workshop (although very 
informally) on his own. He is now an entrepreneur, having acquired skills in 
construction and motor vehicle repair during his service with the KPRAF. Since then, 
he has not looked back.
Saroeun has organised himself as a family-oriented man in the post-war era, 
focused on improving his family condition. He currently lives with his family in his 
own house on the outskirts of Phnom Penh. He runs a small-scale informal 
construction firm, along with two more side occupations: repairing motor cycles and 
vegetable gardening (in the rainy season). He also builds houses for low-income 
families in the city.
His wife shares in earning the family income. She vends traditional homemade 
pies and noodles among the urban workers in the area. Unlike Souen. none of
Saroeun's children has received a university education. But he is satisfied that all of
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his adult children are economically active. The daily living of Saroeun’s family is 
moderate by national standards but peace and happiness persist in his everyday life. 
12.5 Conclusion
The former militants are not unique: either in the way they have experienced 
collective social violence (including service in the armed force) or in the way they 
have reorganised their lives within the new gender order in the post-war era. Their 
cases represent numerous Cambodians of their generation.
The life histories of these men suggest that the making of a particular pattern 
of masculinity is situational and related to specific historical events. Class politics of 
the KR regime, which was effectively conceptualised in ‘Khmer Sor', powerfully 
transformed young peasants into militants. Construction of masculinities around 
militancy became prominent among the peasants who were recruited to demolish the 
hierarchal Cambodian society into a peasant one. Chandareth says, ‘Most people 
joined in Pol Pot’s political group.’
The entry and exit of the KPRAF paramilitary men from the armed service 
were responsive to the socio-political expectation of maleness configured in two 
different situations: one at the time when a new regime emerged as the saviour for the 
surviving population, and another in the post-war era when the recovery was moving 
forward. They joined the KPRAF within the discourse that men should stand and 
salvage the country from the KR.
Over time, the country gradually moved to political stability. Peace was
restored and the main faction of the KR (led by Pol Pot) was totally eliminated. The
economy began to recover. This was the time when the country began reconstruction
with the support of the international community. New jobs and businesses were
emerging in association with the reconstruction. Some families were able to make use
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of the new opportunities to uplift their family conditions and standard of living. They 
accumulated wealth either by being directly involved in the reconstruction projects 
through government and international agencies, or by running related businesses.
A new gender order emerged in the wake of the country's social, political and 
economic progress in the period of reconstruction, which measured masculinity by a 
man’s success in making his family prosperous and educated. The new gender order 
emphasised men’s success in family prosperity, accumulation of wealth and providing 
good/higher education to children. Men of the families who were prospering received 
social respect and honour. Men of this category whom 1 call ‘Men of Success' gained 
hegemony in the construction of masculinity in post-war Cambodia. Now the former 
militants and armed men who were in a kind of ‘political militancy' found that their 
militant masculinity was obsolete in the changed situation. Their involvement in 
militancy could not even enable them to provide basic necessities for their families. 
As a result their zeal to ‘protect the country' faded. Vuthy, who joined the KPRAF 
feeling an innate obligation to protect the country left the service when he found it 
difficult to maintain his family along with his service in the armed force. He says,
It was difficult for me to maintain family and job together. Finally, I 
stopped working in the army.
‘Men of Success' became discursively idealised in Cambodian society. The 
gender role of Cambodian men of providing the main income for the family caused 
ordinary men and the ‘Men of Success’ to be compared in terms of their roles in 
providing for their families. Family members, particularly wives, played an important 
role in actualising the social discourse among these former soldiers. Souv (Case 6) 
says how his wife conveyed the discourse to him. He says,
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She [wife] always complained and compared us to other couples who were 
our contemporaries. She asked why living conditions of others were better 
than ours. My wife was a woman and she needed to look after her children 
and the family [so her complaints and comparisons were justified].
The discourse brought Cambodian men into a situation where the gender role 
of providing the main income for the family by the ‘successful men' was set as a 
standard for the ‘ordinary' men. It can be argued that ‘Men of Success’ is an ideal that 
puts married and family men in the hegemonic position.
Like Fernando in Xaba's (2001) study, many of the former militants in this 
study had few marketable skills. But unlike Fernando, none of them took the violent 
path in the post-war era. Rather, they made the best use of their ability to resemble, at 
least partially, ‘Men of Success’, the hegemonic masculinity of post-war Cambodia. 
All made their best efforts to earn money. They engaged themselves in low-esteem, 
laborious and dangerous occupations in order to find a place as a man in the new 
gender order. Eventually, many of them made themselves ‘Men of Success.’
Souv, Souen and Sareoun have their own houses in the capital city, and have 
upgraded their occupations, becoming small-scale entrepreneurs. Souv and Souen 
have provided university education to their children. They are respected at least 
among the men of their own social class.
Other former militias and armed men who currently live in rural settings could 
not provide higher education to their children as Souv, Souen and Sareoun have. But 
they have improved their family’s living conditions over the period. They have 
increased their land holdings and other assets that they can pass to their children in the 
future.
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CHAPTER 13
CONCLUSION
13.1 Khmer masculinities: historicity, divergence and phenomenal 
characteristics
Khmer masculinities have been constructed and reconstructed over time. 
Colonial rule from 1863 to 1954, civil war and militarisation from the early 1970s to 
the early 1990s, and the market economy adopted in recent decades have all 
reconstructed Khmer masculinities of the pre-colonial era.
13.1.1 Khmer masculinities in the pre-colonial era
Khmer masculinities in the pre-colonial era were organised within a matrilocal 
support system. A man in peasant society had to pass an apprentice probationary 
period by living with the family of the prospective bride before being married. He 
worked on the farms of his in-laws, built his house, and performed other necessary 
tasks during this period. He had to prove his competency to the parents of the bride in 
order to complete the probation period successfully. After marriage, he made his 
living on lands owned by his wife, which she inherited from her parents. Both spouses 
worked on the land.
A man who provided the main support for the family was seen as being head 
of the family. Given the matrilocal support system of making a family, and women's
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economic role in the family, men's headship of the family was symbolic, rather than 
practical. Intra-family gender roles and relations were reciprocal. The Khmer 
masculinities in relation to the family in the pre-colonial era were not organised 
around direct power.
In pre-colonial times, a man in a polygamous marriage (which was mainly 
practised by some of the elites -  mandarins and royal families), needed the permission 
of his first wife (Prapon Thom) before he could have a second wife. The condition of 
permission of the first wife to have a second wife suggests that even the elite 
masculinities at that time were subject to women to some extent. The first wife could 
seek a divorce if her husband took another wife without her consent.
The need for the consent of the first wife for a man to have a second wife also 
suggests that men's sexual practices, particularly sexual promiscuity, were under the 
control of his wife. Men in polygamous marriages needed to compromise with their 
first wives. In some cases they needed to accept her authority, particularly when 
ambiguities arose in relationship with the other wives. T he first wife in a polygamous 
marriage could enjoy more power than her husband in intra-family gender relations. 
13.1.2 Khmer masculinities in colonial Cambodia
The gender regimes of the French colonial administration promoted patriarchy 
in Cambodian families by (i) promoting men as the functional head of the family, (ii) 
assigning men as the sole breadwinners, and (iii) limiting women’s entitlement to deal 
in public and legal affairs.
The colonial administration adopted Codes Cambodgiens 1898 and Code Civil
Cambodgien 1920 which delineated codes of conduct for local men and women.
Codes Cambodgiens 1898 which preserved some of the pre-colonial gender order
treated men as the symbolic head of the family. The relations between a husband and
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a wife were reciprocal. The Code Civil Cambodgien 1920 promoted men as the 
functional head of the family. Men became the ultimate and only authority within the 
family. Article 194 was particularly vital in this regard as it made men the guardians 
of their wives in all matters. Article 198 also contributed to promoting men as 
functional heads of the family. It said any act by a woman without the authorisation of 
her husband was voidable. In effect the legal provisions of the Code Civil 
Cambodgien 1920, placed women in Cambodian families under the control of their 
husbands.
Apart from being established as the functional heads of their families, men 
also were defined as the sole breadwinners for their families under the Code Civil 
Cambodgien 1920. Articles 193 and 197 were particularly important for establishing 
men as the sole breadwinners. Article 193 said that men should provide necessary 
support to their wives and families. Article 197 brought women’s economic or 
business activities under the control of their husbands. If a woman wanted to run a 
business or carry out any economic activity she had to obtain the consent of her 
husband.
A number of Articles (195, 196, 198 and 200) of the Code Civil Cambodgien 
1920 affected women's rights in dealing with public and legal matters. Women's 
entitlement or authority in public affairs was brought under the control of their 
husbands. This was certainly disempowering for women and empowering for men. 
Article 195 said a woman could sue, or engage in public activities, only with the 
permission of her husband. Article 200 said that a woman, even a business woman, 
could not sue any case without authorisation from her husband.
The legal provisions of the Codes Cambodgiens 1898 and Code Civil
Cambodgien 1920 promoted patriarchy in Cambodian families. The family structure
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and relationships were re-organised within the patriarchal gender order where a man 
believed that he was the head of the family with a responsibility to provide necessary 
support to the family. As head of the family, he also held the notion that he was 
privileged over the family members, particularly the wives. He held command and 
authority over the family. Article 189 of Code Civil Cambodgien 1920 which made 
women submissive and obedient to their husbands further exacerbated patriarchy in 
the family relationships. Thus, the family relationships in the colonial Cambodian 
society acquired a patriarchal, hierarchical and gendered order.
Within the patriarchal, hierarchal and gendered family relationships, 
Cambodian men have been organising masculinities within the notion that: (i) they are 
the head of the family, (ii) they are responsible for providing the main support for the 
family, and (iii) they hold command and authority over the family members, 
particularly the wives.
13.1.3 Khmer masculinities in war-time
Cambodia experienced political conflict, increased militarisation and civil war 
during the regimes of Lon Nol, the DK and PRK, from the early 1970s to early 1990s. 
Some 600,000 to 700,000 Cambodians died from American bombing between 1969 
and 1973 when Cambodia was caught up in the Second Indo-China war. At least 
another 1.5 million Cambodians died during the DK regime. The installation of the 
PRK regime by the Vietnamese army and formation of KPRAF armed force brought 
Khmer masculinities into confrontation and face-to-face war. The KR militias and 
KPRAF armed forces fought until the early 1990s. All these violent events were 
gendered: men carried out the killing, and they were also overwhelmingly the victims 
of the violence.
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A total of fourteen men in this study were actively involved in the KR 
militias (four) and KPRAF armed force (nine). They organised masculinities with 
both fear and courage during war. They often fought against their opponents face-to- 
face and many of them sustained serious injuries and witnessed casualties among their 
comrades.
The entry and exit of the former militias and paramilitary from the militancy 
were responsive to the socio-political expectation of maleness configured in two 
different situations: first at the time when each new regime emerged with a specific 
political rhetoric and later in the post-war era when the recovery was moving forward. 
Class politics of the KR regime, which were powerfully conceptualised in ‘Khmer 
Sor’ (‘Class Enemy’), effectively influenced young peasants to join the revolution for 
a peasant society. In the same way, men who joined the KPRAF paramilitary force 
were influenced by the discourse that men should stand and salvage the country from 
the KR.
The ending of the war and cessation of hostilities by the former KR militias 
and KPRAF members also created a timely response within a new notion of 
‘maleness' in post-war Cambodia. The new notion of maleness developed a social 
rhetoric that emphasised a man's role in family prosperity, the accumulation of wealth 
and education for children. In this post-conflict time, they constructed peaceful and 
responsive masculinities with a focus on the family, as shown in the life histories of 
the former militias and armed men discussed in Chapter 12. Unlike former militias in 
other contexts, none of the former militias in Cambodia took a violent path in the 
post-war period. Rather, they made the best use of their ability to resemble, at least 
partially, the hegemonic masculinity appropriate to the time.
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13.1.4 Khmer masculinities in contemporary time
The contemporary Cambodian society is characterised by political stability, 
steadily increasing social development, the country’s increasing connection to global 
society (globalisation), and a changing labour market (in particular, féminisation of 
labour and the growth of the business sector). We see a dynamic shift of Khmer 
masculinities in the changing socio-economic situation in contemporary times.
The life histories of the Cambodian men in the four groups discussed in 
Chapters 6-9 show that the construction of masculinities by Cambodian men across 
different occupations is diverse and shifting. A man's construction of a specific 
pattern of masculinity adapts to the changing socio-economic context. Despite 
divergence and change, the patriarchal gender order erected during French colonial 
rule remains central to the construction of Khmer masculinities half a century later. 
The notion of men as the head of the family is the default construction of 
masculinities in relation to families by contemporary Cambodian men. Yet the gender 
role of providing the main support to the family, another element of the patriarchal 
gender order erected during the colonial rule, is flexible.
Plurality of contemporary Khmer masculinities
Khmer masculinities in contemporary society show several patterns, 
particularly across different occupations. Most of the men in this study constructed 
their early masculinities in a peasant setting -  characterised by working on the family 
farm at young age for subsistence. Some were involved in proxy fathering, and 
brought up families of the joint breadwinner model. They have reconfigured their 
contemporary masculinities in accordance with their current social classes -  
managers, urban workers or peasants. It seems that their current occupations.
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especially the gender order in the workplace, and how the work is done, significantly 
affect the way men configure their contemporary masculinities.
The mid-career public sector managers who work in a bureaucratic system 
with a rigid hierarchy, where a manager’s performance is measured by senior 
management based on periodic reporting, commonly spend the bulk of their time on 
reporting, meetings, and paper work. As one’s performance does not really affect 
one's promotion, personal relations with the manager are really important for the 
subordinates. The same considerations also affect the relationships between the 
managers and their senior management in the Ministry. Patronage of a senior member 
of staff in the Ministry is very important in achieving a promotion for a manager. 
Therefore, the managers generally are submissive to the senior staff in the Ministry in 
both official and personal relationships. Sopheak, a medical doctor, is the exception; 
he maintains a straight-forward relationship with his senior officials, and was 
unsuccessful in gaining promotion.
Unlike their hierarchal managerial masculine practices in the occupations, 
most of the public sector managers generally maintain some sort of complicity in their 
family relationships by allowing and supporting their wives’ outside paid work, and 
letting their wives make decisions in family issues. Though they consider themselves 
the head of the family -  a kind of default perception - the managers do negotiate with 
their working wives on everyday family matters. Public sector managers' complicity 
with their wives in family relationships is mediated by their awareness on gender 
issues gained from gender equality practice in workplaces, and recognition of their 
wives' contribution to family’s economy.
Unlike public sector managers, the private sector managers, who work in a
fishbowl with an exact target to achieve, spend most of their time with their
304
subordinates in what they typically describe as ‘mentoring' or ‘coaching' them to 
make them ‘better managers’. Using this management jargon, the private sector 
managers apparently identify themselves as people-oriented. But their supervision of 
subordinates to teach them better management skills does not take place in a vacuum 
of power and authority. The power is made apparent to the subordinates as the 
managers appear to them as problem solvers. The public sector managers exercise 
power through a standard bureaucratic system, whereas the private sector managers 
actualise power by solving the problems of their subordinates.
The construction of managerial masculinities by business entrepreneurs like 
Bunthi and Sophea is significantly different from public and private sector managers. 
Bunthi's management practices do not so much involve supervision of personnel. As 
his business involves local entrepreneurs and foreigners, he spends the bulk of his 
time for business networking with local entrepreneurs in the provinces, and foreign 
delegates in Phnom Penh. His work involves many field trips.
Sophea, the owner of a local real estate company, is hostile to his employees 
to ensure that they do not cheat on the commissions from buyers and sellers of 
property -  the source of his company's income. The approaches such as ‘mentoring' 
or ‘coaching’ are ineffective in managing his employees. He uses a totally different 
approach -  a quasi-religious procedure, in which his employees take an oath every 
morning in front of Buddha's statue, swearing that they will not take any commission 
for their own benefit from the clients.
The private sector manager Liang, and business entrepreneurs Bunthi and
Sophea, maintain their family relationships with patriarchal power and authority,
similar to the power relationships in their occupations. As their jobs require very long
working hours, these managers withdrew their wives from paid work to be full-time
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housewives. Unlike public sector managers, the private sector manager and business 
entrepreneurs reconstructed patriarchy in the family by maximising their power and 
authority in the family, not maximising income. They maintain their power and 
authority over the family at some cost to their hard work in their occupations.
Other private sector managers, particularly Chhrem and Prom, maintain family 
relationships more like those of the public sector managers. They allow and support 
their wives’ outside paid work. Chhrem*s complicity and support for his wife in the 
family are mainly drawn on his self-awareness of gender equality. This was first 
raised through his first job and the gender equality practices in his current workplace. 
Prom's complicity to his wife is implicated by the changing labour market where he 
finds his competency less marketable.
The peasants’ resources are land, labour and natural resources (rainwater, 
forest resources, fisheries, etc.). Farming in Cambodia is mainly marginal, 
subsistence, manual and seasonal (in the rainy season). All family members, including 
children, participate in farming activities. Gender practices over two eras of the 
country’s history affect peasant masculinities in Cambodia. One is the matrilocal 
marriage of the pre-colonial era. The other is the concept of men as family providers, 
a gendered practice installed by the French colonial administration.
Almost all peasants in this study followed matrilocal marriage. They began 
their working life on their wives’ land. The peasant usually learns farming skills from 
their parents at a young age. Many of the peasants in this study learned this skill from 
their mothers. Given the matrilocal basis, women have an important role in the 
construction of peasant masculinities. Matrilocal practice, the use of the wife's land to 
begin a peasant’s working life, and women's participation in the farm labour force,
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gave women a substantial stake in the practices of peasant masculinities. Even the 
Khmer term Kasikon (farmers) generally means both men and women.
Peasant masculinities are organised around providing for their families. So, 
land and natural resources are very important in organising peasant masculinities. 
Loss of land as we see in the case of Chantu, or low rainfall as we see in the case of 
Vuthy, can make life precarious for the peasants, particularly for those who lack any 
formal skill to switch to another sector. The peasants generally exploit natural 
resources such as fish, firewood, snails, mushrooms and rattans from the forest in the 
off-season. In recent times, we see a new practice with the growth of the urban sector 
-  temporary migration to a city by peasants to earn extra income during the off-rice 
farm season. Thus a substantial number of peasants nowadays assimilate temporary 
urban working life in peasant masculinities.
Peasants' relationships to their wives are reciprocal. The wives of peasants 
enjoy more freedom in intra-family gender relations compared to the wives of men 
from other sectors. Matrilocal marriage, involving peasant masculinities with a wife's 
land, and women's significant participation in the family’s labour force, give the 
wives of peasants more freedom in intra-family gender relations. The case of Syheap, 
who withdrew his wife from her business, is unusual. Syheap, who is an educated and 
skilled farmer, constructs a quasi-business masculinity.
The construction of masculinities by the former perpetrators of DV is the same
as that of other peasants, as they come from a peasant background. We do, however,
see shifting patterns of masculinity in intra-family relationships in the course of their
lives. The former perpetrators of DV constructed masculinities in the pre-violent
period in the same way as a peasant does. During the violent period, they maintained
control of their families through terror and only playing a minimal familial role. They
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organised their lives around excessive drinking, peer affairs and personal leisure. But 
in the post-transformation period, they have reconfigured their masculinities by 
enhancing their economic role for the family and minimising the expenses and time 
spent on personal pleasure. In the post-transformation period, they maintain their 
families with peace and prosperity, but not necessarily in a non-patriarchal manner.
The urban workers who originally come from a peasant background organise 
masculinities around a specific pattern of gender role expectation. Under the gender 
role, they are expected to earn an income, the same as men who are better-off and 
have improved their family's economic status. This expectation is generally conveyed 
by family members and social rhetoric. Many of the urban workers, particularly those 
from the older age group, successfully achieve this gender role expectation.
Urban masculinities are organised around hard work and long working hours 
in various informal and formal sectors. Most of them are unskilled to semi-skilled and 
build partnerships with their wives in the economic development of the family. Their 
wives, whether they live together with their husbands in Phnom Penh, or live alone in 
the rural provinces, contribute to the family's economy by doing outside paid work or 
subsistence family farming.
By moving to the city, urban workers attempt to achieve their gender role 
expectations but they also suffer problems with their spousal relationships as a result 
of their migration to the city. Adaptation to an urban working environment and 
becoming accustomed to the popular urban male culture are central to many troubled 
marital relationships.
13.2 Men and domestic violence: Reflection on theoretical debates
All the former perpetrators of DV in this study perpetrated violence against
their wives within the notion that men are the heads of their families, and should have
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more power over the family. Men’s such notions attribute patriarchy. At this point, the 
research findings agree with the arguments of Pizzey (1979), Dobash and Dobash 
(1992), Bettman (2009) and Harcourt (2009) who see patriarchy as the context for 
men’s violence against their intimate partners, and Walker et al. (2008) who link 
men’s violence against their partners to the ways men construct gender norms on roles 
and relationships. The study also partially agrees with Heise (1998), Jewkes (2002) 
and Walker et al. (2008) who suggest that delinquent peer relationship and alcoholism 
can cause men's violence.
But the critical look to the onset of violence by these former perpetrators
suggests that though patriarchy serves as the background. Similarly, delinquent peer
relations and alcoholism exacerbate violence, not serve as the primary factors of
violence. Violence against their wives by the former perpetrators of DV takes place
within the dynamics of gender role for the family. Men’s violence against their wives
occurs within the issue of men's role of providing the main support to the family -  a
specific pattern of gender practice installed by the French colony, which has become
part of masculinity by the Cambodian men. As discussed in Chapter 4, the civil codes
also placed Cambodian men as the functional head of the family by giving them
absolute power over the family. Men’s notion of patriarchy which serves as the
background of their violence against their wives is constructed within the logic of
men’s role of providing the main support for the family. Cambodian men are
expected, both by men and women to organise them as the main provider for the
family. Men's life experience, either serving as proxy fathers at a young age, or
participating in the family’s labour force from childhood, or seeing their fathers as the
role model, all reinforce the logic. As long as they can perform the gender role of
providing the family well, it is less likely that their patriarchal notion turns to
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violence. In other way, we can argue that men's patriarchal notion turns to violence 
when they fail to perform their gender role well. At this point, men’s violence against 
their wives has connection to their construction of masculinity. In this consideration, 
the research findings support the structural theorists (Messerschmidt, 1993; West and 
Fenstermaker, 1995; Segal, 2007; Connell, 2005 and 2009) who see men's violence is 
a way to construct masculinity in the context of overall gender hierarchies in the 
society.
We see a paradigm shift in the way the former perpetrators of DV maintain 
patriarchy in the family in post-transformation period. They enhance their role of 
providing for the family by multiplying their income. They maintain family with 
peace and harmony. The post-transformation construction of masculinity by the 
former perpetrators of DV further supports the integrated structural theories that 
men's violence mainly takes place within their social construction of masculinity.
The organisation of peaceful family life by the former perpetrators of DV in 
post-transformation era also nullifies Pizzey’s concept of ‘violence goes on from 
generation to generation.’ The life histories of the former perpetrators of DV suggest 
that a certain practice such as violence is not imprinted. Rather it is situational and can 
be changed.
The onset of men's violence against their wives also suggests that the violence
does not take place in a vacuum and without counter-action and reaction. An active
process is involved in the construction of men’s violence where wives are involved.
The action and reaction are associated with gender specific roles by men and women.
Interestingly, all the former perpetrators of DV in this study hold the notion that their
wives were also responsible for the instigation of violence though they openly
recognise themselves as the perpetrators. They even said that their transformation
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partially resulted because of the changing behaviour of their wives. It is noteworthy 
that the anti-VAW programme they participated in included their wives in the 
programme activities.
Such notions of the former perpetrators of DV are, however, affected by the 
complexity of gender division of labour -  where women are responsible for making 
the family and men are responsible for providing for the family. Within their given 
responsibility which is socially driven the wives of the former perpetrators needed 
their husbands to work harder in order to meet the needs of the family.
In a nutshell, it can be argued that though patriarchy, power relations and 
gender role for the family are all involved in DV, gender specific roles for men and 
women within the family are the trigger for men's violence against their wives.
13.3 Recommendations for anti-DV programmes
Anti-DV programmes can be preventive and protective. The preventive 
programmes should be designed for the long-term as they are intended to transform 
men’s gender norms -which have been constructed historically over a long period of 
time. On the other hand, the protective programme should focus more on legal aspects 
that give protection to the potential victims of violence. The following 
recommendations, which arise from the broad investigation of Cambodian 
masculinities in this thesis, have policy and programme implications. These 
recommendations are not based on formal evaluation of any programme on domestic 
violence.
13.3.1 Recommendations for DV prevention programmes
(i) DV prevention programmes should include men and boys as the primary target
groups in programme activities. The programme should first and foremost
sensitise gender equality issues as the attitude of DV is constructed within
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gender inequality practices. The DV prevention programme should educate 
men and boys towards just and egalitarian roles and relationships in the 
family.
(ii) Men should be educated about the dynamics of conjugal life and daily living. 
They need greater awareness and education that their power over the family 
can come under scrutiny and can be ignored when their wives are burdened 
with both productive and reproductive jobs, or when the income loss in the 
family is sudden despite their efforts to support the family through added 
economic production.
(iii) DV prevention programmes need to take account of the historically-produced 
gender dynamics of DV in Cambodia. It is less likely that these programmes 
will work unless the target groups (men and women) understand and are 
knowledgeable about the historical perspectives of gender role and 
relationships in the family.
(iv) Men need preparedness about the changes in gender role and relationships in 
the family. As we see in the case of Vuthy, when men's wives achieve paid 
work in the changing labour market, which is non-traditional for them, men 
should be ready to accept the new work environment without reservation. 
They should be informed about the culture, practice and gender regime of their 
wives’ work. Existing programmes on gender and/or DV should take this issue 
into account.
(v) As we see in the life histories of former militants and paramilitary men, they 
have constructed peaceful and responsive masculinities in post-conflict period. 
Their transformation largely took place within the social rhetoric of
‘Successful Men’. A similar discourse on men that promotes non-violent and
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gender-responsive men as the ideal social model can be useful to educate men 
in general towards acceptance of non-violence against women. Mass media, 
the education system and government and non-government agencies can be 
used to create the necessary social discourse.
(vi) We see most men, particularly those in the younger age group, are very much 
focused on their children. Many men, despite their problematic relations with 
their wives, are still very concerned for their children. A social discourse on 
fatherhood can be promoted that focuses on the importance of non-violent 
family relationships for the development and wellbeing of children. By 
following the new culture of fatherhood, men will maintain a non-violent 
family relationship. Again, the media and government and other agencies can 
play important roles in promoting the discourse of fatherhood.
13.3.2 Recommendations for protection programmes
(i) As was found in all the cases of former perpetrators of DV. the enforcement of 
the anti-DV law, particularly through community-based action, has 
significantly helped the perpetrators to cease their violence. Similar 
programmes that engage men and women in programme activities can be 
replicated and expanded in new areas.
(ii) As found among a majority of the former perpetrators of DV and some 
farmers such as Chantu and Vuthy, men's violence resulted from their 
shrinking economic role in the family. It seems that these men would be less 
likely to perpetrate violence against the family if they could support their 
family consistently. Chantu, a farmer, said that his family is currently going 
through a quasi-violent situation. He is antagonistic to violence and protected
his mother from his father's perennial violence. The quasi-violence that
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Chantu is currently experiencing is mainly because he cannot feed his family 
as he did in the past as his land has been acquired for a large industrial project. 
Any development project that takes place at the cost of people’s livelihood 
should guarantee an income safeguard for the affected families. In cases like 
this, as the company wants to produce the crop to maximise profit, a policy 
could be adopted under which the farmers could grow crops and supply the 
factory instead of having their land forcibly acquired. Policies like this could 
improve the economic condition of farmers like Chantu , and would not create 
any family conflict.
(iii) Phyrum, the public sector manager who has field-level work experience on the 
issues of gender and violence, suggested that provision of agricultural 
education and information for farmers would address the problem of DV. He 
links men's violence to their gender role of providing the main family income. 
Men are more likely to fall back on DV when their support for the family is 
not enough or is not need-based. Phyrum’s experience also matches with the 
life histories of the former perpetrators of DV in this study. The DV or VAW 
issues should, therefore, be integrated in the overall social development 
programmes of the Royal Government of Cambodia or other agencies. The 
social development programmes that address poverty should take gender role 
into account.
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(1) What is the study about? mm JfJnjlHMH?
The study aims to explore the link between masculinities and men’s violence in 
domestic sphere in changing social, political and economic context.
n t is t i t im fm m t im it f i f jm m a s  rutin  stumtpm I t it ru d n u i
c *  <3 U v j  «=* <t j  n  n  '  p j1 I u
(2) Who is carrying out the study? tnHnanitilHnr3np[faii|^li?
The study is being conducted by Md. Mozammel Haque, PhD Candidate, and will 
form the basis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at The University of Sydney 
under the supervision of Raewyn Connell, Professor.
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The study will follow in-depth interviews of individual men of different social, 
economic and professional backgrounds. The interviews will be carried out in public 
places such as offices, meeting rooms, cafes and commune council premises. The 
interviews will be recorded in audio form which will be transcribed and analyzed later.
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Each interview will take an hour on average.
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consent and - if you do consent - you can withdraw at any time without affecting your 
relationship with the University of Sydney.
You may stop the interview at any time if you do not wish to continue, the audio 
recording will be erased and the information provided will not be included in the 
study.
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All aspects of the study, including results, will be strictly confidential and only the 
researchers will have access to information on participants. A  report of the study will 
be submitted for publication, but anonymity of individual participants will be 
maintained in the report.
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(7) W ill the study benefit me?tnfTlif3nj1Stt^njtiriip itJm fJsHgS6Sfu|?
The study will benefit Cambodian people as a whole in terms of helping to address 
the issue of domestic violence. The study results will be disseminated among 
government and non-government agencies at the end. This will enable the line 
agencies to design more appropriate plan, policy and program on domestic violence.
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When you have read this information, Md. Mozammel Haque will discuss it with you 
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61 420332478.
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contact the Deputy Manager, Human Ethics Administration, University of Sydney on 
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hum an.ethics@usvd.edu.au (Email)._____________ ___________________________________
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my participation in the research project
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TITLE: Men, Masculinities and Domestic Violence in a Developing Society:
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1. The procedures required for the project and the time involved have been 
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answered to my satisfaction.
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I have read the Participant Information Statement and have been given the 
opportunity to discuss the information and my involvement in the project with 
the researcher/s.
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329
3 .
n î î^ s i la t r i î î î fU îH îü f t iS f î i i f i tn î i t î i t îU îH m f tT i f î îJ i iU u i  ui <=« U L> *1
I understand that I can withdraw from the study at any time, without affecting 
my relationship with the researcher(s) or the University of Sydney now or in the 
future.
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4. I understand that my involvement is strictly confidential and no information 
about me will be used in any way that reveals my identity.
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5. I understand that being in this study is completely voluntary -  I am not under 
any obligation to consent.
s t k t f i  n t i r r i î tn ü tS t în i î iü n n ts s ^ tJ i îm fa r i iü n ^ iJ î fa îJ i—■» O (J I j n  |
| § s S n ts i i ] r n H
m îü S n ü â tS tf î rn c iîn m îc Î1 i3 ts in 9 is © t/J u u u
6. I understand that I can stop the interview at any time if I do not wish to 
continue, the audio recording will be erased and the information provided will 
not be included in the study.
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